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Care Beyond Justice is a dissertation based on ethnographic fieldwork at three 
metropolitan drug treatment courts in the United States. Drug treatment courts are specialized 
courts within the criminal justice system that offer eligible defendants a chance at treatment 
instead of incarceration. Unlike previous studies of drug courts, I approach drug court 
practitioners as care workers. Yet because drug courts exist within the criminal justice system, 
these care workers temper the principles and priorities of criminal justice (fairness, equality, rule 
of law, objectivity, impartiality, and penality) with a practice of care, which tends to require 
local, situated assessments of need as well as access. These are often competing ethical 
responsibilities. I illustrate this conflict in multiple ways. I situate drug courts within a history of 
drug policy that is conflicted by related questions about whether to treat or punish addicts and 
addiction, a decision that has historically skewed along racial and class divisions.  
Drug courts change the justice system model in many ways in the interest of being 
therapeutic.  Instead of maintaining the oppositional adversarial model of a trial, they take a 
teamwork approach to the coordination of defendants’ treatment. They apply “maximum 
flexibility” with regard to evidentiary standards instead of the strict procedural rules of trial 
courts. They prize “communication” with their partnering drug treatment agencies from the 
private sector. However, some competing ethics of justice – like individual responsibility, 
penality, and objective standards – feature prominently in drug court practice, degrading the 
provision of responsive and ethical care. Compliance is a concept that too often holds the 
subjects of care wholly responsible for following a treatment plan, when the goals of care would 
be better served by shared responsibility to tweak and tinker treatment to the always changing 
rhythms of life. Collaborative and communicative efforts to provide the best care are not helped 
by the threat of imminent punishment against the subjects of care.  
Many legal practitioners have worried that drug courts compromise principles of justice. 
Indeed, they may. But I argue that they represent an opportunity to carve out a space within the 
justice system that prioritizes care over the demands of objective justice. Thus, Care Beyond 
Justice is an aspirational title. Instead of staging tests of defendants’ compliance and 
commitment to treatment, prioritizing care would mean collaborating in the interest of multiple 
definitions of success and recovery, allowing more defendants to graduate and enjoy the benefits 
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It was March 2015. Midpoint in my fieldwork, I sat on one of the oak benches in the 
gallery of a felony drug treatment court. Defendants trickled in after providing urine samples and 
seeing their case managers in the court’s treatment center within the first hour after court was 
called to session. Arriving conspicuously late in the morning, a defendant sat down near me and 
leaned over a book. According to the online database that the criminal court system publicizes 
detailed information about most defendants, which I routinely checked while typing up my notes 
in the evenings, he was ten months into his drug court mandate, which began with his guilty plea 
to the felony of criminal possession of heroin with intent to sell. When the tardy defendant was 
called, he rose and crossed the bar to stand next to his court-appointed attorney, Faye, who had a 
summery, almost serene, demeanor, and looked to be about twenty years younger than her sixty-
some years.1  As always, I scribbled furiously, trying to keep up with the quick pace of discourse 
among all the drug court practitioners and defendants. But this day was a little different.  
Summarizing his progress based on a report from his treatment program, Faye told the 
judge that her client had perfect attendance and was testing negative. The defendant volunteered, 
“I’m sorry I’m late today. I’ve been working a lot.” The judge responded, “As long as you’re 
here!” Earlier, when Faye told Judge Samuels that another client’s treatment program was 
reporting “inconsistent attendance,” Judge Samuels told the woman, “Sounds like there’s a lot to 
balance.” He reassured her that the fact that she was testing negative was “the important part.”  
But these interactions between easygoing Judge Samuels and defendants were not typical. 
Judge Samuels was filling in for Judge Lazarus, who was out that day. What drew me to drug 
                                                
1 All names of defendants and drug court practitioners are pseudonyms. 
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courts is the way they made explicit that recovery from addiction entails a constellation of 
practices, virtues, and self-discipline that seem to have nothing to do with sobriety. Judge 
Samuels did not seem to embrace this more comprehensive understanding of recovery.  
Drug treatment courts are specialized criminal courts that offer defendants, whose “non-
violent” crimes are deemed to be related to problematic drug use, the chance to plead guilty and 
undergo intensive judicial monitoring of their drug treatment for a minimum of one year in 
advance of their sentencing. If they comply and succeed in treatment, their guilty pleas are 
withdrawn and their charges generally dismissed. If they are not able to comply, often after they 
are given several “chances,” they must generally serve a minimum one year sentence in state 
prison. Graduation rates tend to hover around 50%, both in the region of my field site and 
nationally (for a national rate, see Rempel, Fox-Kralstein, Cissner et al. 2003). This rate itself 
does not tend to be a focus in much of the drug court literature, despite a general preoccupation 
with drug courts’ “effectiveness.” To me, it would seem to be quite an important figure, since 
those who fail tend to be worse off than they would have had they opted for what drug court 
proponents sometimes call “traditional” case processing (Cissner, Rempel, Franklin et al. 2013). 
To me, this figure represents an ambivalence, which I have found to be a key theme in U.S. drug 
policies, treatment courts among them. 
During my fieldwork, I approached my ethnographic research in the drug courts as a 
study in contests over contemporary meanings of individual or personal responsibility, motivated 
by the pervasiveness of “responsibility” rhetoric in political discourse and in circulating 
“neoliberal” values. I found myself in good company with a handful of anthropologists taking a 
new – or renewed – interest in the value, practice, and virtue of responsibility (e.g. Trnka and 
Trundle 2017). When I told Judge Lazarus that my project was to study how the drug court 
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distilled meanings of responsibility, she was intrigued. It really is about responsibility, she told 
me, and yet, she said, despite the fact that drug courts are more researched (specifically, 
evaluated) than other courts, no researcher had ever approached her court with a similar question.  
Questions of responsibility remain central to my analysis in several ways. The liberal 
ideal of the responsible citizen continually reappears during the interactional dynamics among 
defendants and the court practitioners who teach defendants how to enact and embody this ideal. 
In addition to sobriety, working towards becoming this responsible figure was viewed as a key to 
being a recovering addict. This was what immediately jumped out at me about drug courts, the 
example of Judge Samuels being the exception that seemed to prove the rule.  
But over time, the theme of care emerged during my fieldwork as I began to see how 
relations of care formed among defendants and court practitioners (and me, too). Care for an 
other often entails a sense of responsibility, and actions that follow from it. Drug court 
defendants are in an unusual position within the criminal justice system of receiving praise, 
applause, and hugs, but also harsh rebuke and expressions of disappointment from those who we 
expect in other courtroom to be dispassionate jurists. Drug court practitioners are in an unusual 
position within the criminal justice system of ensuring that defendants, who are said to be 
afflicted with the chronic brain disease of addiction, receive good care. Yet, in my observations, 
they also maintain a sense of their responsibilities to a concept of justice that is unique to the 
U.S. criminal justice system, which blends virtues of objectivity, equality, fairness, impartiality, 
the rule of law, and rectification (through penality). This responsibility to the ethics of the justice 
system reinforces ideas about defendants as individually responsible for every poor choice and 
bad act. In the justice system, being responsible means being punishable.  
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Justice and care each have strong ethical valences. They both resound in mostly positive 
ways. Just what care and justice look like in any given context must always be an empirical 
question. In the U.S., the concept of care is widely associated with the subjective - emotion, 
intimacy, interest, familiarity, sociality, advocacy, partiality, and culture (even though good care 
does not require personal affective attachment to the cared for [Lane 2017; Mol 2008]).  As 
Laura Nader and Andrée Sursock (1986) demonstrate, people hold different senses of justice 
across different social and cultural contexts, as well as within them. The justice of the U.S. 
criminal justice system can indeed look different from the different forms of justice that serve as 
rallying cries for social movements. The justice of the justice system of course depends on 
penality in service to a goal of rectification, or restoring the status quo. Justice of the justice 
system should be dispassionate, disinterested, impartial, detached, and objective. It is a 
particularly ethical form of not caring. The drug treatment court context demonstrates that justice 
and care can be competing ethics.  
The ideal of objectivity is a central pillar of U.S. criminal justice (Bucholtz 2009; Porter 
1995). Statues depicting “Lady Justice” represent her as blindfolded, neutrally weighing 
opposing claims for their merit until right overcomes wrong. Guided not by her own proclivities 
and biases, her own subjective way of seeing, she has a “view from nowhere,” the ultimate claim 
of objectivity. The ideal judge acts as a neutral, impartial arbiter, applying the law sine irae et 
studio (without regard to person). By mechanically following the strict procedures of the 
courtroom, such as rules that guide the introduction and uses of evidence and sentencing, she is 
supposed to protect against the intrusion of individual bias (Porter 1995). Her objectivity is an 
ethical stance showing her lack of prejudice. This form of objectivity is a particular form (and 
performance) of subjectivity, Bruno Latour (2004a) observes. Treatment court judges are 
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intimately involved in defendants’ care, working together with prosecutor and defense attorney 
and a clinical and case management staff to ensure that defendants receive appropriate care. To 
mitigate a sense of themselves as too emotionally invested, objectivity continues to feel like an 
imperative stance at times. As Kerwin Kaye Brook observed in his ethnographic study of drug 
treatment courts in New York City, judges face “the risk that [they] will lose their authority, or 
that they will become too caring” (2010, 20). Court practitioners balance the threat to justice that 
intimacy poses with various measures of objectivity.  
Objectivity has several important valences in the concept of justice that is idealized in the 
justice system. In addition to the objective stance of the jurist, and the objective application of 
rules, legal professionals also use a concept of objectivity that “evoke[s] the subjectivity of the 
‘reasonable man’” (Good 2008, S48). Instead of a natural reflection of things as they are, 
independent of human perception, this legal version of objectivity is socially determined. It is not 
a view from nowhere; it is the standpoint of the “typical,” “regular,” “normal” person.  This 
becomes of great import in the drug treatment court. Judging to what extent defendants are 
meeting the demands of compliance, where noncompliance can be met with punishment, may 
hew to ideals of justice. But it is incongruous in contemporary settings of care provision to judge 
a patient’s ability to comply with treatment by what a “regular” person can achieve, and to 
punish the patient if she fails to meet the standard. The standard of “objectively reasonable” is 
rarely explicitly invoked in treatment court. While many court practitioners did emphasize the 
importance of having and strictly following certain protocols, only defense attorney Gayle 
explicitly talked to me about how her colleagues grapple with maintaining objective standards 
for defendants. But Gayle volunteered this insight after I had already begun to detect “reasonable 
man” haunting the proceedings.  
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While anthropologist Anthony Good (2008) argues that this concept of objectivity based 
on the “reasonable man” is particular to the justice system, I suggest that in fact the linking of 
objectivity to this ideological figure makes explicit how objectivity is tied to the privilege of the 
unmarked across many contexts. The virtuous and authoritative quality of objectivity is often 
attributed only to those who already wield the most authority and power, marginalizing other and 
“Other” “subjugated knowledges” (Foucault 2003; Harrison and Harrison 1999). Linguistic 
anthropologists who study how interlocutors use language to enhance their objectivity stress that 
objectivity and neutrality maintain their privileged positions only by marginalizing and 
delegitimizing others as subjective, interested, and partial (Bucholtz 2009; see also Hill and 
Zepeda 1993). In other words, too caring. 
This again has import in drug courts with regard to evidence. Treatment courts differ 
from trial courts further in that they do not apply the strict procedural rules of evidence that are 
supposed to ensure that both parties are able to use evidence in support of their claims. Absent 
this epistemological process that strives for an objective production of a truth (as opposed to the 
production of the objective truth), defendants, to varying extents depending on how “objective” 
they may appear to be to practitioners, are at a significant disadvantage in putting forward any 
evidence that supports a narrative that counters the accepted narrative of the courtroom. 
With further regard to evidence, I suggest that as conflicting ethical goals, justice and 
care each depend on different uses of evidence. In the treatment court, justice and care might 
each be fulfilled by using the very same facts as evidence – a positive drug test, for example. But 
the different ethics of justice and care mean that the same “evidence” leads those confronting and 
interpreting it to different conclusions. In an institution of justice, evidence may imply the 
individual guilt of the defendant. The deliverer of justice may want to punish the illegal drug 
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user based on that evidence. In an institution of care, evidence may point to continuing struggle 
and affliction, and it may point to the need to “tinker” (Mol 2008) with a regimen of care. The 
provider of care may want to treat and comfort the user based on that evidence.  
The objectivity of criminal justice in the U.S. follows an ethic of equality: everyone 
should be treated “the same” under the law, without preference or prejudice. But equal treatment 
does not meet the necessities of care, where a treatment regimen must be responsive to multiple 
scales; it must be tailored to individual needs, goals, values, and strengths, and it must attend to 
differential access in an uneven landscape of structural inequality and violence (Farmer 1999).  
Importantly, justice is also a fundamental ethical principle of health care delivery and 
distribution. This sense of justice is one of the primary motivations for my own work. This 
distributive – or redistributive –  justice is not a principle of criminal justice. Insofar as both 
forms of justice share the goal of equality, their means to that end are critically different. The 
distributive principle of justice in the realm of critical public health and medical anthropology, as 
opposed to the realm of criminal justice, implies that equality as an approach is inadequate for 
the achievement of equality as an outcome in hierarchically stratified societies.  
 
Ambivalent approaches 
Ambivalence is inscribed in drug policy. The drug is the paradigm example of the 
pharmakon – both cure and poison, an opposition contained within one entity. The pharmakon, 
the basis for Derridean deconstruction, shows that the two sides of any binary may not be so 
separate after all.2 This implies undecidability, uncertainty, ambivalence. But, Rosalind Morris 
                                                
2 Taking a step further along with Jacques Derrida (1981), drug courts stage daily the ritual of the 
pharmakos; when the tension between poison and remedy cannot be resolved, a scapegoat is 
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(2007, 372) writes, “The undecidability of analysis entailed by this logic does not disable the 
capacity to decide, practically, between alternatives in everyday life, although Derrida is often 
accused of as much. Rather, it describes the encumbrance of decision, the provisionality, and 
hence the ethical burden of decision, which must be made in the absence of absolute 
determinations.” Good care entails decisions. These decisions often entail considerations of the 
ethical, whether tacitly or explicitly. The tension in the ethics of decision lie at the heart of this 
dissertation. I argue that a tension between the principles of care and justice beat in the heart of 
the ethics of decision-making in drug court. In this ambivalent, ethically burdened space of 
decision, drug court practitioners decide and act. 
Addiction implicates. It is a concept that extends into the daily lives of many, whether or 
not we are intimately tied to someone who uses or we ourselves use any of a class of what are 
considered “drugs” –a shifting and somewhat arbitrary grouping at any given moment in the 
century of legal prohibitions on drugs in the U.S. Terms like “enabler” and “codependent” pull 
family and friends into the pathological web of addiction. And when it comes to those suffering 
among us, what do we owe them, how do we help them, and what is the ethical thing to do when 
someone doesn’t want or feel they need help? What is the right thing to do when we’re not even 
sure how to help? What is the value of life, is it universal, and whose lives should be valued? 
Addiction seems to carry with it all of these moral and ethical valences and questions. 
These are questions not just of ethics, but also of governance. How should public money 
be used, to what effects are government resources put, how is the government exercising its 
“police power” to ensure public welfare – that is, both public safety, and the health and well-
                                                
selected for expulsion. She becomes both the poison to be expelled and the cure, as her expulsion 
is hoped to offer the cure to society. 
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being of the ill and the suffering (Dubber and Valverde 2006). Who is perceived as ill and 
suffering, who as criminal and predatory? These tensions get to questions “at the heart of the 
state,” as Didier Fassin argues (2015, 2), and “illustrate the multiple aspects of a notion as central 
as it is ambiguous in contemporary societies: security, a term which signifies the protection of 
persons against criminal and delinquent activities when classified as ‘public,’ or alternatively 
against the hardships and vicissitudes of life when qualified as ‘social.’” These distinctions seem 
to call out for a cleaving of the population “between dangerous categories and categories in 
danger, between those destined for repression and those who inspire compassion.” Drug courts 
both illustrate and indeed are based on the notion that the line between these distinctions “is thin 
and permeable” (ibid) yet still, they continue to draw that line.  
Addiction itself is probably more multivalent than ambivalent. Consider the scope of 
what one can be addicted to – illegal drugs, prescription medications, drug treatments like 
methadone, alcohol, cigarettes, sex, love, sugar, wheat, gambling, video games, cell phones, 
television.3 Consider the sheer range of therapeutic options. Addiction can be treated by 
psychiatric professionals, medical doctors, nutritionists, yogis, social workers, therapy dogs, 
certified substance abuse counselors, alternative healers, shamans, and peers in recovery. A short 
list of treatments includes art therapy, music therapy, buprenorphine, Ayahuasca tea, Iboga root, 
bee-keeping, acupuncture, virtual reality, and heroin itself. Treatment takes place at diverse 
locations, such as largely Medicaid-funded rehabilitation and detoxification clinics, methadone 
clinics, hospitals, spa-like rehabilitation resorts, private doctor’s or therapists’ offices, gardens, 
hotel rooms, Bwiti Healing and Initiation ceremonies in Gabon, shamanic retreats in Peru, harm 
                                                
3 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1993, 135) suggests that the growing significance of addiction as a 
lens for making meaning of consumption since the 1970s has been fueled by fear of foreignness 
and the porousness of borders in an age of increased international trade and migration. 
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reduction programs, prisons and jails, and at Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous 
meetings (which take place in all sort of spaces, including church basements, schools, hospital 
cafeterias, bookstores, Masonic temples, and Veterans of Foreign Wars halls).   
Addiction’s status as a disease has been asserted and contested in multiple ways since it 
emerged in its modern iteration. Scholars trace disciplinary battles over the ontological status of 
addiction and alcoholism since the 19th century (e.g., Hickman 2004; Valverde 1997).4  Kane 
Race (2009) observes, “Power never knows whether it wants to punish or save the drug user, 
incarcerate or treat this figure. Instead, both strategies are kept in reserve as mutually reinforcing 
alternatives” (69). Crucially, Race notes, “It is almost always the underprivileged – those marked 
by class or race – that bear the brunt of the sterner form of discipline” (ibid., 69). At the dawning 
of “modern” concerns about addiction, hysteria burgeoned around racialized depictions of the 
harmful effects of drugs on demonically drug-possessed Others and their White victims. 
 
A history of divergence 
Congress began to legislate against drugs in 1910 when considering the Foster bill, an 
early predecessor of the 1914 Harrison Act, which directed U.S. drug policy toward prohibition 
(Nolan 2001). Testimony given at legislative hearings in Congress’ earliest attempts to address 
drug consumption through law enforcement measures was thoroughly saturated with racist 
imaginings of Black men “perverted” by drugs (ibid., 24), or White women enthralled to Chinese 
                                                
4 Building on Foucault’s work in The History of Sexuality (1990 [1978]), Sedgwick notes that the 
identity of “the addict” emerged in the late nineteenth century (1993, 135). Sedgwick explains, 
“Under the taxonomic pressure of the newly ramified and pervasive medical-juridical 
authority… and in the context of changing class and imperial relations, what had been a question 
of acts crystallized into a question of identities” (1993, 130). The use of narcotics came to be 
seen as something an addict does, and “addiction” – whether disease, moral turpitude, lack (of 
will, intelligence, honesty, or responsibility), or all of the above – emerged. 
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men in opium dens in seedy Chinatowns (Chen 2012). Fed by and feeding the myth of the Black 
rapist (Davis 1983 [1981]) and racist stereotypes of Chinese immigrants, these discourses linked 
drugs with violent Black and Chinese sexualities and innocent White femininity. Nearly a 
century later, as Dorothy Roberts observes, “Crack’s apparent confinement to inner-city 
neighborhoods made it the perfect target for Reagan’s ferocious War on Drugs and the media’s 
disparagement of Black Americans. The media soon imbued crack with phenomenal qualities: it 
was instantly addicting, it intensified the sex drive, and it turned users into violent maniacs” 
(1997, 155). Such rhetoric helped to instantiate what anthropologist Helena Hansen and historian 
Samuel K. Roberts (2009) call a two-tiered approach to addiction treatment. White middle and 
upper class addicts have historically been treated and poor and working class and people of color 
criminalized. As treatment has been increasingly extended to the poor and working classes and 
people of color, it has tended to be in more criminalized settings (like methadone clinics) 
(Hansen and Skinner 2012). Hansen and Roberts argue that this demonstrates the “increased 
centrality of race as a function of the biomedicalization of addiction” (2009, 98, emphasis 
added). 
Many origin stories of drug courts repeat that drug courts were an ad hoc response to 
overloaded dockets from the “crack epidemic” in the 1980s. They are often represented as a 
salve to the misguided approach in criminal justice that incarcerates addicts, and explicitly strive 
to repair racial inequity propelled by the War on Drugs. But the impulse to treat addicts who find 
themselves in the grips of the criminal justice system is not entirely new. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
the federal government erected “prison-like hospitals” in Lexington, Kentucky, and Fort Worth, 
Texas, to rehabilitate addicts after the 1914 Harrison Act, the first major drug-criminalizing 
legislation in the U.S., resulted in overcrowding in the prisons (Campbell 2011, 125). In 1962, 
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then-Governor Nelson Rockefeller signed legislation that gave arrested addicts the option to stay 
in a state-run mental hospital for three years as an alternative to prison. The initiative was largely 
deemed a failure by 1966 (Kohler-Hausmann 2010; Feldman and Benjamin 2010), and just a few 
years later, Rockefeller pushed the passage of infamously punitive drug laws, which sparked a 
succession of now ubiquitously-termed “draconian” measures the country over.  
Rebecca Tiger (2013) argues that today’s drug treatment courts represent another turn in 
the cycles of punishment and reform that have characterized the modern penal institution since 
penitentiary reform in the early nineteenth century. Michel Foucault (1977) and Angela Davis 
(2003) have noted that the prison itself was a humanitarian reform to more spectacular forms of 
violence as punishment. Humanitarian reforms, Tiger argues, “should be understood […] not as 
progress toward a more humane approach to punishment but as a continual effort to remake and 
redo punishment in ways that reflect prevailing social and cultural understandings about human 
nature and the causes of and ways to control deviance” (2013, 42). Drug courts resemble 
Progressive-Era reforms, especially juvenile justice reforms, which “ushered in the enduring, yet 
fractured, idea that individualized treatment based on the application of scientific rehabilitative 
principles could transform certain offenders whose criminality was ascribed to a condition that 
rendered their culpability partial” (50-1).  
Many scholars of drug policy in the U.S. focus on the 1970s because of then-President 
Richard Nixon’s declaration of a War on Drugs. Journalist Dan Baum (2016) recently reported a 
“revelation” about U.S. drug policy that frankly many Black and Brown people have known all 
along, having experienced it firsthand. President Nixon’s domestic policy advisor, John 
Ehrlichman, admitted to Baum that Richard Nixon’s War on Drugs was aimed at “disrupting” 
new organizations of people working to change the racial, class, and war-making status quo, like 
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Black Panthers serving breakfast to Black and Brown children (see Nelson 2011), Young Lords 
demanding better care for Black and Brown patients at public hospitals, and college youth 
gathering en masse in antiwar protests, by vilifying them in the public imagination for drug use 
and criminalizing them harshly. In effect, law enforcement cracked down on communities of 
color for minor drug offenses far more than college campuses.  
Contrary to a common argument that the War on Drugs has been a massive failure of 
policy, scholars who recognize mass incarceration as a system of racial control (Alexander 2010) 
argue that, in fact, the War on Drugs has been extremely effective. It is no revelation to state that 
Black and Brown men and women are arrested and incarcerated at cosmically disproportionate 
rates in the United States, and this has been especially driven by, or better rationalized by, the 
War on Drugs (Alexander 2010; Davis 2003; Mullings 2003). According to one recent report,5 
“blacks are nearly four times as likely as whites to be arrested for drug offenses and 2.5 times as 
likely to be arrested for drug possession […] despite the evidence that whites and blacks use 
drugs at roughly the same rate. From 1995 to 2005, African Americans comprised approximately 
13 percent of drug users but 36% of drug arrests and 46% of those convicted for drug offenses.” 
Many experts contend that the drug war and its strategy of criminalization and stigma has had no 
perceivable beneficial effect on drug use or addiction, however (e.g. Alexander 2010).  
In addition to its bellicose shifts in drug policy, the 1970s is a decade often regarded as a 
major turning point for social-political-economic formations the world over (although these 
changes are often seen as originating in metropolitan centers, like Chicago, or major institutional 
                                                
5 See “The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons.” Sentencing Project. 




conglomerates, like the World Bank, and then imposed upon “third world,” “developing” 
countries of the “Global South”). “Neoliberal” ideals and practices have had decidedly uneven 
application in different countries or regions. But I think it would be missing the big picture if I 
did not at least link the drug courts to a broader “neoliberal” context in which an economic 
rationale comes to structure ideas of the social and the political. By this logic, at the policy level, 
programs to promote the “social good” must first and foremost aim to be cost-effective.6 This 
turn to “cost-effectiveness” is a key justification for drug courts as well, which are said to save 
taxpayer dollars (when compared with “traditional” criminal justice case processing).  
At the level of the individual, such a rational, cost-benefit analysis should be applied to any 
action. Such is the nature of a responsible subject of the contemporary moment. As Max Weber 
(2001 [1905]) presciently observed over a century ago, the modern projects of capitalist 
expansion and depoliticized bureaucratic governance have also depended on calculability, human 
control, and predictability, and thus the growing responsibility of human beings for the 
management of risk. This disenchanted, detached bureaucratic government of life, preoccupied 
with minimizing its costs, is what Weber meant by “Iron Cage,” a phrase with redoubled salience 
in the criminal justice context. Accompanying these developments, theologian Anthony Balcomb 
(2014, 363) explains, “was the formal equality of citizenship, rule-bound legislation of legal 
norms, an autonomous judiciary” – in a word, justice. 
                                                
6 In the United States, the creation of the Congressional Budget Office in 1975 is an institutional 
manifestation of these brewing ideas, and an institution that helped to further entrench them. The 
CBO represented a sea change in how governance was viewed. Instead of a focus on how a bill 
might shape society, the focus turned to “bills as variables in a complicated equation” hinging on 
spending (Karabell 2017). A bill was only assessed for the good it might do as a secondary 
concern, the primary concern being how much it would cost or how much revenue it would 
generate. 
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Wendy Brown argues that neoliberalism “carries responsibility for the self to new 
heights: the rationally calculating individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his 
or her action no matter how severe the constraints on this action, e.g., lack of skills, education, 
and childcare in a period of high unemployment and limited welfare benefits” (Brown 2003, 15). 
Drug use and criminality have been reconceptualized as “mismanaged life” (ibid.).7 Kane Race 
(2009) draws attention to how, beginning in the 1970s in the U.S. as well as Australia, the focus 
of drug policy shifted from an emphasis on the dangers of particular substances to consumers’ 
“abuse” of them. Race also observes that “compliance” became a focal point of medical research 
in the mid-1970s. “Noncompliance” with a treatment regimen and “abuse” of drugs become dual 
nodes in a turn toward self-administration as a central object of governance. Drug courts 
represent a blending of this juridical and medical focus on individual responsibility for abusive 
addiction and noncompliance.  
 
A history of diversion, or caring about crack users 
Increasingly punitive drug policies escalated through the 1980s, a time of moral panic 
over the “crack epidemic,” an inner-city “underclass,” and HIV/AIDS, of which injection drug 
users were seen as primary vectors. Joel, a high-level administrator at Altruist Society, one of the 
largest drug treatment providers in the state and a favored partner of drug courts, suggested that 
given this stigmatized backdrop, the establishment of drug courts was “gutsy”: 
Joel: Some of these were pretty gutsy moves. You know, drug 
addicts, I think after the 70s or I guess– I think the crack epidemic 
                                                
7 This helps to explain why despite assertions that addiction is a chronic disease, recovery 
requirements at drug treatment courts revolve around education, vocational skills, parenting 
skills, and anger management, in addition to abstinence and medical and mental health care. 
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hurt any kind of sympathy […] for someone's kid being addicted to 
drugs. […] I think that families and communities were a lot more 
sympathetic to addiction prior to the crack epidemic […] and I 
think the crack epidemic created a different type of addict, 
someone who, uh, it was such a debilitating drug that it- it's effects 
were that much quicker whereas I guess the old-fashioned 
psychedelic or heroin addict of the sixties, that downward spiral 
was a pretty wide one. […] People would keep jobs, finish school, 
but the crack epidemic was a very tight spiral. Um, and you ended 
up with someone who was less socialized. […] No education, 
family ties destroyed, no employment history, there was just very 
little to build on. […] And I think it hurt in some ways with just 
people being sort of sympathetic to addiction. 
 Although Joel’s description of the “tight spiral” of the crack epidemic attributes all of the 
downward movement to the chemistry of the drug itself and its effect on the unmarked body, 
creating a “different type of addict,” what it leaves out is the fact that the intense moral panic 
around crack figured around Black communities. Black women’s sexuality and reproduction, in 
particular, drove moral panics around crack, especially as the figural “crack whore” was 
repeatedly represented as birthing crack-addled babies who would surely grow up to be violent 
super villains (Roberts 1997). While these hysterical imaginings never bore out, they led to 
policies and practices that tore many mothers from their babies.  Neither do Joel’s remarks take 
into consideration the changes in policing that attended the “crack epidemic,” which tightened 
that spiral downward. Yet Joel’s remarks are notable here because they represent drug courts and 
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drug court practitioners as extending sympathy where others would not. They cared, he 
suggested, even when it was difficult to care.  
By the late 1980s, the harsh penalties introduced throughout the 1970s coupled with more 
intense measures of state surveillance for drug-related crimes meant that court dockets, prisons, 
and jails were busting at the seams. Costs were high, communities were devastated, and 
incarceration didn’t seem to be having an ameliorative effect on drug sales or addiction. Kaye 
Brook (2010, 69) explains, “it was at this point that bureaucratic innovation was necessitated 
within the bounds of a neoliberal and highly incarcerative logic. A variety of drug ‘diversion’ 
programs were initiated at precisely this time, eventually culminating with the apparent 
ascendancy of drug treatment courts,” the first example of which appeared in 1989 in Florida.8   
Into the 1990s, as urban real estate developers, in partnership with local governments, 
sought to remap the cities and their inhabitants (Manalansan 2005), a love affair with the theory 
of broken windows gave us “quality of life” or “order-maintenance” policing. Enforced through 
racial and class profiling, this swept ever-increasing swathes of people of color and the homeless 
into the criminal justice system. Joel described to me the development of the state’s first problem 
solving court in this context: 
They were basically like quality of life crimes […] So, whether it 
would be street cons, like three card monte […] prostitution, low-
level drug possession, it would really back up the docket. […] And- 
so that would be the […] tax dollar kind of problem […] and then 
                                                
8 Since the Miami court, drug courts have proliferated around the country, cropping up also in 
other countries, like Australia, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Cayman Islands, 
Ireland, Jamaica, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland, Suriname, and the United Kingdom 
(see http://www.nadcp.org/countries). 
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you're dealing with a bunch of people that really weren’t - there was 
nothing real punitive you can do with in response, according to 
sentencing guidelines […] and if it took more than a day or two to 
adjourn, it was time-served […] This was a good opportunity […] 
for a brief intervention. […] The cases were being seen and heard 
and adjourned in far less time. 
The overly-enterprising police force, responding to directives from their superiors to 
make more low-level arrests, birthed a new population of low-level offenders that eventually 
necessitated the creation of a new court to deal with them. Joel’s remarks about the establishment 
of the first problem-solving court in the state help me to see the slippage in the oft-touted version 
of the drug court origin story that drug courts emerged as a benevolent alternative for addicts 
swept up by the crack epidemic. It is also critical to see drug courts as handling the surplus of 
low-level drug offenders mounting due to the continuation of an escalating “war” on drug users.  
Because of this, Kaye Brook (2010) argues that drug courts, far from an alternative, are a 
continuation of a criminalizing approach to drug consumption.   
A private industry arose to capitalize on rising rates of incarceration. Public-private 
partnerships spread from the provision of services within municipal, state, and federally run 
prisons, to staffing and managing those prisons as well. Borrowing from Dwight Eisenhower’s 
warning about the threat to liberty and democratic values of a military industrial complex, 
scholars critiquing the prison industrial complex demonstrate how mass incarceration capitalizes 
on egregious racial disparities9 (Davis 2003, Gilmore 2007; see also David Harvey’s concept of 
                                                
9 And yet these disparities are often explained away or even go unnoticed by the normalization of 
mass incarceration and its “new racial equilibrium,” as Michelle Alexander (2010, 176) argues.   
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accumulation by dispossession [2000, 2003]). Drug courts, which work only in partnership with 
private drug treatment facilities, are examples of the kinds of public-private partnerships that 
critics of mass incarceration like Angela Davis and Ruth Wilson Gilmore note will continue to 
fuel and escalate demand for shackled bodies to drive profits and sustain fragile economies.  
Jackie, the statewide drug court coordinator, started working with the treatment court 
model when it was first introduced in Judge Lazarus’s jurisdiction in the mid-1990s. Prior to 
that, she had worked as a defense attorney for the legal services organization in the county. She 
told me: 
It really resonated for me, having practiced largely during the 
crack epidemic, where I just saw thousands of lives destroyed and, 
you know, had sort of been begging judges for years to let my 
clients do treatment and, you know, by and large falling on deaf 
ears, and so here was a model that, you know, not only would 
allow people to get drug treatment but, you know, had an addiction 
model, um, approach to it, you know. It was relatively non-
punitive, um, although certainly there is the leverage that is used, 
and, um, so it was just overall very appealing to see an effort to try 
to handle, you know, the revolving door of addiction and crime[…]  
In Jackie’s remarks, regular criminal courts are full of “deaf ears.” They were ignoring the 






Labels of “bad” or “sick” appear to guide mercurial approaches to drug policy, although 
as Rebecca Tiger (2013) argues, treatment courts approach defendants as both “bad” and “sick.” 
There is some value in the medicalized approach to addiction in that it pushes the response to 
addiction away from punishment and towards treatment, but despite the strong push to firmly 
biomedicalize addiction as a “brain disease,” like a palimpsest or pentimento, it bears the traces 
of its past renderings. While understandings of addiction as a disease of the will (see Sedgwick 
1993, Valverde 1997) ring of the logics of another time, this is very much a contemporary way 
of understanding addicts. As a “defect in liberal subjectivity” (Valverde 1997; 1998) and in the 
moral faculties of willpower, addiction raises questions about the core values of U.S. society. Do 
people have free will, personal responsibility, bootstraps?  
The concept of justice in the criminal justice system relies on such values of individual 
liberal autonomy. Arguably, contemporary ethics of care suggest that medical care also relies to 
some extent on these values, especially in the priority given to respect for autonomy. But 
bioethics is a balance of autonomy with non-maleficence (“do no harm”), beneficence, and 
distributive justice (Muller 1994). Further, the autonomy of bioethics need not implicate 
individuals through conceptions of individual guilt and punishment. In fact, contemporary logics 
of care vehemently insist that guilt, shame, and stigma generally mount immense barriers to good 
care. Yet it is a mistake to think that human experiences of medicine and illness are somehow 
free of moral valences, of blame, and of stigma. The utility of the medical model in reducing 
stigma is compromised by the strong moral standing of the healthy body in U.S. culture and the 
alternately “pitiable” or “disreputable” body of the disabled (Mollow 2013). Pause to note that 
ambivalence that echoes race-based divisions of addicts. 
 21 
I encountered many defendants in drug court who did not consider themselves addicts, 
but who did believe they could benefit from drug court –especially from the potential dismissal 
of their felony charge if they succeeded. Take Isaiah. He never used any hard drugs he told me, 
continuing, “What’s a hard drug? I don’t know.” Here he destabilized the objective 
characterization of some drugs as hard (in large part an objectification that occurs through the 
criminal law). He used to smoke marijuana, but he hadn’t smoked for two years. Since the drug 
court practitioners maintained a concept of addiction as a chronic, incurable illness, he was able 
to make claims to addiction to get himself a place in drug court.  
Drug courts make certain claims to addiction a legitimate way to approach the state for 
care, and for mercy. They forge not just “responsible citizens,” but also what Adriana Petryna 
calls “biological citizens.” Petryna (2002) explains that in biological citizenship, new decisions 
and values are attached to experiences of pain and suffering. Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas 
(2003, 441) explain, “Biological citizenship can thus embody a demand for particular 
protections, for the enactment or cessation of particular policies or actions, or, as in this case, 
access to special resources.” Drug courts help to define what addiction is, determine who fits that 
definition, and carve out new ways for those people to relate to the state. They carve out both a 
new way for people to make demands on the state (i.e. give me a chance, offer me treatment 
instead of prison), and a new – and extensive – way for the state to involve itself in the lives of 
those citizens.  
Writing about disabled ex-gang members in Chicago, Laurence Ralph (2012) emphasizes 
the diversity within stigmatized groups. In contrast to a larger community of disabled activists 
who mobilize a social model of disability that emphasizes “multiple ways to view ability,” his 
interlocutors “rely on a medical model of disability that highlights physical differences rather 
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than seeking to diminish them,” even as “the medical model echoes the 19th century notion of 
the black defective body” (ibid.). Ralph argues that this demonstrates “the severity of 
circumstances for these disabled, African American ex-gang members. The fact that they are 
willing to insist on the defectiveness of their own body points to the sheer depth of the problems 
they have to contend with […]” (ibid.). 
The medical model of addiction has similarly been questioned and contested. I think it is 
important to add complexity and depth to the idea that, simply because scientists can point to 
patterns of chemical activity in brain receptors, addiction has an objective status as disease. 
There are people who suffer with their drug use and want to cut back or stop altogether, and 
some of them experience their condition as disease. Some do not. Addiction’s objective 
ontological status aside, because the drug courts use the medical model to justify removing 
felony charges from users’ records, in this context the medical model can have significant utility 
(if only around 50% of the time, for those who graduate).   
Rose and Novas (2003, 440) point to the “specter of racialized national politics” in a 
notion such as biological citizenship. Historically, for instance in national legislation such as the 
3/5 Compromise, what was taken to be biology (as “race”) has shaped the measure of citizenship 
in the U.S.10  Thinking along these lines, Isaiah and defendants like him assert themselves as 
addicts in a tactical (De Certeau 1984) embodiment of the “delinquent citizenship” (Ramos-
                                                
10 The 3/5 Compromise of 1787, which legislated that slaves be counted as three-fifths of free 
citizens for the apportionment of political representatives and tax revenue, has a contemporary 
analog in such political practices of counting prisoners as constituents of the often rural and 
conservative towns where prisons are located, giving those towns more political power and 
directing more tax money to those districts. This is despite the fact that prisoners cannot vote and 
or make use of local services that revenue goes into.  This pulls political power and money away 
from the under-resourced urban neighborhoods of color from whence prisoners 
disproportionately come. 
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Zayas 2004) of the racialized and drug-involved citizen. Consider Nathaniel, a charismatic Black 
man in his early thirties at the time of his participation as a defendant in Judge Fierro’s court. 
Our mutual friend disclosed to me that Nathaniel defiantly laid claim to the label of criminal, not 
addict, in their treatment group. But that is surely not what he told the court practitioners who 
approved his entry only on the condition that he was addicted.  Nathaniel – stylish, funny, 
playful, and somewhat incongruously to me, employed for several years by a funeral home – 
powerfully moved between stigmatized labels in different settings, establishing his claim to the 
care of the state in one, and then asserting a kind of delinquent agency in the space of treatment 
where he was supposed to, paradoxically, take responsibility for being out of control.  
 
Of Interventions, scholarly and otherwise 
“Submit Your Loved One,” beckons the heading above a fillable online form for those who wish 
to sign their loved ones up for the A&E television series “Intervention.”  If selected, the show 
will help family and friends stage an intervention for the entertainment and edification of the 
viewing public. I refer to this program11 to point to the cultural saliency of “the intervention,” 
and to point to the centrality of addiction as an organizing principle in contemporary U.S. life.  
                                                
11 I confess, I’ve never even seen the show. Kamala Visweswaran (1994) points out that there is 
some knowledge our interlocutors will refuse to share with us, and some that ethnographers will 
refuse to share about our interlocutors. There are also certain knowledges we refuse to subject 
ourselves to. A classic trope of ethnographic research is that it is “holistic,” taking everything 
into account. But like all forms of research, all forms of narrative, and any statistic, we inevitably 
produce partial accounts (Clifford 1986; Haraway 1988; Hoag 2011; Strathern 2004; 
Visweswaran 1994). Refusing to “see” something is decidedly not objective, but in different 
ways, we all refuse to see certain things. I place see in quotes because as a sighted person, I’m 
chagrinned by how difficult it is to write outside of ableist metaphors. But sight remains a key 
metaphor for grasping, knowing, and encountering the world, including in anthropology. 
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The intervention has become a trope, easily drawn upon for comedic effect. There is also the 
obligatory scholarly intervention.  
My intervention here is to draw attention to how competing ethics, like justice and care, 
press on those in powerful positions. I think it is critical that empirical research attends to the 
good intentions that prop up human activity, from the worst atrocities of world history to more 
ambivalent programs like drug courts, which can feel both oppressive and helpful to defendants. 
Perhaps one of the most vexing questions at the center of this project is how particular actors can 
believe that they are doing good works in the world despite what appears to others to be contrary 
evidence. And what does it mean to mean well? 
 
An anthropology of care 
Anthropologist Elana Buch (2015, 279) writes, “‘Care’ in English-speaking places 
connotes both affective concern (caring about) and practical action (caring for),” although 
whether one entails the other remains an empirical question in any context. The practical action 
of caring includes diverse forms of practice, ranging from everyday actions among intimates, 
like acts of romance or attending to illness or injury, to large-scale, organized systems of expert 
administrations of treatment, as in healthcare.   
Anthropologists have increasingly turned to studying “care” in various forms (Buch 
2015; Lane 2017; Ortner 2016). Perhaps this trend is guided by the pervasive influence of 
“therapy culture” (see Nolan 2011; Shaw 2001). Perhaps it is due to the relatively recent 
“invention of humanitarianism” at transnational scales (Fassin 2012) in responses to crises of 
environmental disasters and political and economic strife that produce masses of refugees 
seeking asylum across national borders. Perhaps this is a response to the extent to which “making 
 25 
live” (Foucault 1990), or “life itself” (Rose 2007), has become the primary object of governance 
over the modern and post-modern era. Or perhaps it is a response to “dark” (Ortner 2016) 
disciplinary interests in questions of biopower that have grown out of the uptake of Foucault’s 
work in anthropology and related social sciences and humanities. It is most likely many things. 
Sherry Ortner offers a critique of some anthropological work on care as being so taken 
with “the good” that we “ignore the larger contexts of power and inequality in play” (ibid., 65).  
There is excellent anthropological work on care that does not ignore power and inequality. 
Especially relevant for my site, Sameena Mulla’s ethnography, The Violence of Care: Rape 
Victims, Forensic Nurses, and Sexual Assault Intervention, “traces the complex of care that 
emerges from the interpenetration of legal and therapeutic practices” (2014, 4) when forensic 
nurses in the United States examine victims of sexual assault with their “dual responsibilities of 
treatment and evidence collection” (ibid., 5). Mirroring Mulla’s site, where the forensic-legal 
creeps into a treatment setting, my field site is a legal-forensic setting that treatment has 
penetrated.  Like sexual assault in the “institutional imaginary,” drugs and addiction have a 
hybrid, ambivalent, medical and criminal status, which entail “simultaneously distinct and 
conjoined therapeutic and juridical aims of intervention” (ibid.).  
Anthropologists who study the care of humanitarianism show how the politics of what 
Miriam Ticktin (2011) calls “regimes of care,” although motivated by moral calls to diminish 
suffering, distinguish those “deserving” of care from the undeserving, ultimately contributing to 
inequalities and a biopolitical division of the population. This separation demarcates where the 
limits of care in a politics of life give way to a politics of death (Mbembe 2003).  
 Like Ortner advises, I try to bring attention to the ways projects of caring and “the good” 
and power and inequality can be “in active interaction with, rather than opposition to, one 
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another.” As Ortner explains, “the violence of power and inequality is not simply physical force 
and/or deprivation, but always at the same time the ways in which it limits and deforms projects 
of what Veena Das has called ‘the everyday,’ projects of care and love, happiness and the good 
life” (2016, 65).  Indeed, my study attends to the ways a project of care is contoured, and perhaps 
interrupted, by ideals of justice that ironically often disavow the violences of power and 
inequality in their aspirations to equality. What interests me is not just how a project of care is 
deformed by power and inequality, but even more how the exercise of coercive power and 
inequality can be driven by ethical striving toward the good.  
 
Objectivity and the view from anthropology 
Contemporary anthropologists show that the practices and epistemologies that are 
thought to ensure objectivity are particular to social, cultural, and historical contexts (Bucholtz 
2009, Jasanoff 2005; Latour 2004a). But this wasn’t always the case. As Renato Rosaldo (1993) 
points out, the project of the social sciences, including anthropology, was historically one of 
objectivism. Rooted in colonial expansion, the discipline was especially challenged by 
decolonization and imperialist expansion over the mid twentieth century. Clifford Geertz 
emerged during this time of rethinking of the objectivist position of the ethnographer. According 
to Rosaldo, Geertz led an alternative project to that “once-dominant ideal of a detached observer 
using neutral language to explain ‘raw’ data” (37). Instead, Geertz sought “to understand human 
conduct as it unfolds through time and in relation to its meanings for the actors” (ibid.).  
For Geertz (1973, 10), the question of whether “culture” was objective or subjective was 
“misconceived.” Geertz wrote, “Once human behavior is seen as […] symbolic action – action 
which […] signifies – the question as to whether culture is patterned conduct or a frame of mind, 
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or even the two somehow mixed together, loses sense.[…] It is the same as that of rocks on the 
one hand and dreams on the other – they are things of this world” (ibid.).   
Following the influence of Geertz, as well as Pierre Bourdieu and Raymond Williams, 
Rosaldo (1993) argues that: 
a sea change in cultural studies has eroded once dominant 
conceptions of truth and objectivity. The truth of objectivism –
absolute, universal, and timeless – has lost its monopoly status. It 
now competes, on more nearly equal terms, with the truths of case 
studies that are embedded in local contexts, shaped by local 
interests, and colored by local perceptions. (21) 
Ethnographers have since this sea change emphasized the intersubjectivity of the production of 
ethnographic knowledge (e.g. Briggs 1986; Duranti 2010; Fabian 2014; Rabinow 1977), 
emerging from the everyday interactions between the ethnographer and her interlocutors, and in 
a dialectic with social theory and disciplinary norms.  
What this has meant for ethnographic practice is to acknowledge, as Rosaldo (1993, 
xviii) notes, that “knowledge and power are intertwined because the observer’s point of view 
always influences the observations she makes.” As Judith Irvine and Susan Gal (2000) write, 
“There is no ‘view from nowhere,’ no gaze that is not positioned. Of course, it is always easier to 
detect positioning in the views of others […] than in one’s own.” This presents a necessity, and 
an additional challenge, that the ethnographer position herself explicitly in the text, which I 




My ambivalent position 
Like drug court practitioners, I have struggled professionally with the dangers and 
suffering that come with drug use (as well as the pleasures and release). But my work over the 
years has been very different.  Between 2008 and 2011, I worked at needle exchange programs in 
New York City, applying a “harm reduction” philosophy to my work. The harm reduction 
practice of my mentors has an important history of activist invention by and for drug users, and 
locally, the Black Panther Party and the Young Lords (Moore and Clear 2012). My harm 
reduction mentors taught me to prioritize redistributive justice – that is, facilitating people’s 
access to clean needles and other health-promoting resources. My mentors’ practice emerged 
from a “harm reduction of color critique” (HROC), which Samuel K. Roberts12 explains, is a 
political analysis concerned with structural inequality. “From this view,” Roberts explains, “we 
see that there’s a connection between a failing education system, hyper-vigilant state security 
systems, the mass carceral state, and deindustrialization and lack of job opportunities.” 
Harm reduction of color critique practices from a place of non-judgment not only because 
stigma is a barrier to access of health-promoting resources, but also out of the recognition that 
stigma functions to justify massive public energy and expenditure on a carceral state, Roberts 
notes. Stigmatization of addicts, tied as it is to exaggerated ascriptions of agency to the 
user/dealer, also leads to what Paul Farmer (1999, 87) calls “immodest claims of causality,” 
which, by blaming individuals for their conditions and seeking to educate them and reform their 
behaviors, diverts attention away from assessing the conditions that structure their risk. I propose 
                                                
12 See Kirsten West Savali. “The Scholar: Samuel K. Roberts Jr. on Drug Policy, Radical 




that drug courts’ approach to treatment is severely curtailed by a depoliticized notion of 
individual recovery. Instead, what Samuel Roberts calls “radical recovery” would require a 
radical restructuring of conditions of inequality. A radical concept of recovery would strive for 
what critical medical anthropologists call “experiential health.” Experiential health is defined as 
“[a]ccess to and control over the basic material and nonmaterial resources that sustain and 
promote life at a high level of satisfaction.” (Baer, Singer, & Susser 2003, 5). 
Increasingly funded by public health departments, harm reduction practice seemed to be 
splitting during my work at needle exchanges between this politicized work toward what Samuel 
Roberts calls “radical recovery” that is central to a “harm reduction of color” practice, and a 
liberal ideology of responsible life and health promotion. While I was learning harm reduction 
praxis “on the ground” from politicized harm reductionists, whose fierce defense of drug user 
autonomy owed more to the battles over sovereignty of Puerto Ricans and people of color around 
the world, I was also sitting in public health classrooms earning my Master’s degree. In a 
regrettable application of public health logics, I once found myself coaching a peer educator 
under my supervision how to pronounce “human immunodeficiency virus” as if she could not 
help to prevent the spread of HIV if she could not verbalize the full medical term for it (see Pigg 
2005). She just would not say it. I was trying to be encouraging, or to use the term of art, 
“empowering” (see Cruikshank [1999] for a critique). “You can do it!” I cajoled as we sat face to 
face in my office…until she burst into tears. The field of practice is complicated. 
 From what I learned firsthand as an outreach worker, informed by HROC’s critical 
analysis, and as critical scholarship in public health has confirmed, the hyperpresence of law 
enforcement in the lives of racialized and poor drug users and street-based sex workers structures 
a field barring access to resources and care-giving facilities and enforcing vulnerability to 
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violence, illness, loss, and premature death (Appel, Ellison, Jansky et al. 2004; Blankenship and 
Koester 2002; Cooper, Bolsak, Temalski et al. 2009; Golembeski and Fullilove 2005; Rhodes 
2009; Shannon, Rusch, Shoveller et al. 2008). I therefore approached the institution of drug court 
with skepticism. And yet many of the drug court practitioners I came to know do recognize, to 
varying degrees, the harms caused by the criminal justice system to drug users. Many drug court 
practitioners lament and seek to repair the racial and class injustices of the War on Drugs. I am 
therefore hopeful that drug court practitioners, many of whom agree that prison is a devastatingly 
inadequate response to the problem of addiction, will recognize some of their ethical positions 
and aims reflected in this thesis, and take seriously both the critiques and possibilities I lay out. 
That is, I want to intervene not just in the anthropological literature, but in drug policy, too.  
The stakes are high. The U.S. imprisons more people, per capita, than any other nation in 
the world. About 40% of U.S. prisoners are Black, while only an estimated 13% of the U.S. 
population is Black.13 Drug court practitioners attempt to change these truly shameful facts from 
within the criminal justice system. But the 2.3 million people who are currently incarcerated 
represent fewer than half of those currently under criminal justice control. Treatment courts join 
with probation and parole in an extensive net of surveillance. For those caught in this net, not 
just criminal behavior but other kinds of “noncompliance” can hurl them right back behind bars.  
At the same time, treatment courts represent many defendants’ best chance at avoiding a 
felony record, the lifelong consequences of which are far-reaching and devastating. At a 
transitional moment for drug policy, the new head of the Justice Department Jeff Sessions has 
                                                
13 Wagner, Peter and Bernadette Rabuy. “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017.” Prison 




made clear his zero-tolerance position on drug use, in spite of the country’s recent shifts toward 
decriminalization. The stakes are made even higher. It would be dangerous in this context for me 
to insist that treatment courts have nothing to offer. Instead, I recognize the good that court 
practitioners are trying to do in a hybrid field with often competing ethical ideals, and how drug 
court practice might seize on opportunities to fortify its approach to treatment. 
But this dissertation is certainly full of ambivalence for me. I recognize the importance of 
a prison abolitionist perspective, which I am certain would offer trenchant critiques of drug 
courts on at least two bases. First, as examples of criminal justice reform that appeal widely to 
politicians and a general public, drug courts may lend an alibi to the carceral state. It’s not so bad 
after all.  This may serve to perpetuate the whole institution of mass incarceration (Davis 2003; 
Gilmore 2007; Spade 2011). Second, by distinguishing drug offenders from a population of 
“violent offenders,” drug courts may deepen the punitive treatment of these less “deserving” 
individuals. These points are well taken.  
Taking into consideration the unavoidable fact that mine is a Trump-era dissertation 
(albeit conceived during what felt like more promising times), I take no position as to whether 
drug treatment courts should or should not exist in a universal sense or within what has remained 
consistently a structurally violent criminal justice system over the course of liberal and 
conservative presidential administrations alike. But for now, they do exist and I studied them. 
My analysis of their current practices, and recommendations for change that stem from that 
analysis, follow from that fact. This means also that I position my account as partial because I 
concern myself with – I care about – people who are “drug-involved,” and my care for drug 
users/dealers is shaped by a critical analysis of racism, structural inequality and mass 
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incarceration. The “kinky empiricism” (Rutherford 2012) of anthropology imposes limits on the 
kinds of knowledge that anthropologists produce, and the ways we relate our work to theory.14  
My project deals with the good intentions of those with the authority to administer care.  
These questions are certainly important for me, not just as a researcher and an intellectual, but 
also in my own ethical strivings. Although I approached drug courts with skepticism, during the 
course of empirical research, that skepticism became ambivalence. Over time, I came to identify 
with practitioners in drug courts in certain respects. We have all had to think long and hard about 
what addiction is, what the best way to tamp down its harms might be, what humane treatment of 
drug users entails, and above all, how to be an ethical person in our practices of care for addicts.  
So, I am of two, perhaps irreconcilable, minds. I am convinced of the necessity of 
opposing the mass carceral state along all of its tentacles, which also means that I oppose those 
reforms that make the larger institution more acceptable, especially to those who are removed 
from its most venal and hidden centers. Yet I fear letting go of reforms, potentially sacrificing 
millions of people waiting in cages for a change that may never come in their lifetimes. 
Meanwhile, I remain protected and removed, looking down from an Ivory Tower – and by that I 
don’t just mean academia. Who am I to tell Isaiah and Nathaniel and Charles and Frank and John 
and the many defendants I watched in drug court that I don’t think they should have had the 
                                                
14 According to Danilyn Rutherford, kinky empiricism is:  
An empiricism that admits that one never gets to the bottom of 
things, yet also accepts and even celebrates the disavowals required 
of us given a world that forces us to act. An empiricism that is ethical 
because its methods create obligations, obligations that compel 
those who seek knowledge to put themselves on the line by making 
truth claims that they know will intervene within the settings and 
among the people they describe. (465)  
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treatment option? How can I advocate for their deprivation of that potential, if very partial, way 
out? On the other hand, who am I to help perpetuate the system?  
In this sense, I feel that the work of my recommendations to more firmly distinguish drug 
courts from other criminal courts is not unlike the work of a defense attorney with a radical 
critique of the system in which she works. She isn’t working towards reform so much as she is 
devoting herself to the unrelenting work of helping the particular individuals assigned her – 
working, no doubt often in vain, to find them some mercy. Oddly enough, while working in 
needle exchange, I considered enrolling in law school to do just that. But I decided against it 
because of the ethical encumbrance of such punishing work. Here I find myself in the same 
ambivalent and ethically impossible position. Audre Lorde’s words come to mind: The master’s 
tools will never dismantle the master’s house. But when I think of Lorde’s words, I often think of 
a line from Lorde’s friend and colleague, Adrienne Rich, that burned itself into my brain the first 
time I read it in high school: this is the oppressor’s language/ yet I need it to talk to you. Can 
both precepts stand beside one another? Or is it…black and white? 
I don’t know if I am right about this, but my impulse is to try to hold these two positions 
in an unbearable tension with each other. Thus, I acknowledge that my recommendations 
represent a severely limited gambit in a War that never should have been. 
 
Methods 
I waited, if that can be considered a method – and I think it can (Auyero 2012). Like 
defendants, I waited on a line that folded back and forth on itself, out the glass doors of the 
courthouse and down the city street, sometimes in frigid cold, rain, and the wind that sweeps 
through the wide avenues of the city, as defendants and their families and I slowly made our 
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ways to the metal detectors and officers impatiently barking “next” at us.15  We waited in the 
quiet halls of the courthouses for the doors to open while court staff met in private and 
orchestrated the day’s calendar. I waited in the courtroom while the clerks and resource 
coordinators made calls, got files in order, printed the day’s certificates on brightly colored 
printer paper, and court officers talked about their weekends, passed around a jar of pretzels, and 
attended to any defendant who timidly approached the bar separating the gallery from the stage 
of court action. I waited and I watched, and I scribbled, and when I could, I asked questions. 
I studied three drug courts, which I selected because of their different locations in and 
outside of a big city in the northeastern United States. I knew that each court would pluck 
defendants from different environs, with different demographic pools. I wanted to study across 
the different textures and affects of city and suburb – the pace of transportation, density of 
population, the ways people rub and bump up against one another, and the frictions and 
fractiousness of street traffic. I don’t specify the state or counties I worked in because while 
every state in the U.S., Puerto Rico and Guam, have drug courts,16 many counties only have a 
single drug court, with a single judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, etc. If I were to identify any 
place or practitioner, I would compromise the privacy and confidentiality of my interlocutors.  
                                                
15 Oh, those metal detectors, in anticipation of which I would always try to remember to remove 
the AA batteries from my digital voice recorder in the hopes that it might pass through 
undetected. This rarely worked, and my recorder was usually confiscated by court police officers 
for the day. I would never have used it to record court proceedings, which one needs explicit 
permission to do. I carried it with me to use with explicit consent during interviews, whether 
scheduled or spontaneous.  
16 As of June 30, 2012, there were 2,734 drug courts throughout the U.S. There are drug courts in 
operation or in planning stages in Australia, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cayman 
Island, Ireland, Jamaica, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Suriname and the United Kingdom. 
See History: Justice Professionals Pursue a Vision. National Association of Drug Court 
Professionals. Accessed August 21, 2017. http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-
courts/drug-court-history 
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None of the three courts I studied distribute descriptive statistics about their defendants’ 
demographic profiles, so I will rely on averages of drug courts in the area (which I will not cite 
to maintain the confidentiality of my site) together with my own records. Judge Lazarus’s and 
Judge Connelly’s courts were located in different districts of the city. About four out of five 
defendants in these courts were men. Around half of the drug court defendants in the city were 
Black, one-third Latina/o, and one out of every eight were White. In the city drug courts, almost 
all defendants are there for drug offenses, whether felony possession or felony drug sales.  
Judge Fierro’s court was in the small urban center of a mostly suburban county outside 
the city, flanked on all sides by some of the most affluent zip codes in the region. About a 
quarter of suburban drug court defendants were women. Far more defendants in the suburban 
courts were there for property offenses and larceny than in the city. Closer to half of defendants 
were White; around one-third or so were Black; and a smaller proportion were Latina/o. As 
defense attorney Gayle pointed out to me, when compared with the demographic profile of those 
arrested and incarcerated in the county, the defendant profile in drug court was substantially 
Whiter and more affluent. The danger that the treatment option will be reserved for White and 
middle class defendants, potentially pushing people of color deeper into punitive approaches, is a 
concern of some scholars and policy advocates, which I will discuss in Chapter 3. 
Consistently visiting three different courts was useful to me in deciphering patterns. Each 
court was led by different judges, had different procedures, and was contoured by the social, 
political, and geographical differences of their jurisdictions. Their differences helped me to feel 
confident in what I identified as similarity and even sameness, too. Further, by pure luck, each of 
the three courts granted me different access and offered richness of “data” in different respects.  
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Judge Lazarus’s court was a bounty of interactional data. She took time with each 
defendant, inquiring, inciting them to speak, and taking pains to distill particular lessons, often 
returning to a theme – a sort of “moral” for the day – like responsibility or honesty. I interviewed 
Judge Lazarus in her chambers twice. The second time, she said she never realized how long I 
would be at this. My reappearance day after day, week after week, month after month, and year 
after year (over the summer in 2013, and from September 2014 until August 2015) seemed to 
both perplex and bemuse court practitioners. They joked that soon I would have a job there, and 
that I must know better than anyone how it all works.  
Allen, the Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) in Judge Lazarus’s court, seemed 
somewhat alienated from his colleagues, and we would often chat about the morning’s 
proceedings at lunch adjournment. I hounded busy defense attorneys at the public defenders’ 
organization in Judge Lazarus’s jurisdiction, finally getting an interview with one, Samantha, 
and a private attorney, Scott. The director of the treatment center agreed to be interviewed on 
two separate occasions, but neither could be audio recorded.  
Judge Connelly allowed me to sit in the jury box to watch proceedings, within spitting 
distance of the public defender, ADA, court reporter, and other treatment professionals. Visibly 
part of the show, but with no explicit role on the drug court stage other than as some kind of a 
scribe and occasional banterer, defendants must have wondered who I was. Most notably, I was 
permitted to sit in on morning meetings at which the drug court practitioners would discuss each 
defendant before her appearance and decide on a course of action for her ongoing care. I 
interviewed a case manager, the director, and the coordinator in Judge Connelly’s treatment 
center, and I got to speak casually with the other staff there. I spoke often with treatment 
professionals who worked with the drug court defendants with co-morbid mental health 
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disorders. I routinely had lunch with Pete, the defense attorney on the team. Paula, his colleague 
who stepped in to defend clients with serious mental health issues, also sat down with me at her 
offices for an interview. I interviewed one of the two ADAs who oversaw the drug court 
operations in her office over lunch. I held a focus group with attorneys, social workers, and a 
policy advocate at the politically embattled (but also fiercely respected by many in the social 
justice non-profit sphere) public defense organization, Just Defenders, located in Judge 
Connelly’s jurisdiction. A private attorney spoke candidly with me one morning as we raced 
around the court building, descending to the lower level where attorneys attempt to connect 
through court police with their clients bussed in for court appearances from prison or jail.  
I was almost stopped at the gates of Judge Fierro’s court. At the outset of my fieldwork, I 
contacted Cindy, the county-wide drug court administrator, to introduce myself and ask her when 
the court held session. I expected just to have a casual chat and to find out which days to block 
out to observe Judge Fierro’s court. Instead, Cindy told me I would have to submit a research 
proposal and she would forward it to “the appropriate parties for review.” Anxious about 
communicating my research goals to unknown interlocutors with different research interests and 
practices, I shared my proposal with a local drug court expert before passing it on to Cindy.  
Nearly six weeks after sending it to Cindy, I heard back from Jackie, the statewide drug court 
coordinator, who, it turned out was the “appropriate party.” In an email to me, and cc-ing many 
people I didn’t know, she wrote that her office could not help me with my research, but that I 
was free to observe on my own. That was fine by me, as I was not seeking help with my 
research– that is, I would need people to speak with me, but I didn’t necessarily need the 
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collaboration of her office to give me access to their troves of statistical data. Of course, such 
access would have been nice. Nevertheless, I persisted with my project as planned.17  
On my first day visiting Judge Fierro’s court, Gayle, one of the two defense attorneys on 
the team, befriended me. Bright, thoughtful, and passionate and often a fierce advocate for her 
clients, Gayle sat down with me for two long interviews over lunches, lent me a stack of drug 
court training manuals, and connected me with a graduate of the court and other drug court 
professionals, including the statewide coordinator, Jackie, who this time, agreed to be 
interviewed. I also interviewed the second defense attorney on Judge Fierro’s team, Karen, and 
Probation Officer Castillo. Bob, the friendly prosecutor, approached me to talk a number of 
times, and we sat and talked in his office once, too, but his superiors – specifically the head of 
Public Relations in the District Attorney’s office – wouldn’t permit him to sign my consent form. 
At the start of my fieldwork, Judge Lazarus told me I could not speak to drug court 
defendants without the permission of their attorneys. I had already cleared my project with the 
University of Illinois’ Institutional Review Board, so I was never sure if talking to a defendant 
without their attorney’s permission would be a breach of ethics or of etiquette. But, I deferred to 
Judge Lazarus. Luckily, Gayle and Karen, the two public defenders on Judge Fierro’s drug court 
team, gave me express permission to talk to their clients. This meant I could and did develop 
friendships with defendants while we all sat around waiting for the doors to open.  
I was ill-at-ease “researching” defendants, especially in this space of interrogation (see 
Rosaldo 1986). Approaching defendants for the first time was always a careful act. I didn’t want 
                                                
17 Cindy eluded me throughout my research. I couldn’t get through to her on the phone ever 
again. One day, I steeled myself to go in search of her office on the upper floors of the court 
building. When I found it, I asked the officer working the desk outside the offices if she was in. 
He went inside to check, returning some time later, very apologetically telling me that he had 
thought she was in, but he was wrong. Follow-up attempts proved unsuccessful as well. 
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to offend, alarm, trigger, or jeopardize their recovery. So, I was relieved that defendants 
sometimes introduced themselves to me. Early in his drug court mandate, Sam approached and 
asked me, “Writing a dissertation?”  I just had that look, he said. As the months passed, there 
was a growing number of defendants I felt comfortable approaching, and they often helped me 
bridge new relationships. Some became friends. I met them at cafés and luncheonettes near the 
courthouse or near their homes. I looked at photos of their kids and significant others, and I 
chatted with their moms. I visited one friend at home when a family member passed away. I 
often drove another home, to work, or to his treatment program.  
Given their vulnerable, liminal legal positions under the panoptical surveillance of the 
courts, I remain surprised (and grateful) that any defendants confided in me. In fact, I was rarely 
rebuffed. Once – one time only – I greeted a young Black man who began his drug court 
mandate several months after I started my fieldwork. He was very quiet in court proceedings, but 
well-liked by a group of his peers, and I wanted to know more about him and what he thought 
about drug court. I smiled and asked him how he was doing. He answered very politely – so 
politely that I just knew he didn’t trust me. After he walked away, a friend told me, “He thinks 
you’re undercover.” “Yeah,” I said. That was clear.  I respected that and wasn’t going to try to 
“earn” his trust, to prove myself to be trustworthy; because maybe I wouldn’t be – and couldn’t 
be, according to everyone’s terms. Even though my notes were protected from subpoena by a 
Certificate of Confidentiality from the National Institutes of Health, I worried about becoming a 
factor in anyone’s “noncompliance.”  I didn’t want to fulminate dissatisfaction, but I wanted to 
show my respect for their critiques. I didn’t want to join with an oppressive criminal justice 
system by praising the model, but I wanted defendants to succeed and get out of there. I wanted 
defendants to feel they could confide in me whether they had praise or criticism for the drug 
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court – both stances posing their own risks. And every defendant I spoke with balanced some 
measure of gratitude and fondness for court practitioners with critique. 
My notebooks are full of the shorthand I developed over time as I attempted to record as 
much of what I heard and observed while sitting in treatment courtrooms as I could. Because I 
was not permitted to audio record court proceedings, when I provide “transcripts” of courtroom 
discourse, I do so when I feel confident in their accuracy in the moment, but also that they 
represent patterns in what I observed over time in what many have termed the theater of drug 
court. But in fact, I rely more on direct quotes from audio-recorded interviews – the backstage 
whispers – than I anticipated I would during my fieldwork. At the time, I felt that while 
personable, often lasting an hour or more, my interviews yielded little usable data when 
compared with courtroom interactions. After listening to them, often many times over, it became 
apparent I had not realized their value because I took much for granted while becoming a drug 
court “expert.” In fact, the taken for granted was the important stuff after all. 
I visited a couple of other drug courts to get a sense of the breadth of drug court practice. 
I became a dues-paying member of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals 
(NADCP) and attended several of their webinars. I tried to visit the NADCP offices in 
Washington, DC, but was unsuccessful in getting anyone to commit to meeting. One employee 
of the organization did eventually speak with me over the phone about his work as a trainer. I 
watched videos posted to YouTube and Vimeo about drug court, read personal blogs about drug 
court, and listened to public radio programs that mentioned drug courts and addiction in the U.S. 
When they told me to do so, I found articles on the websites of local papers that printed 
defendants’ mug shots and the stories of their arrests to their and their families’ chagrin. I met 
with a coalition of “peer” workers – that is, current or former drug users – from local syringe 
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exchange programs to talk about their knowledge of and experiences with drug courts. A private 
interview with Sandrine, a graduate of Judge Lazarus’s court, came out of that meeting.  
I tried to maintain friendships with defendants after my research ended, but it has been 
hard. In some cases, defendants went into either residential treatment or jail during my fieldwork 
and hadn’t come out again months later when I left the field to give birth to my daughter. After 
Amanda graduated, Sam told me he was worried she was using again. Neither he nor I was able 
to get in touch with her. Sam and I kept up for a while, but when he told me he was getting 
remarried to someone who didn’t know the extent of his criminal justice involvement, I 
suspected we might lose touch (and we have). Frank and I also kept up by text messaging, but 
time between messages lengthened. Same with Isaiah. My sense is that once they graduated, 
most defendants would rather put the drug court experience behind them, and I was part of that 
experience. In certain ways, backed by the institutional power of the University of Illinois, the 
approval of its Institutional Review Board, with a Certificate of Confidentiality from the 
National Institutes of Health to boot and, as a somewhat parasitic researcher, I really was a part 
of the drug court institution, helping to enact the state. Eventually, defendants were bound to 
want to put me and our friendship behind them along with the drug court.  
About eight months into my year of fieldwork, I started to “show.” I was pregnant. One 
could write a fascinating account about the experience of the pregnant ethnographer. As a 
pregnant White woman, people who had never given me the time of day smiled, asked how I 
was, when I was due, and commiserated with me about parenting and pregnancy. My belly was a 
visual marker of “one of the historically most classed, racialized, and sacralized sentimental 
objects in the United States – motherhood” (Tapia 2010, 375). As a heteronormative White 
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woman, my pregnancy and all of the meanings it carried – of motherhood, nurturing, vitality, 
strength, and vulnerability – seemed to make me approachable.  
Whether she wants to or not, a pregnant woman becomes a concern of the community. 
She becomes a subject – and an object – of care, and this can entail some of the ambivalences of 
care that this dissertation addresses. People may be more likely to show her some consideration 
and warmth. Yet, in many ways, her authority over her own body is usurped and policed. She is 
under heightened surveillance. Scholars have shown that pregnant women of color are policed in 
far more invasive ways, with far more serious repercussions, than White women (Knight 2015; 
Roberts 1997).18  These are thorny intersections at the crossroads of care as surveillance and care 
as nurturing, life-sustaining sociality – intersections that come up throughout this dissertation.  
 
Nanny state, daddy state   
As spaces of care within the justice system, drug courts and their practitioners may face 
particular challenges to their objectivity. Critics of the drug court model fret that it may bestow 
the judge with unfettered discretion to proceed according to what attorney Richard C. Boldt calls 
her “subjective impressions” (Boldt 2010, 70). This discussion should not ignore the 
intersectional dimensions that gender and race play in ideas about care and justice. In coarse and 
                                                
18 Dorothy Roberts (1997) has thoroughly documented the criminalization of Black women for 
using drugs while pregnant. According to Roberts, “between 1985 and 1995, at least 200 women 
in thirty states were charged with maternal drug use…The charges have included distributing 
drugs to a minor, child abuse and neglect, reckless endangerment, manslaughter, and assault with 
a deadly weapon” (153). Statistics suggest drug use during pregnancy occurs at similar rates 
among White and Black women, but Black women are prosecuted at disproportionate rates (172, 
175). Institutional racism and poverty place Black women under heightened surveillance by 
government agencies and by health care professionals who more often test and report pregnant 
women of color to the authorities for drug use (173-4). Further, drug testing occurs at higher 
rates in public hospitals, where working-class women of color are more likely to seek care (173).   
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pervasive naturalized gender binaries, mothers are care-giving, fathers are disciplinarians. Such 
normative and excluding dualities inform characterizations of the welfare state as the “nanny 
state” and the penal state as the “daddy state” (Wacquant 2009). I argue that drug court 
practitioners are care workers, both in the sense that they perform a great deal of “emotional 
labor” (Hochschild 2003), and in that they guide and determine the design of the care and 
treatment of defendants, who are viewed as afflicted with a chronic illness. But they are care 
workers of the state and have institutional power over the subjects of their care. As noted earlier, 
this care can thus be as paternalistic, with its aim of responsibilizing and civilizing, as it is 
nurturing and feminized. It embraces defendants with one arm of the coercive daddy state and 
one arm of the nurturing nanny state. Locked in this embrace, defendants “fear the state as well 
as implore it, dread its punishment as well as demand its assistance” (Fassin 2015, 3).  
Care is feminized and “care workers” are generally identified as women, especially 
women of color, often in diaspora from the Global South to the North, where they find employ in 
low-paying, physically and emotionally-taxing, caring professions (Lane 2017). But Martin 
Manalansan (2008) insists we must queer the “chain of care” paradigm in scholarship on care 
worker migration, which “foregrounds the pathos of dislocated biological motherhood” at the 
expense of queered forms of care and care-givers. I worry that while the normative gendering of 
care and objectivity creates gender hierarchies between normatively gendered men and women, 
it makes the care of those who fall outside the binary illegible as care and their truths more 
doubtable. For this, I take Manalansan’s insights about queering the gender of care in concert 
with Cathy Cohen’s (1997) vision of queerness and Robert McRuer’s (2006) critique of 
compulsory ablebodiedness. In this section, I first lay out the normative gender framework of 
care and objectivity, before I discuss defendants’ queer position beside this framework. I propose 
 44 
that the way in which this gendered care/objectivity opposition queers, and excludes, many 
defendants, also structures an underlying logic that justifies their punishment as a necessary and 
benevolent routine of a practice of care, even though it is so antithetical to most contemporary 
logics of health and mental health care. 
Cohen (1997, 441) urges expansion of the notion of queer to be “inclusive of all those 
who stand on the outside of the dominant constructed norm of state-sanctioned white middle- 
and upper-class heterosexuality. Such a broadened understanding of queerness must be based on 
an intersectional analysis that recognizes how numerous systems of oppression interact to 
regulate and police the lives of most people.”  In this light, defendants are people whose 
“choices,” not necessarily in sexuality, but certainly in pleasure, “are not perceived as normal, 
moral, or worthy of state support” (Cohen 1997, 442). McRuer argues that compulsory able-
bodiedness, or “being capable of the normal physical exertions required in a particular system of 
labor” (2006, 8), produces disability and “is thoroughly interwoven with the system of 
compulsory heterosexuality that produces queerness” (2006, 2, drawing on Adrienne Rich [1993 
(1980)]). As addicts, defendants are queered by this compulsion to be able-bodied.  
Dean Spade (2011) observes that “gender is an organizing principle of both the economy 
and the seemingly banal administrative systems that govern everyone’s daily life, but have an 
especially strong presence in the lives of poor people.” The criminal justice system enforces 
gender norms; prisons make being trans or gender queer impossibly dangerous (Davis 2003). So, 
it is no revelation to note that courtrooms in the U.S. rehearse and define gender and its norms. 
The “static formula” (Manalansan 2008) that equates the normative heterosexual woman with 
care and love, perhaps better suited to social work than legal work (a common characterization of 
drug courts themselves), seems to inform some drug court staffing. In Judge Connelly’s 
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jurisdiction, where different ADAs staffed drug court proceedings daily, the district attorney’s 
office would often its assign pregnant women because, one practitioner explained to me, drug 
court was seen as easier. I wondered if there wasn’t some implicit sense that in their pregnant 
state, they might screw up a real trial, and further, that something about drug court just seemed 
appropriate for these women whose bulging bellies were constant reminders of motherhood.  
That is, within the normative framework of woman as caring, women are also 
normatively imagined as less objective than men, more ruled by emotion, less able to detach and 
to see things as they “really” are. But to embody these negative qualities in heteronormative 
ways is also to remain within the normative framework. For defense attorney Gayle, this was a 
boon to her practice as an advocate.  
Gayle: I’ve thought this the whole time as a criminal defense 
attorney: we get way more stuff done than men do. […] Because 
we can appeal– First of all, most judges are men and there’s a 
slight element of fear that men judges have when dealing with us 
women. […] They don’t know if we’re going to get mad at them, if 
we’re gonna get emotional on them, which sometimes we do.  
Wielding this emotional weakness, for Gayle, as a White middle-class woman who is expected to 
embody it, can be powerful in limited and ephemeral spaces of play. 
On the other hand, Jerome, a treatment resource coordinator who had worked in the 
courthouse under three different judges over his tenure, worried about the manipulability of their 
previous judge, Judge Salcedo, a Latina woman who, on retiring from her judgeship, went on to 
work as a labor activist (again evincing that sense of care as advocacy). He compared her with 
the Irish American Judge Connelly, the sitting judge for most of the duration of my fieldwork: 
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Jerome: She acted more – aside from being the judge, more of a 
social worker. […] She got it. Sometimes to a fault. Sometimes she 
wanted to save the world. But that was a good thing because she 
was very compassionate and understood, you know, that people 
came through these doors, they were broken, and so that’s how we 
came up with the concept of allowing people multiple 
opportunities whereas other drug courts it’s like, “do this or else.” 
Judge [Connelly] he too is very compassionate – he’s one of the 
“good old boys,” as it were, and, um, there are times that he’ll 
resist some of the recommendations that we uh, we make. Um, but 
overall he understands the concept and he’s learned a lot because 
when he first got here, um, he didn’t know as much as [Salcedo] 
did, but he’s grasped a lot from us. […] And he’s still learning. 
I asked Jerome if Judge Connelly engaged the participants less often than Judge Salcedo did. 
Jerome: I would say more stern because he’s an older Irish 
Catholic and comes off with that boisterous– but not less, I 
wouldn’t say less. Um, he does, you know, give, uh, affirmation 
when it’s due, I mean, when we give certificates or even when 
they’re not getting certificates we tell him, “Look, this person just 
obtained their GED, show him an atta boy,” you know? 
[…] Judge [Salcedo], yeah, she was very flexible, uh, she was very 
protective of the females […] especially females that come in 
pregnant and, you know, are smoking crack or using heroin, you 
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know, but they both, you know, they both– just different 
styles.[…] I guess people viewed [Salcedo] because she was a 
woman, you know, “I can get over on her.” […] There were times 
she could be very firm, and she’s very short in stature too […] 
where Judge [Connelly] is big and, you know. 
Jerome added that Judge Connelly was “more quick to stop the BS.”  
Like Judge Salcedo, Judge Lazarus’s small physical stature was also often remarked on 
by defendants when she would descend from the bench for graduations or to meet their young 
children or new babies.19 The raised bench helped the judge gain heightened presence that added 
to the perception of her as an all-seeing and all-knowing objective figure, and one not able to be 
swayed or pushed over. When she would step down, it was something like pulling the curtain 
back on the great and powerful Oz. For instance, amid drug court graduate Sandrine’s discussion 
of the comfort she takes in feeling as though Judge Lazarus can still “see her” on Facebook even 
though she has long since graduated, she inserted a remark about how short Judge Lazarus is.  
Sandrine: I don’t try to, like, stay on her page but I stay on 
[Facebook] so she could see- because I know she could see me 
[…] You know, I don’t know the extent of how that relationship 
should go, but me knowing that she can see me period […] is 
                                                
19 Judge Lazarus would only step down from the bench when a defendant was doing well in the 
mandate. Family attendance when a defendant was in trouble was sometimes viewed as a 
manipulative tactic to guilt the judge into responding with leniency to an instance of 
noncompliance. Casting suspicion on defendants for this supposed abuse of normative family 
care anticipates my argument about defendants as lacking and in need of parental care, and 
punishment. 
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enough for me. […] But she’s so short. You know? [laughs] When 
she came down off the—[laughs, inaud.] 
EM: You were surprised – yeah – way up there. 
Still, being a “small” (but not too small) woman fits within a paradigm of gender normativity 
that depends on what McRuer calls “compulsory ablebodiedness,” even as it is seen as 
significantly less ablebodied than big (but not too big) and strong men are.  
For defendants, these normative gendered tensions between the objectivity and care of 
practitioners had different stakes, as they tried to negotiate what is proper conduct not only for 
themselves but for those who had tremendous power over their lives. Isaiah said of Judge Fierro 
that she was “more of a person than just a judge.” She “puts her feelings into [her job], which 
could be good and bad.” When we talked about his recent positive alcohol tests, John told me, 
“I’m getting a whooping right now.” Referring to resource coordinator Marilyn, he said, “I guess 
maybe she is disappointed, you know what I’m saying? And the way some people get 
disappointed, they may lash out and do something because maybe they want the best for you.”   
John said that Marilyn told him he was cocky and that she said to him, “You think you’re 
clever.” I asked John what he thought she meant. John said, “I think she had a relationship and 
that guy looked like me.” “When she says, ‘you’re not all that,’” John continued, “that’s telling 
me, like […] you feel a little personal here.” Isaiah similarly speculated that he might have 
reminded Marilyn of someone that had hurt her and that’s why she gave him such a hard time. 
Women, and even more so women of color like Marilyn, are more readily seen as subjective and 
especially as ruled by painful emotions from past romantic experience – “baggage.” That sexist 
common sense appears to inform John and Isaiah’s interpretation of Marilyn’s treatment of them. 
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“You think you’re clever,” the words John told me Marilyn said to him, ring of suspicion 
and doubt and feeling sure that someone is trying to deceive but is not particularly good at it. 
Defendants in drug court were doubted almost constantly. In this dissertation’s first chapter, I 
will address how this manifested, and was exacerbated, in the absence of rules of evidence that 
guide courtroom trial proceedings. Most of them men, as queered addicts, many racialized and 
poor, they could not draw on the normative White objectivity of a “good old boy.” 
Sam, a defendant in Judge Fierro’s court, told me about his weekly visits with Probation 
Officer Castillo, and the way her care crept too far, although somewhat enticingly so, into his 
romantic, sexual, and religious life: 
Sam: And I wanna show up. I like talking to her. She talks to me 
about women.  I know, it’s weird. She keeps on telling me to date 
women I’m attracted to. 
EM: Huh! 
Sam: She- see, her theory is that if I didn’t feel so guilty about 
being with the women I’m with, that I wouldn’t have taken drugs 
[…] to- to- push- kind of, escape from that feeling of guilt. 
EM: Wow. 
Sam: Like, that’s her theory. 
EM: Wow. 
Sam: And she came up with that pretty fast, too. […] I mean, so 
fast that I thought maybe she was really trying to hit on me.  
EM: […] It’s interesting that she- she puts herself in that role. 
Sam: It- it- she’s not supposed to be doing that. 
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EM: Yeah. 
Sam: Not only is she not supposed to be doing that, but like the 
entire discussion was completely inappropriate. It’s just that, 
because I’m kind of attracted to her, like, I’ll let it go. […] Like 
and because my lawyer [Gayle] hates me, I have to let it go?20 […] 
But if my lawyer liked me, and I didn’t like the probation officer, I 
would’ve, like, actually would’ve sued them, maybe, over religious 
discrimination. […] Because she- she keeps on telling me, like, 
well you know it’s not true that like – she didn’t say explicitly that 
Moses didn’t give the Torah – I mean that God didn’t give the 
Torah to Moses on Mt. Sinai – she doesn’t explicitly say that, but 
she keeps on saying that, she goes, “well, you know those are 
manmade, like, you don’t have to keep them.” She actually says 
that to me! […] You know she says, “everything’s manm—” she 
goes, “I’m a very religious person but, you know, even I don’t 
believe that, like, no one – you have to be crazy to believe that” 
[laughs].  I’m like, “alright,” you know, like what am supposed to 
[…] at one point I said to her, like, “I’m not really sure what I 
should say because, like, I don’t want you to violate me.” [laughs] 
Like, “you could sexually violate me. That I wouldn’t mind at all.” 
EM: You didn’t say that. 
                                                
20 Sam’s mention that his attorney hated him anticipates some of the limits of advocacy and the 
“teamwork” care model in drug courts, which I will discuss further in Chapter 2, “Team up, 
Speak Up, Lock Up: Creating Webs of Surveillant Care.” 
 51 
Sam: […] No, I didn’t say that. […] But I was thinking that. 
Sam is a (now disbarred) attorney, which partly informs his sense of what court practitioners 
should and should not be doing and, he felt, informed how court practitioners viewed him (e.g., 
that he thought he was better than everyone else and needed to be taken down a few notches). 
Sam acknowledged that he was “different” than most drug court defendants. As a devout 
Orthodox Jew and a white-collar professional, he was a particularly unorthodox defendant. As a 
pious self-proclaimed sex addict who used drugs to enhance his sexual experiences, albeit 
“heterosexual,” he was most certainly queer. Sam clearly sexualized Officer Castillo, in part 
because he felt she was sexualizing him in ways she “wasn’t supposed to,” but no doubt because 
she is a woman of color, too. Sam also demonstrated how he is caught in a double bind between 
Officer Castillo’s attempt to disenchant his moral world outlook from her powerful position, 
such that he “didn’t know what to say.” These stories of truly intimate moments point to the 
frictions of care and objectivity in drug courts while they also point to the ways that care and 
objectivity are explicitly gendered.   
 While I’ve made the claim that drug court practitioners are care workers, Isaiah also 
suggested to me that defendants might have to do a little care work themselves: 
Isaiah: Can I be blunt? She [Marilyn] wanted an ass-kissing. I’m 
not that. But, I’m not gonna allow you to hang me up when you 
have my life in somewhat control? 
EM: Right 
Isaiah: I’ll kiss your ass a little while. I will. Or at least say what- 
what you want to hear. […] And pamper you and coddle you, 
because I don’t expect to be pampered or coddled at all. 
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Isaiah’s remarks square with an observation that Gayle made to me about how poor and 
working class people of color who are disproportionately under criminal justice control don’t 
expect to receive care from the justice system. Somewhat reminiscent of how Black Americans 
must learn to “de-escalate” interactions with police (which would seem to be the job of the 
police), Isaiah suggests that he had to coddle the treatment coordinator in charge of his care. This 
caring for was an essential form of self-care for Isaiah. 
There was a prominent perception that many drug court defendants undergo a 
transformation of caring during their drug court participation. It is said that they go from being 
selfish to caring. Defendants are often characterized as being “anti-social” or as moving in anti-
social friend groups (like gangs), or lacking positive social support networks. It is sometimes 
suggested that drug court teams provide a measure of care that many defendants lack now, and 
lacked growing up. This calls up images of absent fathers without calling out the primary 
institution that has ensured their absence (i.e. prison) (Alexander 2010). It privileges a domestic, 
two-parent home as a space of familial care, discounting the ways that more queered relations of 
care remake and sustain other kinds of families. But it also draws on “the historically 
dehumanized place of nonwhite and economically disadvantaged women in visual landscapes of 
the maternal” (Tapia 2010, 376), whose care and love for their children is imagined as less than 
White women’s, justifying brutal acts against women of color’s reproductive sovereignty 
(Nelson 2003; Roberts 1997). In turn, this brutal and mistaken imagining of the absence of love 
and care for mothers’ sons and daughters detracts from the extent to which their lives are seen as 
mattering, the extent to which their deaths are imagined to be grievable (Butler 2004; Feder 
2007). Echoing Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s (2007, 28) definition of racism: “the state-sanctioned or 
extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death,” 
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J. Jack Halberstam (2005, 3) observes that “the abbreviated life spans of black queers and poor 
drug users, say, does not inspire the same kind of metaphysical speculation on curtailed futures, 
intensified presents, or reformulated histories.” 
But also, it seems that the presumption of an original deficit of parental care comes to 
inform what kind of care defendants are thought to need. It was fairly common for court 
practitioners to step into the roles of the caring parents that it was presumed defendants lacked. 
Likening defendants to children was another queering. And this particular queering would seem 
to justify discipline and punishment as appropriate and necessary parts of a practice of care, as 
parental care for children is often seen to be. I need not point out how profound a mistake it is to 
confuse relations among court practitioners and defendants as those between parents and 
children. The recommendations that appear in this dissertation are informed by models of care 
that come out of a critical medical anthropology and critical public health and a harm reduction 
of color critique. I do this while maintaining a critique of the medical model of addiction. But the 
medical model continues to provide a powerful basis for people in precarity to demand care from 
the state. And not just care, but also mercy. 
 
Terminology 
When people enter drug court as defendants, their court identity lexically morphs from 
“defendant” to “participant.”  Joel, an administrative figure at Altruist Society, one of the state’s 
largest treatment providers, told me that this change in label came about in the late 1990s or early 
2000s. He had gotten involved with the city’s first problem-solving court and thereafter helped 
codify and institutionalize what the drug court model would be, negotiating the often-tricky but 
ultimately “synergistic” partnership between public and private, or between criminal justice and 
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social service. “Each system identified the same person differently” – inmate, parolee, 
probationer, defendant, client. “So, what was funny was when we would be at the table, if it were 
me talking about someone participating in the program, I would naturally go to ‘client,’ but I 
would catch myself” because his colleagues from the court system would use the term defendant. 
“I think that that just represented, um, some of the maybe control issues that were going on […] 
Who does the person really belong to.” This all “went on for years and years until the drug court 
codified ‘participant’ […] to just standardize the language.”  
While Joel’s explanation that “participant” was a compromise and a relinquishing of 
control over the person and the problems she posed as an object of governance, “participant” 
speaks to a procedural justice ideal that the defendant be – or be made to feel like – an integral 
part of the process; a stakeholder, to use another keyword of contemporary norms around 
community engagement (however superficial these efforts often turn out to be). I use the term 
defendant, however, to allay confusion with the term research participant, as both practitioners 
and defendants participated in my study.   
 “Addiction” and “addicts” are tricky words, too.  While the professional register in most 
government agencies is “substance abuse,” I’m as uncomfortable with the term “abuser” as I am 
with “addict.” Further, despite their diminished status in an increasingly biomedicalized realm, 
“addiction” and “addicts” remain constant lexical labels for people who use drugs. Not only 
because they are so often used by my interlocutors, however, I also use the terms addict and 
addiction in this dissertation, aware of their stigmatizing connotations, precisely because I want 
to highlight the historicity and dialogism (Bakhtin 1981) of the label. Contemporary terms like 
substance use or substance abuse may strip important histories of addiction away.  
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Choosing the right path 
The “roadmap” of the dissertation. The heading borrows a common metaphor I heard in 
drug courts (and one with a particularly spiritual, if not only Christian, ring). Chapter 1, 
“Compliance Trials: Flexible Evidence and Objective Standards,” takes up the issue of 
compliance, emphasizing the role of court practitioners’ interpretation and evaluation of 
evidence and an ideologically-informed objective standard by which to measure defendants’ 
actions. Unlike in trial courts, drug courts are not held to rigorous rules of evidence. This 
evidentiary flexibility ultimately curtails what defendants may contribute to their own care. 
Overall, I argue that compliance turns out to be a test of defendants, disavowing the truly shared 
responsibility among care workers and those receiving care for compliance.  
In Chapter 2, “Team up, Speak Up, Lock Up: Creating Webs of Surveillant Care,” I 
explore two central components to the drug court care model: teamwork and communication. I 
suggest that while these are often crucial to the provision of good care, drug courts must be 
careful that teamwork doesn’t entail teaming up against defendants. I show how communication 
and teamwork is used to further the goals of a particularly surveillant care. I suggest that care in 
drug courts would be improved by removing the imminent threat of punishment for any instance 
of noncompliance, facilitating communication in the interest of care. I suggest that the teamwork 
approach has promise in that it recognizes the import of shared responsibility for a regimen of 
care, but that that team must include defendants if it is to devise plans for treatment that are 
responsive to defendants’ needs, desires, and conditions of access and possibility.  
In Chapter 3, “Beyond Effective: Thinking Ethics, Rethinking Evidence,” I address the 
fact that drug courts are said to be evidence-based programs. I evaluate the evaluations and 
discuss what I think they provide evidence of. As for the assertion that drug courts work, I look 
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at what research has suggested about who drug courts work for. Evaluation research, which both 
informs and reflects drug court practice, also insufficiently represents what goes on in drug 
courts (the “magic” of them, as Gayle put it), and the impacts they have on defendants’ lives. I 
argue that there is a slippage between what is “effective” and what is ethical and a related 
slippage of practice and implementation. I also suggest that the existing repertoire of best 
practices from a too-limited “evidence base” provides an insufficient guide to drug court 
practitioners who are balancing competing ethical principles and priorities of justice and care.  
Chapter 4, “Testing Care: Truth Games, Confession, and Urine Trouble,” aims to 
question assumptions about the therapeutic uses of urine drug tests. I suggest that the drug 
courts’ rigid approach to urine tests sets up a truth game in which defendants are given two 
options: confess or go to jail. The intent of the game is to be therapeutic, but I show how its 
effects far exceed therapeutic intentions. I show how maintaining the legitimacy of the tests, 
especially in their transit from laboratories to the hands of lay drug court practitioners, depends 
in some measure on collusion. I suggest that the drug court’s care model would benefit from the 
removal of the ultimatum of the truth game. Defendants have good reason to deny use when any 
relapse sets off automatic negative consequences, more intensive treatment plans, and often 
punishments.  I end this chapter with a reflection on Judge Lazarus’s assertion that defendants 
often deny, or lie about, relapsing due to their magical thinking.  While somewhat ironic, given 
her court’s own unwillingness to hear contrary evidence, I suggest that this magical thinking 
could be an entry point for court practitioners to relate to defendants through a shared 
vulnerability and at the same time, through shared dependence on the performative power of 
language. At the same time, the regressive lens that “magic” has in a disenchanted world leads to 
Chapter 5, in which I discuss the time politics of drug courts.  
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In Chapter 5, “Time and the Addict: The Promises of Deferral, Return, and 
Transformation,” I illustrate the multiple temporalities that constellate around and are propelled 
by drug courts. I discuss how the conceptualization of addiction as chronic owes not just to its 
medicalization, but also resonates with the cycling, self-perpetuating, pathological repetitions of 
“culture of poverty” theory, and its antecedents and contemporary manifestations, even including 
“revolving door” metaphors of the criminal justice system. I show how the care model in drug 
court is not always sensitive to the heterotemporality of defendants’ lives, especially the play of 
scrambling and waiting drug court requirements set in motion among working class and 
impoverished defendants. I discuss how drug court practitioners emphasize the virtues of 
patience and deferral of gratification while defendants express that what is often being deferred 
is the care and the resources they need to thrive, or even to survive. I show that drug court 
practitioners celebrate the prodigal defendants who struggle with noncompliance before they 
succeed, and argue that these defendants actually draw more care around them. I discuss the drug 
court transformation narrative as a conversion tale, whereby defendants place themselves along a 
straight (and narrow) diachronic storyline from their sinful past to their saved present selves. All 
organized around one of Judge Lazarus’s graduation ceremonies, these temporalities are tied to 
the belief that the improvement of society begins with self-improvement.  
In the Conclusion, “Carving Out a Space Outside the Binds of Justice for Care, and for 
Mercy,” I present my interlocutors’ questions and critiques of this underlying individualist logic 
of the drug court model and its emphasis on personal transformations instead of a more radical 
recovery that emanates from a notion of shared responsibility and interdependence. I revisit the 
binds of vexing questions of justice and reiterate that the priorities and principles of justice in the 
context of the U.S. criminal justice system are antithetical to a practice of care in drug courts. 
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Because drug courts have carved for themselves a space apart, however, there may be enough 
leeway to set this justice aside in the interest of care, and to exercise mercy.
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CHAPTER 1   
COMPLIANCE TRIALS:  
FLEXIBLE EVIDENCE AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS 
 
Hannah: But the idea that, like, evidence would inform any 
decisions that are happening in treatment court is, like– 
Radhika: Yeah 
Hannah: I don’t think I’ve ever heard anybody say anything about 
evidence […] 
Like Hannah and Rhadika, both criminal defense attorneys employed by a public defense 
organization called Just Defenders in Judge Connelly’s jurisdiction in the city, one of the things 
that struck me about drug court proceedings was an absence of explicit talk of “evidence.” As 
defendants rose from the gallery benches and took their places one by one before the judge, court 
practitioners cited reports sent in from counselors at privately run treatment programs, urine drug 
test results, reports from alcohol-monitoring devices, and sundry other sources of facts used as 
evidence. To clarify what Hannah said, evidence does inform decisions, but not in the rigorous 
way legal professionals are trained to use it. The crucial decisions in drug courts are, first, 
whether a defendant is “in compliance” or not, and second, how to either reward or sanction her 
in the most therapeutic way. 
Whether a defendant can remain in compliance or not ultimately dictates whether she will 
succeed or fail drug court. I argue that determinations of “compliance” combine interpretation of 
certain forms of privileged evidence, and not others, with certain “objective” standards of what 
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constitutes reasonable behavior, effort, and foresight. Interpretation of evidence entails 
judgments about what kinds of evidence, and producers of evidence, are authoritative, but unlike 
in standard U.S. criminal courts, evidence in drug court makes its way into the epistemological 
process of judgment less by explicit procedural rules and more by social rules. Certain kinds of 
evidence are not subject to the systematic scrutiny of a trial, while defendants’ attempts to 
introduce evidence are met with extreme doubt.  
On the other hand, very much like in traditional courts, the objective standard set by the 
fiction of the “reasonable man” is based on a constellation of privilege – gender, class, race, 
wellness, and ability, for starters. His privilege is a function of his ideological perfection as the 
typical exemplar of liberal personhood. He represents the ideal that drug court defendants should 
aspire to: gainfully employed, educated, punctual, rational, engaged in normative family 
relations, law-abiding, honest, and, of course, sober. He lurks throughout my dissertation. 
In this chapter, I discuss how, much like in trial courts, defendants are often held to 
objective standards by court practitioners who determine what they can and cannot do, or if they 
are or are not in compliance. However, defendants expressed that these objective standards are 
out of touch, lacking a complex understanding of their different social positions, diverse 
experiences of addiction, and a recognition of their competing responsibilities. This inflexible 
practice disavows deep-seated inequality that curtails some people’s chances more than others in 
what Gayle called the “big lie” of the criminal justice system. This goes to my overall assertion 
that certain contemporary principles of justice can be antithetical to contemporary logics of what 
constitutes good care. I describe two drug court interactions in which defendants were 
noncompliant because they were late, and according to court practitioners, unreasonably so. 
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Compliance is not self-evident. It is a determination made by weighing certain forms of 
evidence, and discounting others. I contrast the uses of evidence in most criminal courts with the 
drug court model, which applies “maximum flexibility” to evidentiary procedures in service of 
“solving a problem.” Using two ethnographic examples, I show how this maximum flexibility 
de-authorizes defendants, rather than allowing them to take on agentive roles in explaining the 
circumstances of a positive drug test and thereby helping to determine the direction of their 
treatment. Looking at another interaction between Judge Lazarus and a defendant who wanted to 
contest his drug test results, I show how defendants have little recourse to put forward any 
evidence for their claims. In this example, Judge Lazarus played with the movable authority of 
linguistic registers, voicing, and reported speech to delimit what may be considered to have 
evidentiary value. I then analyze another interaction between Judge Lazarus and a defendant in 
which the judge glanced at a recipe for cake on her computer screen and used that information as 
evidence that the defendant had acted irresponsibly. In this instance, Judge Lazarus drew on her 
institutional authority to deem what she found in that moment on the internet to be true, factual, 
and evidentiary. First, I explain how defendants become responsible to maintain a status of 
compliance and the stakes of noncompliance. 
 
The dangerous plea 
That questions of evidence are of little mention in drug courts is legally explained by the 
fact that defendants in drug court are not on trial. They must plead guilty to one (or sometimes 
more) of the felony charges against them as a prerequisite to participation.1 The plea hearing that 
                                                
1 While most readers will be more familiar with the concept of an arrest charge – e.g., “Colonel 
Mustard, you’re under arrest for the murder of Mrs. Peacock” – the average reader may not be 
aware that prosecutors will often charge Col. Mustard with a cascade of “lesser included 
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marks the initiation of a defendant’s drug court journey is the last time many defendants will find 
themselves immersed in a formal legal ritual until they either graduate or are terminated (and 
incarcerated) a year, or even two or three years later. At this plea hearing, drug court defendants 
waive some of their due process rights – their right to a trial (and the procedural rules and rights 
due defendants during trials) and their right to appeal any sentencing decision. When defendants 
waive their rights to a trial by pleading guilty, they forgo the strict procedural rules that guide 
legal practitioners in deciding what information, facts, or objects can be considered reliable and 
relevant and therefore admissible as evidence to either party’s case. Defendants are thus in a kind 
of legal limbo between the time of their allocutions and their sentencing.  Because of this limbo 
status, and because nobody can predict whether a defendant will succeed a year or more down 
the line (a point reiterated to me by several different court practitioners independently), “It can 
be a really dangerous plea,” Samantha, a criminal defense attorney with one of non-profit public 
defender organizations in Judge Lazarus’s jurisdiction, told me.  
Samantha said, “I get it, that’s the carrot, but, like, it’s like taking the plea up front just 
sucks away all- all what we’re trained to be able to do for our clients, which is fight for [them].”  
Samantha referred to the legal leverage that is supposed to coerce defendants to remain 
compliant. The carrot is the incentive that if they succeed, their charges will be dismissed; the 
stick, that if they fail, they will go to prison and be branded a felon for life. 
There are significantly fewer drug treatment courts that operate with a pre-plea model, 
where the defendant does not have to plead guilty to participate. In the pre-plea model, there is 
neither prison sentence nor certain felony conviction looming over the defendant’s head and 
                                                
charges” from the class A felony of murder in the first degree down through manslaughter, 
assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a deadly weapon, etc., in the hope that at least one 
will “stick.”  
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coercing them not to fail in treatment. While proponents of the post-plea model worry that this 
diminishes the incentive to stay with the program, a recent, well-regarded multi-sited evaluation 
of drug courts across the U.S. (the “MADCE”) found that both models show similar benefits in 
reducing crime, and that pre-plea models actually do a better job of reducing drug use among 
participants (Zweig, Lindquist, Downey, Roman, and Rossman 2011). Coercion itself may not be 
the key to treatment courts’ ability to help people. But the three courts I studied followed the 
post-plea model. 
When defendants enter their guilty pleas, they also enter into contracts.2 As parties to a 
contract, they consent to be bound by a set of rules that are specific to drug court. These rules 
supplement the criminal laws to which defendants are of course already subject. In addition to 
being law-abiding, defendants now have to be “compliant,” too. In other words, they become 
legally accountable for “otherwise normal behavior” (Paik 2011, 42). Deviations from 
compliance can include absence from outpatient treatment, absconding from inpatient treatment, 
lying, breaking a rule at rehab, not looking hard enough for a job, relapse, tampering with a urine 
sample or alcohol monitoring device, being late, and having a bad attitude. These instances of 
noncompliance may be punished with a “sanction” – a somewhat bureaucratic sounding term for 
punishment.   
                                                
2 Serving as something of an analogue to informed consent forms, these contracts minimally lay 
out the terms of defendants’ participation. This includes the ultimate risk of participation, which 
is the sentence they will serve should they fail.  Framing the relationship between court 
practitioners and the defendant as contractual situates defendants as “rational actors” making 
informed choices, despite the fact that court practitioners sometimes referred to defendants as 
“delusional,” “stupid,” “idiot[ic],” and “believers in magical thinking.” Further, as I will 
demonstrate throughout this dissertation, nobody really knows what they may be getting 
themselves into, so a “rational choice” is out of the question. 
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Practitioners invariably responded to a defendant’s relapse by extending and intensifying 
treatment, while their response to surmising that a defendant had lied about a relapse (i.e. denied 
it) usually included sending the defendant to jail for a few nights (sometimes up to two weeks) 
before extending and intensifying treatment. At other times, it was not necessarily predictable 
which actions might be met with which sanctions. Defendants would lose time (extending their 
mandate or regressing them to the beginning of their current phase), do time (in jail), spend a day 
or more sitting in the courtroom’s jury box (which was otherwise empty), write an essay, be put 
on probation, be sent to live in a residential treatment facility, be required to attend outpatient 
treatment or self-help groups more often, and be scolded, chastised, and yelled at from the bench.   
On the other hand, when defendants were doing well, they might be rewarded with praise 
from the judge. As defendants hit benchmarks of sanctionless “clean time,” they moved through 
the three “phases” of their court mandates. They also received certificates of completion printed 
on pastel or neon paper as they advanced through the three phases of the program. For this 
accomplishment, the judge would lead the courtroom in a round of applause, and offer a 
handshake to the defendant. But increasingly severe punishments also accompanied each phase 
advancement, as defendants were held more and more individually responsible for acts of 
noncompliance. 
In my estimation, the sanction repertoire was significantly more elaborate than the 
reward. Kerwin Kaye Brook (2010, 95) likewise observes, “the [drug] court appears to devote far 
less attention on rewards and instead continues to focus upon its historical specialty: 
punishment.” Indeed, not only are punishment schedules more elaborate, but also, punishments 
can seem disproportionately harsh when compared with the benefits of rewards. When I asked 
the room full of defense attorneys and social workers, all bright women in their late twenties and 
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thirties, at Just Defenders about rewards and punishments, one of them quipped, “What’s the 
opposite of jail? Applause.” 
This disparity between the value practitioners effectively place on sanctions over praise is 
significant, because the MADCE also found that the use of more severe sanctions like jail time 
did not contribute to reductions in crimes committed or days of drug use by defendants (Roman, 
Rossman, and Bhati 2011). In fact, in drug courts where the percentage of sanctions involving 
jail was between 1 and 20 percent, the researchers found that “the number of crimes and days of 
drug use reported at 6 months were higher than for clients who did not receive jail time 
sanctions. They were estimated to commit 10 more crimes and report 5.4 more days of drug use 
than those with no jail sanctions” (ibid., 224). On the other hand, the researchers found that 
praise from the judge was “significantly related to fewer crimes and fewer days of drug use” 
when they checked both at 6 and 18 months after baseline (ibid.).  This seriously undermines the 
use of jail as part of a therapeutic jurisprudential practice.  
Private defense attorney Scott explained how the defense attorney’s power to affect the 
outcome is constricted because of the plea and the contract that redefines and sustains the 
defendant’s ongoing relationship to the court post-adjudication: 
Scott: There’s little you can do because they’ve already pled guilty. 
EM: Right 
Scott: And, you know, that’s– that’s their contract. They’re pleading 
guilty so they’re on the hook if they do anything wrong and it’s 
supposed to be an incentive to someone – especially my client who’s 
there now – he pled guilty to felonies – felonies that will ruin his 
life.  
 66 
Samantha explained, “they’re already conceding guilt in the beginning so if they screw 
up enough times and [Judge Lazarus’s] like enough, that’s it, right.” As a public defender, 
Samantha spends her days racing from one courtroom to another. Most of her clients are not drug 
court defendants, but when we spoke, she had six or seven clients in drug court. She explained to 
me, “My job is really easy. Like, I’m supposed to defend someone. Like, I don’t care if they’re 
guilty or innocent or whatever, I’m just supposed to put everything I can to do that. And in drug 
court, you can’t do that.”  Her job as a public defender is truly not easy, especially given the 
resource constraints on funding public defense systems in the U.S.3 But her characterization of it 
as “easy” speaks to a certain ethical ease that allows her to pursue every line of defense for her 
clients with determined tenacity and singular focus. In drug court, there is less clarity about her 
role. In a trial court, she must either instill and nurture a jury’s doubt about the verity of a 
prosecutor’s story or expose a breach of due process, like a mishandling of evidence, something 
that will otherwise nullify the prosecution’s case. In drug court, however, she often lacks the 
resources and the “mechanisms” (her word) to draw upon or instill doubt in the version of events 
put forward by the drug court team. With that background, I will move on to my discussion of 
how court practitioners determine whether defendants are in compliance.  
 
Objective standards of compliance 
Borrowing from the therapeutic register, the term compliance emphasizes a patient’s (in 
this case, defendant’s) responsibility to follow a treatment regimen (Farmer 1999; Lerner 1997; 
Race 2009; Trostle 1988). As is sometimes the case in medicine, a focus on 
                                                




compliance/noncompliance can tend to put too much stress on an individual’s misapplication of 
or diversion from a presumably appropriate treatment plan and not enough attention to what 
kinds of resources and access a patient or drug court defendant might need to “comply.”  
Holding defendants individually responsible for compliance ignores the complex chains of 
circumstances, events, and interpretations that lead to the determination that a defendant is 
noncompliant (Paik 2011, 43). 
Legal Services criminal defense attorney Gayle, one of two public defenders on Judge 
Fierro’s team, explained how defendants in different social positions (gender, class) can have 
different responsibilities that compete with drug court demands, and that can make compliance 
more difficult for some than others.  
Gayle: No. I actually– I think women tend to do worse. And– and 
I, you know– how do I define worse. Women have so many more 
responsibilities than men do, and they are so much more conflicted 
than men are. 
EM: About the program itself? 
Gayle: No, I mean about how to juggle all of the different– these 
competing responsibilities and, I mean, listen, I’ve been there, so I 
really and I home right in on that because I’ve been in their shoes. 
I mean, I’ve had money, I’ve had a partner, but, you know, I mean, 
I’ve been on trial and one of my kids wakes up and is sick as a dog 
and what- what do you do? You have to make the best decision 
you can and these women are under scrutiny that I was never under 
because if they make the wrong decision, [the Department of Child 
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Protection] comes in and castigates them and maybe makes a- you 
know, and if they make the right decision, then, you know, then 
where do they put their sick kid? So, that is– that is really hard. 
EM: Yeah 
Gayle: And we have not found a way to deal with that  […] Um, 
but you know I think with women, women I think, and maybe this 
is just because how I evolved is kids and work– I tried to handle it 
all on my own and um the women in our program tend not to have 
a lot of family support or they are the family support and so, you 
know, we have tried many different, you know, on an individual 
basis tried to figure out how to do something but really in the end 
and I know this myself, you can become so overwhelmed and it’s 
a– it’s not like men. Men close the door, even if they’re living with 
their children, they close the door. But when you’re a woman, 
that– that's really not an option that’s available to you. And so, 
sometimes, it’s they’re just so tired and overwhelmed and they feel 
they have no options that they end up opting out and I’ve had a few 
women who have done that because of issues that we tried very 
hard to work with them on.  
Gayle showed a deep awareness of what she called the “big lie” that all defendants are equally 
positioned to meet the many and diverse demands of the multi-pronged criminal justice system. 
This is what she called the big lie: 
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Well, you, know in the criminal justice system there’s that big lie 
all the time: “Why didn’t you come in with the fine money?” 
“Why? Well, you know, my kid needed to eat this week.” And 
that’s not an excuse. There is this ridiculous idea that every client 
is capable of compliance and so their failure to comply is a willful 
failure to comply. 
But Gayle struggles with whether the drug court team should develop subjective as 
opposed to objective standards for defendants. Immediately after she told me about how her team 
in drug court had not found a way to deal with inequities produced by class and gender 
difference and those that emerge from women’s “competing responsibilities” (Trnka and Trundle 
2017), she proceeded to tell me about how making “special arrangements” for a defendant can 
backfire. For instance, in the middle of one woman’s mandate, Gayle told me, “she had a baby”: 
So, and we made all these special arrangements, which you know I 
am not– I have to say I don’t favor making a lot of special 
arrangements. Because one of the things I’ve found with people in 
general is the more special arrangements you make for them, the 
more casually they take their responsibilities and so often they’ll 
do things and they– you know, they think everyone’s just going to 
understand because they understood the last time and that 
complicates things and that kind of happened with her. 
Special arrangements, Gayle suggests, don’t promote personal responsibility, an assertion 
that, like the “bootstrapping” Horatio Alger narrative so often repeated and idealized (but rarely 
achieved), disavows the “special arrangements” that those with race, class, and gender privilege 
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receive, and that she herself just alluded to. Despite her assertion that women tend to have a 
more difficult time balancing the demands of drug court with their many competing 
responsibilities, Gayle returns to privileging that objective standard of justice that applies the 
rules regardless of a defendant’s circumstances and social position.   
According to Gayle, Judge Fierro was also grappling, admirably, with this tricky balance 
between an objective standard and individualized care: 
Gayle: I have to credit our judge, because she’s an incredibly 
bright and ethical person. And she really grapples- as we all do – 
with these issues that you’re doing all these – this is unfolding in 
front of other peoples’ eyes and so you also have to be consistent, 
but you have to teach people that being consistent doesn’t mean 
treating everybody identically. 
EM: Right. 
Gayle: But you also have to have a certain standard and you have 
to be respectful of other- everybody’s spectrum. 
EM: Right. 
Gayle: So, it’s very difficult. It’s very tricky –if you want to do it, 
you know, with due respect for the individual and for everybody in 
the program. 
Gayle illustrated well the tricky, arguably impossible, balance of both holding everybody to an 
objective standard while still being respectful of the spectrum of the audience of defendants 
before practitioners. This is a spectrum of differential access, privilege, and dispossession. 
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But while court practitioners may be grappling, Sam, a defendant in Judge Fierro’s court, 
found the drug court’s objective standards inflexible, ethnocentric and presumptuous, and 
frustrating. Sam was frum, a Yiddish word meaning devout or pious in one’s observance of 
Jewish law and customs. He lived in the next state over, which helped him keep the fact that he 
was a defendant in drug court separate and secret from his tightly knit Orthodox community. 
When early in his treatment court mandate, Sam asked if he could attend the wedding of an old 
friend’s daughter, he wasn’t just dispassionately told “no.” From where I sat, it was a tense 
moment in court (and that wasn’t even the half of it – or “what actually happened,” he said). His 
request was eyed with suspicion, as if his only motivation for wanting to attend the wedding was 
to drink alcohol. Drinking alcohol was prohibited for all defendants, even those, like Sam, who 
were not alcoholics. This follows from the ideology that once one has become an addict recovery 
depends on total sobriety. 
Sam told me: 
But they have all these assumptions. […] Like you should know 
that I’m not going to a wedding to drink, I’m going to a wedding 
because my friend’s kid is getting married. I didn’t make up the 
excuse. Here are the invitations. Here’s the night. Just, like, work 
with me, you know. And it always comes out wrong, like, what 
you’re hearing in court is not– it’s not reality. It’s not what actually 
happened. Like, I said to my lawyer [Gayle], “Offer them things.” 
And instead, she went and said, she said to me, “No. We don’t 
horse trade like that.” Then she went up and horse traded- tried to 
horse trade in the least way possible, that was much less than I was 
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willing to give. She’s like, “Oh, Mr. [Levy] promises that he’ll, uh, 
make it up. He’ll make up the sessions he misses.” So, I mean, 
that’s true – that’s the least amount I would have done. And it was 
like, “Whoa, whoa – what’s going on here. He thinks he’s so 
different,” like, “This is crazy,” like, “Weddings are a place to 
drink.” It’s like just the– the automatic assumption, like to even 
think […] 
Sam then voiced the response he would have hoped to have received, but did not: “He wants to 
go to two weddings, here are the invitations staring us in the face, like, he’s clearly not doing this 
so that he can drink. Like he’s doing it ‘cause it’s a wedding.”  But, he said, instead: 
And- and then there are all these assumptions about what would 
his wedding be like as opposed to any other wedding. It’s like, 
“It’s the same. We know what a wedding’s like. Everyone gets 
drunk.” No one gets drunk at our weddings, so, like, why would I 
be getting drunk at a wedding? It doesn’t happen. It’s like, I would 
be embarrassed to get drunk at a wedding because everyone would 
look at me like I’m foolish, you know, and disgusting and an 
alcoholic and then they would talk about me: “Oh my god, did you 
see [Sam]? Like, “he was drinking at the wedding. He must be an 
alcoholic.” And then it would be, like, more bad stuff about me 
[laughs]. So, like, why would I ever do that? It’s just, it’s so far – 
Their thought process is just so- like it’s always that way, the 
justice system, and that’s what’s so frustrating about it is there’s no 
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thought that goes into it. There’s no creativity – it’s the – they have 
all these rules that they have to follow that don’t show any 
semblance of creativity. […] It should be malleable enough that 
judges can make exceptions for different things depending on what 
they see in front of them. […] Here I am, I’m coming to you. I’m 
volunteering. I’m showing you the invitation […] Like, I’m not 
sneaking behind your back and going to a wedding […] I’m 
coming up and asking you for permission. 
Sam’s critique, echoing Gayle’s concerns, is that drug court practitioners, as agents of the justice 
system, impose certain inflexible, objective standards on defendants in drug courts, even though 
they are technically not on trial. He also criticizes the drug court practitioners for their 
assumptions about addicts (assuming that his reason for wanting to attend a wedding is to get 
drunk) and for the ethnocentric assumption that all weddings are like the weddings they are 
accustomed to (where people get drunk). His example shows how an objective standard is 
harmful to him and his relations of social care: 
But, in- in our community, you know, like going to someone’s 
wedding is like, you do it all the time. It’s a done thing, like, it’s 
expected. Like, you’re gonna go. Like, how can you not go? I 
mean, this guy, I’ve known him for twenty-five years, the father of 
the bride. You know? So how could I not go? I-I-I couldn’t 
conceive of not going. And so that’s frustrating. It’s frustrating 
when you know there’s something you want to do that’s a good 
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thing to do and a nice thing to do and it’s just viewed as being, 
like, this horrible thing. 
Sam evoked a sentiment that came up for other defendants, too, especially those who were 
surprised to find that their actions were taken as noncompliant, for instance when they had 
secured themselves a place in a treatment program after a relapse. Rather than a demonstration of 
responsibility, this was viewed as an irresponsible, noncompliant shirking of drug court 
directives.  In Chapter 2, “Team up, Speak Up, Lock Up: Creating Webs of Surveillant Care,” I 
show how this tight control over defendants’ networks of care is part of how the drug court keeps 
close tabs on defendants through good and timely communication. 
 In telling this story, Sam also indicated that despite the courts’ attempt to follow and 
enforce rules objectively, he was often left guessing what would or would not be expected of 
him. He told me that in retrospect, he never should have even mentioned the wedding. He could 




Drug court rules revolve around scheduled appointments and being on time. One 
participant handbook listed these four rules:  
1. Remain abstinant [sic] from all drugs and alcohol 
2. Appear in court as Scheduled. 
3. Follow your treatment plan.  
4. Complete the [Treatment Court] Phases. 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For all that they stand for in their misleading simplicity, these rules remind me of Kobayashi 
Issa’s poem describing the reflection of the distant mountains in the eye of a dragonfly.  
Smaller print under rule 2 explains: “You will be required to appear in front of the Judge 
on a regular basis. On your scheduled court date, arrive at [Treatment Court] at 9:00 am[…]” 
And under rule 3, “You must attend all Case Manager, treatment, and support services 
appointments.” In text boxes to the right of these rules, defendants are reminded: “Your 
treatment schedule will vary according to your progress. It is your responsibility to keep all 
scheduled appointments and to arrive on time. You must review your treatment plan with your 
Case Manager and follow it carefully” (emphasis in original). Progress, responsibility, schedule, 
plan. These words repeat like a constant drum beat in the drug courts. This is not simply about 
bureaucratic expedience, although it is that, too. Practicing punctuality and a scheduled life is 
supposed to ingrain responsibility into the wayward defendant.4 These rules of punctuality are 
part of treatment and what it means to recover from what is considered an unending condition 
(i.e. addiction).  
In the late morning of the summer of 2013, Mr. Moreno,5 a burly young Latino man, 
stood before Judge Lazarus with his hands cuffed behind him. His attorney and the judge argued 
over several instances of noncompliance; among them, that Mr. Moreno was previously late to 
court when his father’s car broke down on the way. The judge expressed scorn that his father 
didn’t tell him to get in a cab and get to the courtroom. The details didn’t really matter though; 
what mattered was that “he didn’t leave early enough to get here on time,” she said.  
                                                
4 Foucault (1977) described the elaborate timetables that shape penality in its modern 
correctional form. Conformity to a managed schedule is supposed to transform the prisoner’s 
very disposition, deportment, and orientation to his life, and the world. 
5 For defendants with whom I had no personal relationship and never spoke to, I refer to them by 
last names (pseudonyms, of course) just as the court practitioners generally did. 
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 After Mr. Moreno’s attorney and the judge discussed a positive drug test, Judge Lazarus 
said, “So I’d like to hear one honest statement from Mr. [Moreno].”  He obliged: “I was stressed 
out and I smoked.”  
Judge Lazarus:  So why do you think we want you in treatment? 
Mr. Moreno: To stop smoking. 
Judge: What do you think treatment would help you with? 
Mr. Moreno: Being responsible and making appointments.  
Mr. Moreno clearly distilled the temporal aims pulsing through drug court conceptions of 
treatment and responsibility: making appointments. Judge Lazarus then sort of corrected him, 
answering her own question: “how not to get high when you get stressed out or angry.” 
Treatment is supposed to help with that too, but Mr. Moreno was also spot on.  
When it was alleged at his 19th weekly appearance before Judge Fierro that Charles, a 
Black man I guessed to be in his thirties, missed treatment two days prior, Gayle, his attorney, 
told the judge that he was minding his girlfriend’s baby and the babysitter never showed up. 
Marilyn, the resource coordinator from the court’s in-house treatment center told Judge Fierro, 
“That’s why [our case manager] had him come to the office to discuss prevention plans, because 
we don’t want this to happen again.”  I was rattled by this phrase “prevention plans.” Judge 
Fierro responded, “Listen, things happen that are not preventable.” “But,” she continued, “they 
seem to happen to Charles a lot.” Charles winced and shook his head. I could hear the now well-
worn quotation by Nobel prize-winning 19th century French poet and journalist Anatole France: 
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to 
beg in the streets, and to steal bread. The judge’s tone stern, and her voice raised, she continued: 
“His file is replete with this type of situation. This is the last one.” In fact, Judge Fierro did seem 
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to expect Charles to prevent the unpreventable in the future. 
To be punctual, Marilyn’s reference to “prevention plans” suggests, one must plan ahead. 
Foresight is at the crux of legal responsibility, according to legal theorist Arthur Ripstein (2001). 
The legal fiction of “reasonable man,” who exercises reasonable foresight to prevent reasonably 
foreseeable harm, lurks in the proceedings at drug courts. He is the standard bearer for an 
“objective standard of reasonableness.” He appears in trial courts when judge or jury must 
determine what an “ordinary” (ibid. 102) person would do or believe in the same circumstance as 
the defendant.6  
Foreshadowing the themes of temporality in Chapter 5, “Time and the Addict: The 
Promises of Deferral, Return, and Transformation,” Marilyn’s reference to “prevention” 
presumes a “reasonable” temporality, a temporality that is paced somewhat predictably, and that 
extends towards the expectation of a life lived gracefully into old age. I learned as a harm 
reduction outreach worker passing out clean needles, condoms, and snacks to sex workers 
walking the strolls, that when the distance to one’s horizon is compressed by the urgency of 
survival, one is motivated by a different sense of longevity and prevention. Violence, arrest and 
incarceration, hunger, the intense pains of dopesickness – these all present themselves as 
immediately life-threatening risks, and by life-threatening, I mean existential survival and I also 
mean preventing “social death” (see Cacho 2012; Patterson 1985) and what Angela Davis (2008) 
has called “civil death.”7 Preventing illness is secondary when one might not live to see the 
                                                
6 As Mark Kelman (1994) points out, the “subjective standard” is no less problematic, as such a 
standard for reasonableness could deem reasonable the killing of a person of color out of fear 
driven by the ongoing portrayal of Black and Brown people as inherently violent and dangerous. 
Or rather, implementing a subjective standard might risk exonerating such acts of violence.  In 
fact, however, the objective standard does routinely exonerate killing based on racialized fear.  
7 Convicted felons, even after they have satisfied their sentences, will never regain the civic 
rights of fellow U.S. citizens. Restrictions on voting, employment, vocational licensure, 
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symptoms of a virus or a cancer begin to manifest. To bring it back to the context of the 
courthouse, as private defense attorney in Judge Fierro’s jurisdiction Scott said to me, “I don’t 
know if you’re aware of this, but people plead guilty to things just to get out of jail […] and you 
know, you don’t realize it at the time because your family is crying for you to come home, but 
you’re possibly ruining your life on this.” As we sat sipping coffee at a café near the immigration 
detention center where he also does a lot of his work, Scott indicated that certain people must 
balance the immediate, urgent commitments to family and to living life outside of prison, with 
the risk of ruin that taking a plea can promise. 
The “reasonable man” sets an “objective standard,” but not a “view from nowhere,” as 
“objectivity” is sometimes oddly characterized. In fact, this is a very particular, situated 
vantage.8 The “reasonable man” is the middle-class man, whose hard work is financially 
rewarded, whose job dictates relatively predictable patterns of life and perhaps the promise of a 
linear rise towards a prestigious retirement. This is no doubt a fantasy for most, but still a potent 
one that drives an ideology of liberal personhood (and thus, of what it means to recover). 
Inevitably, defendants who rely on public transportation, and who may not always have the fare, 
or who cannot afford child care, will be late more often. In effect, they simply do not “have 
time.” They are dispossessed of a time that runs its course and leaves them behind, waiting on a 
                                                
eligibility for public assistance, private and public housing, and exclusions from protections of 
anti-discrimination laws can follow an “ex-offender” for a lifetime (Allard 2006; Freudenberg, 
2002; Howell 2009). These “collateral consequences” of a criminal conviction are myriad and 
constitute what scholars have called a “civil death” (Davis 2008), a term used to describe an all-
encompassing civil disenfranchisement. This kind of civil death is haunted by, or is another 
iteration of, the total denial of civil and social recognition (the “social death”) of African and 
African-descended slaves of this country’s recent past. 
8 As is mine. My previous work with drug users at needle exchange programs shapes my 
expectations of care for drug court defendants. 
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street corner or “stuck” with a baby, late for their court-mandated appointments, and thus, not in 
compliance.  
Charles and I later discussed the fact that his decision to stay with a four-month old could 
have been seen by court practitioners as the responsible choice. He joked that if he hadn’t stayed 
he could probably be sent to jail for neglect. I agreed, also joking that maybe child protection 
services would get involved, and his girlfriend could lose custody of her child. In the comfort of 
hindsight, we could joke. Joking made a dangerous subject feel safe as we were only just getting 
to know each other. But it’s really no joke that some families are under intense scrutiny and are 
too often wrenched apart by state agencies that deem parents irresponsible (see Knight 2015; 
Roberts 1997).9 
A few months later, Charles told me he suspected he would get locked up for missing his 
appointment with probation when he didn’t have money for the bus; that he was told, “‘no 
excuses’ or some shit.” According to Marilyn, his program was reporting he had been absent 
from treatment for the prior week and a half. She reported to the Judge that his Medicaid had 
become inactive, but she mentioned this as if another piece of damning evidence that Charles 
was off the rails, irresponsible, spiraling out of control, and not as a reasonable explanation for 
his absence from treatment. In fact, getting bounced from Medicaid is an all-too-frequent 
bureaucratic ordeal for those on (and off and on and off again) the rolls. Marilyn reported that 
                                                
9 Just imagine the tragic irony that a family court could terminate a parent’s rights to be the 
caretaker of her child because she had to abandon him to fulfill another court’s mandate. I don’t 
know if it has ever happened, but the scenario is plausible, and state institutions impose these 
sorts of double binds often. I’m thinking, for instance, of scenarios in which public health 
departments give out clean needles, and police departments arrest people for possession of 
needles as drug paraphernalia. Or when health departments provide free condoms, and police 
departments use condoms as evidence that someone is working as a prostitute.  Of course, we 
can view these double binds in the themes of this dissertation as hewing to tensions between care 
and justice, the nanny state and the daddy state (see Wacquant 2009). 
 80 
Charles said he thought he didn’t have to go. I reserve my doubts that Charles would be so 
indelicate as to say to his surveillors that because he didn’t have insurance to pay for it, he didn’t 
“have to” go. Even if he relished the time away from treatment, I doubt he would allow that 
relief to creep into his presentation to treatment staff. It is more likely that what he tried to 
convey to Marilyn was that he thought because his Medicaid got cut off, he couldn’t go (or he 
was afraid that if he did, he would receive a hefty bill down the line – not at all an 
“unreasonable” expectation). Judge Fierro again said that his file was replete with compliance 
issues.  
Charles told the judge, “I’m not a waste of space. I want this chance. I want to stay in this 
program.” Judge Fierro told him she hoped jail would serve as a “wake-up call,” implicitly 
invoking the clock that rouses the responsible actor to the conscious order of a daily schedule. At 
that, he was cuffed and led through the door to the holding cells. 
 
Flexible standards of evidence 
In a criminal trial, the court is bound to certain procedural rules of evidence. Briefly, with 
a caveat that legal practitioners take entire courses on evidence law, poring over thick volumes 
that discuss their complexities in painstaking detail, the rules of evidence are in place to “vet” 
evidence to make sure it is relevant, reliable, and would not prejudice a trier of fact by casting 
any party in a negative light in ways not determined to be directly relevant to the case at hand. 
Legal practitioners tend to be careful to distinguish between facts and evidence. Lorraine Daston 
(1994, 244) explains that facts become evidence “[o]nly when enlisted in the service of a claim 
or a conjecture.” Virginia R. Dominguez (2013) highlights this distinction and describes the 
intensive consideration generally given to evidence in the legal realm: 
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If nothing else, laws about evidence in the United States, put 
together and presented to those in training to be lawyers, highlight 
that facts are not evidence in themselves, nor is evidence a collection 
of facts. Rather, the question is always what can and cannot be used 
as evidence of a theory or claim, how things go from being 
noteworthy or immaterial or just there to becoming evidence of 
something, and how to call into question something presented as 
evidence by opposing counsel. (644) 
Lawyers may agree on certain facts of a case, but then marshal evidence to support the 
claim that they seek to prove beyond the reasonable doubt of the trier of fact (e.g., in a jury trial, 
the jury).The evidence rules are intended to foster a tightly-regulated epistemological process so 
that jurors have just enough evidence to support a decision that one party has prevailed over the 
other. Above all, this process is an attempt to make the trial fair, although it is most certainly not 
always successful.  
Fairness should be seen to be situated in particular historical and cultural ways, and 
contested always, despite its aspiration to the universal. Susan Philips’ (1993) study of the U.S. 
Federal Rules of Evidence helps to illuminate some of the deep currents that inform what are put 
forth as fair and proper routes to knowledge in the U.S. context. First, she argues, the rules of 
evidence guiding trial procedure are influenced by Christian inquisitions for truth. Witnesses 
must swear on the Christian Bible to tell the truth, as the Judge looks down from her bench with 
the words “In God We Trust” emplaced on the wall above her. At the same time, the trial process 
mirrors a scientific concern with factuality and evidence and the application of a rigorous method 
to establish legitimate knowledge. Like a scientific trial, a legal trial tests a prosecutor’s 
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hypothesis, to see if it can withstand the defense’s challenges to convince an ideally neutral trier 
of fact. Finally, the trial models a democratic process that is committed to the idea that staging a 
conflict between opposing parties, to be ultimately voted on by an evaluating public, is a fair way 
to make important decisions. It follows that a trial is subject to politics of knowledge production 
that exist outside of courtrooms, in politics, the academy, and the Church, too.10 For instance, 
O’Barr (1982) found that juries were less likely to find a witness credible if her testimony was 
marked by features of “powerless speech.”11   
In drug treatment courts, the rules of evidence are not called upon to help court 
practitioners guide what may or should be considered evidence.  “No, they don't apply,” said 
Samantha as a cappuccino machine blasted through another espresso at a coffee shop several 
blocks from Judge Fierro’s court.  As toxicologist Paul Cary12 explains, “The drug court model is 
built upon an evidentiary foundation that provides maximum flexibility to team members as they 
apply innovative treatment strategies designed to succeed where other legal remedies have 
failed.” Cary produces significant amount of professional drug court knowledge, giving webinars 
and publishing fact sheets for the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) 
                                                
10 Academic politics of knowledge production suffer from similar biases (Arif 2016; Dominguez, 
Gutmann, and Lutz 2013; Habib 2017).  
11 William O’Barr’s (1982, 42) study of linguistic evidence in criminal and civil court 
proceedings suggests that the admissibility of “demeanor evidence,” such as “style, 
paralinguistic cues, and nonverbal behavior to reach a decision about a witness’s credibility” 
compromises the courts’ ideals of equity and fairness. Those witnesses who use “powerless 
speech” tend to be judged as less credible than more powerful speakers, affecting “their chances 
for a fair hearing in court” (ibid., 116). The use and interpretation of demeanor evidence is not 
bound by explicit rules, notes O’Barr (ibid., 43), but in fact it is rule-bound because it is “socially 
patterned.”  
12 Paul L. Cary, “Urine Drug Concentrations: The Scientific Rationale for Eliminating the Use of 
Drug Test Levels in Drug Court Proceedings.” Drug Court Practitioner Fact Sheet 4 (2004): 1-8, 
Accessed July 27, 2017, http://ndcrc.org/sites/default/files/urine_drug_concentrations_2.pdf.  
Page 2. 
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and National Drug Court Resource Center (NDCRC). By “team members,” Cary means the drug 
court practitioners themselves. One peculiarity of drug treatment courts is that they take a 
“teamwork” instead of an adversarial approach. Instead of two opposing parties, the prosecuting 
and defense attorneys are supposed to be working together with the judge and a staff of treatment 
professionals in what they collectively determine to be in the best interest of the defendant’s 
recovery, which I will discuss further in Chapter 2. This “maximum flexibility” in the 
evidentiary foundation is of particular interest to me. If the tight regulation of rules of evidence is 
supposed to ensure fairness, what does maximum flexibility achieve? What are the limits 
imposed on drug court practitioners, and what are the limits imposed on defendants, in 
knowledge and truth production? 
Noncompliance, Samantha explained, is “a violation of the conditions that you pled to, 
which is a different standard [of evidence] – it’s not ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ it’s like 
‘preponderance of evidence’ that - even then, in [Judge Lazarus’s court] at least, it’s not really 
clear if that’s even the standard?” At that moment, Samantha seemed to realize she didn’t 
possess a legal concept for the evidentiary standard in drug court. Stopping herself mid-sentence 
as she tried to apply legal concepts, she testified to the murkiness of the process by which drug 
courts arrive at – or produce – their truths. Note that Samantha moved from the highest standard 
of evidence (evidence that establishes proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard used in 
criminal cases to determine a defendant’s criminal guilt) to the lower standard of evidence used 
in civil cases (where the party bringing the suit, usually the plaintiff or claimant, must prove their 
claim with a preponderance of evidence, i.e., more convincing evidence than the respondent can 
marshal). Drug court doesn’t use the highest standard, she said, but then again, not the lower 
standard, either. 
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Evidence and very strong belief 
Urine drug tests are the most constant and trusted forms of evidence in drug courts. Like 
sociologist Leslie Paik (2011, 77) who studied juvenile drug courts using ethnographic methods, 
I observed that drug court practitioners hold urine drug tests out as “the only objective way to 
determine drug use,” even as they “recognize that drug testing is frequently problematic.” “I start 
with my very strong belief that the testing is accurate,” Judge Lazarus told me. Judge Lazarus 
attested to the accuracy of the tests, “even though,” she said, “I have a little bit less confidence in 
the testing by the programs,” by which she means the privately-run rehab and drug treatment 
programs defendants are mandated to attend or reside at. She explained that she was less 
confident in the results of tests done by the programs “since I don’t see what they do, you know, 
how careful do they handle them.”  Toxicologists warn of the many points at which a urine 
sample may be mishandled, mislabeled, misattributed, or contaminated in clinical settings 
(Reisfield, Goldberger, and Bertholf 2009).  
Sitting in Karen’s office on her day off as her young daughter flitted around the room 
entertaining herself so her mom could so graciously be interviewed, Karen mentioned that her 
favorite subject in law school was evidence. Karen was the second public defender on Judge 
Fierro’s treatment court team, with a smaller proportion of clients than Gayle.  I clumsily asked, 
“Um, have you had any thoughts about, sort of, the way evidence is or isn’t used in the drug 
court that you just find interesting or notable or– ” She interjected, “Like the drug tests?” She 
continued, “It’s funny, because sometimes I think they’re a little too quick to jump on, ‘Oh it was 
a positive,’ when there are other, kind of, mitigating factors as to what happened.”   
The gold standard in urine testing is gas chromatography–mass spectrometry (GC-MS). 
Processed and analyzed in toxicology laboratories, on the whole, these costly tests are reserved 
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for the occasional confirmation of a positive result given by a point-of-contact immunoassay test 
strip.13  In addition to being less costly, immunoassay tests are also valued because they provide 
“a quick, qualitative result” – that is, simply positive or negative (Robinson and Jones 2000, 10). 
GC-MS confirmation testing is performed less often in drug courts than in “traditional criminal 
justice drug testing programs,” note forensic scientists Robinson and Jones, in an issue paper 
published by the Office of Justice Programs Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance 
Project at American University. Robinson and Jones point out that this is “because the purpose of 
drug testing in drug courts is primarily to monitor a participant’s progress in treatment” (ibid., 
emphasis added). Hence, a lesser standard of evidentiary proof. 
Samantha described how Judge Lazarus’s court lacks a mechanism for defendants and 
their advocates to challenge the evidentiary reliability of particular drug test results. Doing so is 
literally frowned upon by drug court practitioners. I said to Samantha, “say you get a positive 
urine test and the client is- is saying, ‘but I didn’t use.’ It seems like there isn’t really—” 
Samantha: a mechanism! 
EM: --any way out of- of that. 
Samantha: Yeah!  You can fight. Like I had a colleague who 
fought, fought, fought, […] and uh, I- I think he won.  
EM: Really! 
                                                
13 Following Latour and Woolgar (2013, 51), urinalysis technologies – the gas chromatograph 
and the mass spectrometer, as well as the bioassays – can be considered “inscription devices.”  
An inscription device is “any item of apparatus […] which can transform a material substance 
into a figure or diagram which is directly usable by one of the members of the office space” in 
the laboratory. GC-MS produces curves and peaks which, are seen as having a direct relationship 
with the substance at issue (in our case, urine). In the lab, the diagram becomes the focus of 
interpretation and the starting point for analysis. The diagram shares certain features of Karl 
Marx’s (1972) fetish. It is alienated from its producer and it disguises the materiality of the initial 
substances and the work that went into making the ultimate inscription possible. 
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Samantha: Or at least he got them to realize that there had been a 
mistake. I think. Like I remember this all happening, and then I 
think I went on vacation. This was last year. So, you can fight – 
[but] like [Judge Lazarus] gets really annoyed with you. 
EM: Mhm 
Samantha: The- you know, everyone rolls their eyes at you – like 
everyone’s really mad that you’re – that you’re challenging it, 
because it’s not how it’s set up--  
EM: Right. 
Samantha: You know, what they say is, “Well, it’s a violation. 
We’ll throw you in for a couple of days.” Or, “You’ll have to go 
back in to 90 days, you know, uh, rehab.” So, yeah, it’s very much 
not – there’s no mechanism for challenging anything once you’ve 
taken that plea and started. 
Evincing the “warmer side of the state” (Fassin 2015, x), Samantha’s remarks remind us 
that the state is enacted by individuals who may not want their colleagues and superiors to get 
really annoyed and roll their eyes at them. Although Samantha said, “you can fight,” the fact that 
she hazily recalled that one colleague, one time, about a year before, might have done so is in 
step with my own observation that defense attorneys rarely questioned evidence of any sort put 
forth by the drug court team.  Scott told me, “I – other than just what you see me do in there, as 
much as I can – I’ve never had a hearing on an actual test.” He continued, “[Legal Services] is 
probably your best bet at finding someone, um, to get that answer from – of successfully – I can’t 
imagine they’re very successful.”  
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Once during my fieldwork in Judge Lazarus’s court, a privately employed defense 
attorney put forward a challenge to the accusation against his client that he had tampered with 
the device attached to his ankle (called a SCRAM bracelet) that monitors for any alcohol 
consumption (or contact). The court flew in a representative of the private company that 
produces and tracks the devices. He offered expert testimony to the accuracy of the claim that the 
device had been tampered with. Not only was the scientific register in which the witness spoke 
treated by the drug court practitioners to be unassailable, bolstered immensely by a report flush 
with technically impressive graphs and diagrams,14 but it also seemed that at least some of the 
drug court practitioners felt that the defense attorney who tried to put forward a defense was out 
of his league and simply did not know what was best for his client. He should not have tried to 
question the science. Instead, he should have worked as part of the “team.” By putting up a 
defense, they seemed to feel, he was only hurting, not helping, his client.  
In addition to a bit of glee in anticipation of watching this defense lawyer be thoroughly 
flummoxed by the expert witness – that is, glee in a “this’ll be good” kind of way – Allen, the 
district attorney, also seemed annoyed, partly due to the hundreds of dollars the court (and the 
proverbial taxpayer) would have to shell out to fly and lodge the expert.15 I got the sense that in 
the social economy of the drug court, the defense attorney was viewed as just not very 
considerate.  Yet at the same time, this hearing clearly provided the drug court an opportunity to 
                                                
14 Unlike in a trial court, the trier of fact in this case was not a jury, but the judge. However, 
Judge Lazarus was already convinced of the accuracy of the SCRAM science.  
15 Based on casual talk with ADA Allen, I did not get the impression that the court would have to 
compensate the expert, because he was an employee of the private corporation who supplies the 
courts with SCRAM bracelets, not an independent scientist. The courts are SCRAM’s bread and 
butter. 
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make a spectacle of the might of the science behind the SCRAM alcohol-monitoring technology, 
to discourage would-be challengers in the future. 
But again, this was a rare occurrence.16 Samantha told me: 
Samantha: It’s hard to even be like: “I want a hearing,” like, “Bring 
in the technician.” 
EM: Mhm 
Samantha: “Who runs the SCRAM bracelet?” “Bring in the person 
that took the [urine] sample,” you know? Like, “Bring ‘em in!” Like 
there’s not – they don’t allow that. 
EM: Mhm 
Samantha: And there’s really no mechanism to demand it. I mean 
you could – you could probably go through a – a writ process, but 
it’s just not set up for that. It’s like you’ve already pled, like there’s 
no– nothing about the case matters, the only thing that you’re 
fighting anyway is like the dirty urine or the [inaudible] sample, so 
yeah, you’re– it’s a frustrating process and everyone just wants to 
make it go smoothly. “Bad update or good update?” Like, “staying 
                                                
16 That expert witnesses make rare appearances in drug court is matter-of-factly explained by 
Robinson and Jones (2000, 7), again speaking to that lack of an evidentiary standard:  
The expert witness is rarely used in drug court programs because 
the drug testing conducted is primarily for supervision and 
monitoring purposes—rather than for prosecution—and drug court 
participants generally have already agreed to participate in the drug 
testing program and to the sanctions that may be imposed for a 
positive test result. 
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in the program or headin’ to jail for a couple days?” you know, or 
for more. 
Samantha’s experience suggests that despite the courts’ reliance on regularly contested scientific 
evidence, the absence of challenges to that evidence may be in large part because doing so 
appears to annoy colleagues and superiors who want to make what Samantha called a 
“frustrating process” “go smoothly.” In the team spirit of drug court, defense attorneys feel 
pressure not to question evidence.  
As Anthony Good (2008, S57) argues, lawyers’ positivist view of evidence, or in this 
case, drug test results, “reflects understandable practical imperatives rather than metaphysical 
naïvety. After all, legal proceedings must produce definite outcomes – verdicts or judgments – 
within quite short time spans.” But defendants are made to shoulder the responsibility for these 
institutionally imposed time limits on knowledge-seeking. I will delve deeper into this in Chapter 
4, “Testing Care: Truth Games, Confession, and Urine Trouble.” 
When drug court practitioners say, as they often do, that the results of a drug urine test 
are “objective” or that “the tests don’t lie,” what they imply is that the drug test results report on 
objectively true things in the world, and that they do so without intention. This opposition of 
objective/subjective recurs at multiple scales in a semiotic process of differentiation that Judith 
Irvine and Susan Gal (2000) identified– that is, how we create social difference through 
ideologically informed systems of signs. According to Irvine and Gal, three core processes are at 
the heart of semiotic differentiation –  iconization, recursivity, and erasure.  These semiotic 
processes facilitate identity formation through self/Other distinctions, where the Other is 
“essentialized and imagined as homogeneous” (ibid., 39). Through iconization, linguistic 
features come to be seen as iconic representations of social groups (or their attributes) and their 
 90 
“inherent nature or essence” (ibid., 37). These icons tend to take on properties of binary 
relationships that mirror the self/Other distinction – good/bad, responsible/irresponsible, 
objective/subjective. Fractal recursivity is the projection of these oppositions from one level of 
relationship to another, such that they can recur endlessly at multiple scales (ibid., 38). These 
icons and their recursions represent an ideological simplification of the sociolinguistic field. 
Irvine and Gal thus use the term erasure to describe the way this simplification “renders some 
person or activities […] invisible. Facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either 
go unnoticed or get explained away” (ibid.). 
In this instance, the objective/subjective binary recurs in the phrase “The tests don’t lie. 
People lie” and then recurs once again to further divide people along its axis. Some people 
habitually lie more than others (namely, addicts are the liars). Lying becomes iconic of addicts, 
who are seen to be locked up in a self-absorbed, inward subjectivity. The opposition of 
lying/truthful (or subjective/objective) can then be mobilized at different levels of relationship, 
such that some people’s words are automatically trusted as more objective(ly true). While it 
would be outrageous to claim that addicts can only and always tell false statements, if contesting 
a urine test, they are automatically disbelieved, even as a matter of policy. This simplification is 
a process of erasure.  In the next two sections, I turn to analyze two instances in which the 
objective/subjective binary recurs to divide people and kinds of evidence as authoritative or not 






I’m not a scientist: elusive authority 
In the following interaction, which took place in the summer of 2013, 20 minutes before 
lunch adjournment, Mr. Fitch a middle-aged White man, stood before Judge Lazarus. She shook 
her head in disapproval.  
Judge Lazarus: How long you been coming here? 
Mr. Fitch: 15 months 
Judge: On a misdemeanor [the mandate] could have been 
completed in 8 months. 
Mr. Fitch: I screwed up many times. [But I’m] doing much better. 
Judge: Really, how is that. 
Mr. Fitch: [I’ve got] 90 days clean. 
Judge: Which 90 days is that. Explain. 
Judge Lazarus was clearly not happy. The defendant’s treatment program reported that he had a 
positive drug test. Mr. Fitch tried to explain that his doctor told him that because he was taking 
methadone and was given Lidocaine by a dentist, the combination of the two caused an “adverse 
drug reaction” that resulted in a positive urine test for a drug called Darvon. Judge Lazarus 
challenged him: “What does ‘adverse drug reaction’ mean?”  Another court practitioner 
volunteered, “I thought it means adverse to your health.” “What [does that have] to do with the 
drug test?” Judge Lazarus asked the defendant.  He replied that his doctor told him there was a 
“possibility of a cross-reaction.”  Judge Lazarus parsed it finely when she responded, “He’s a 
doctor, not a scientist.” 
 Judge Lazarus then boiled it down to the core issue, as she saw it: 
 92 
Here’s the problem. [The lab] says you tested positive. And tested 
positive for an opiate. I don’t know who said “Darvon.” We can’t 
see what opiate it was. 
She speculated: 
You said you were in pain. [You said your] father gave you a pill. It 
must have been Darvon. 
Mr. Fitch said, “No it was one of [those] 500 milligram Advil.”  
Mr. Fitch tried once again to explain the “cross reaction.” He spoke to his dentist, he said, 
and learned that while he thought he received Novocain during a recent procedure, he instead 
had been administered Lidocaine. Holding a sheet of paper up, the defendant told Judge Lazarus 
that he printed out and highlighted information about cross-reactivity. “I’m not a scientist,” 
Judge Lazarus responded.  
The defendant made another attempt to challenge the accuracy of the drug test. He said 
that after learning he had tested positive for Darvon, he looked up the drug online because he had 
never heard of it, and found out that it was discontinued in 2010. “How could I come up positive 
for something there for something discontinued in 2010?” He then pointed out that on the same 
day that his program got a positive result from his test, “an hour later [I] came up negative here.” 
Judge Lazarus seemed puzzled as to why Mr. Fitch kept talking about Darvon. “When 
did they tell you it was Darvon?” The treatment program “must have sent it [the test] out” 
because the “cup can only tell positive and negative,” she reasoned.  She’s “gonna get the lab 
report,” she said. If the treatment program sends their samples out, it may be to “a more sensitive 
machine. Our machine can’t tell you what drug it was. Only that it’s an opiate. I will tell you that 
at the moment, I don’t accept” the argument about a cross-reaction. 
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Mr. Fitch protested, “I’m doing great, your honor. My father’s here to vouch for me […] 
I did not take Darvon. I’ve never even heard of Darvon. It was off the market in 2010 […] I was 
receiving Lidocaine shots from the dentist for six weeks.” 
Judge Lazarus: If this caused the “adverse reaction,” how come you 
didn’t test positive any other days. Because what you tested positive 
for may be something we don’t test for. They consider you tested 
positive for a substance for which you’re not approved. You know, 
throwing out those words, it’s to me as ridiculous as “my father gave 
me Darvon.” You’ll say anything. You’ll say anything. That’s what 
I hear. 
The defendant repeated that Darvon is “not on the market” and is “not my 
drug of choice.” 
Judge Lazarus: You have no idea what they’re talking about. Why 
are you telling it to me. […] But, oh, I should believe you. […] I’m 
done! I’m done! […] Whatever documentation you have, feel free 
to leave. 
This interaction demonstrates that the maximally flexible evidentiary foundation in drug courts 
does not provide much flexibility to defendants.17 The defendant attempted to introduce “hard” 
evidence (see Dominguez 2009), documents that he hopes will support his claim that he did not 
take Darvon, or anything other than approved, prescribed drugs – Lidocaine and methadone.  In 
                                                
17 I did not get to speak to this defendant, and even if I had, I am in a similar position to Judge 
Lazarus in that I ultimately cannot know whether he is lying, whether he used Darvon or another 
unauthorized opioid. I make no judgments about these claims here, and that ultimately is an 
important difference between my position as an academic and Judge Lazarus’s position in the 
drug court. 
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Chapter 2, I detail the process of objectification of texts that the drug court teams rely upon as 
hard evidence.  But the extent to which documents are considered evidentiary does depend on 
who attempts to introduce them. Here, the judge invited the defendant to “feel free to leave” his 
documentation. She would not consider it in the moment; it is unlikely she ever gave it any 
evidentiary weight.  
The defendant attempted to draw on the authority of the doctor’s expertise by using 
reported speech. Reported speech can be used to deflect responsibility (e.g., “he told me to do 
it!”) (Shuman 1993, Kuipers 1993), but also to enhance authority (e.g., “he told me I could”) 
(Hill and Zepeda 1993). According to Jane Hill and Judith Irvine (1993, 6), “One of the principal 
ways in which utterances come to be seen as authoritative concerns speakers’ ability to create 
‘double-voiced’ utterances (to use Mikhail Bakhtin’s term) that manage to add the moral weight 
of other voices to their own.”  In fact, this is what Judge Lazarus did when she said “[The lab] 
says you tested positive.”  But Judge Lazarus did not accept the defendant’s attempt at double-
voicing. It appeared she recognized his use of reported speech as both a deflection of 
responsibility – “You’ll say anything,” she said – and an unsuccessful attempt to enhance his 
authority.  “You have no idea what they’re talking about,” she said, rejecting his authority to use 
the words of the medical authority. She asked and answered her own question: “how come you 
didn’t test positive any other days. Because what you tested positive for may be something we 
don’t test for.” 
Judge Lazarus drew on the authoritative power of reported speech by pointing out its 
absence in the defendant’s story: “I don’t know who said Darvon.” She even used the technique 
of reporting the defendant’s speech in a way that suggests he unwittingly incriminated himself 
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during his attempt at self-defense and positions her as somewhat omniscient: “You said you were 
in pain. [You said your] father gave you a pill. It must have been Darvon.” 
Judge Lazarus even questioned his doctor’s technical authority – “he’s not a scientist” – 
and then her own: “I’m not a scientist.” In so doing, Judge Lazarus exalted the interpretation of 
urinalysis so as to be inaccessible to anyone but a qualified scientist – leaving the drug test data 
untouchable within the courtroom walls. Not only is she unqualified, but there is no one present 
in the courtroom who is qualified to interpret or reinterpret these results. They would need to call 
in an expert witness. But this won’t happen. And the defendant is not able to offer any evidence 
as to his “innocence.”  
Judge Lazarus also peppered her speech with Mr. Fitch’s own words, early when she asks 
him “What does ‘adverse drug reaction’ mean?” and then “If this caused the ‘adverse reaction,’ 
how come you didn’t test positive any other days,” and finally “it’s to me as ridiculous as ‘my 
father gave me Darvon.’”  Niko Besnier (1993, 175) shows how quoting can serve to allow a 
speaker’s “own voice to ‘leak’ onto the quote, and yields what Bakhtin ([1934] 1981, 364) calls a 
parodic stylization of the quoted voice.” By integrating Mr. Fitch’s words, some of them even 
his own use of reported speech, Judge Lazarus uses what Bakhtin ([1934] 1981) called 
ventriloquation – “when a speaker speaks through the voice of another for the purpose of social 
or interactional positioning” (Samuelson 2009, 52). Beth Lewis Samuelson (2009, 52) explains:  
Through ventriloquation, speakers reveal aspects of their ideology, 
beliefs, opinions, views, and attitudes (Wortham, 2001[a], 2001[b]). 
They may introduce evaluation of a person, object, or utterance, or 
they may highlight a main point or point out something that is 
instructionally significant. Since ventriloquated speech is often in 
 96 
the historical present, the utterances possess an eyewitness quality 
(Chafe, 1994). The speech represented may not necessarily be 
verbatim, or for that matter even real. (53) 
“Why are you telling it to me,” the Judge asked Mr. Fitch, indicating his words not only 
lacked authority but were also out of place. Elinor Ochs (1988, 218) observes how directly 
indexed epistemological stances in talk indirectly index social status. For instance, she notes that 
“in many societies, […] lower-status persons talking to higher-status persons are expected to 
evidence confused speech or to otherwise index that they do not know as much as their 
addressees” (ibid.). Here the defendant contravened this norm by attempting to use authoritative 
discourse to narrate his experience. He was out of place, attempting to exercise authority where 
he had none. 
 
Piece of cake: evidence of irresponsibility 
On a Thursday in mid-July 2013, one of the last cases to be called up before Judge 
Lazarus was that of a middle-aged Black man who spoke with a Jamaican accent, Mr. Watkins. 
He had previously pled guilty to felony charges of driving while intoxicated in order to 
participate in the drug treatment court as an alternative to incarceration. Like the many 
defendants who cannot afford private counsel, he stood beside Faye, the Legal Services criminal 
defense attorney on Judge Lazarus’ drug court team. Faye summarized reports from his 
outpatient treatment program and from the court’s treatment center. She reported that the 
defendant tested positive for alcohol on July 5, but that he was “not admitting that he drank any 
alcohol.”  By using the phrase “not admitting,” Faye implied that Mr. Watkins did in fact drink 
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alcohol and was now lying or in denial.  She didn’t say, for instance, “My client maintains that 
he did not drink any alcohol,” reserving the possibility that he was being truthful.  
Judge Lazarus: Then tell me about what you were doing on July 
4th. 
Mr. Watkins: I stayed home. 
Judge: You were with your family? 
Mr. W: Yes. 
Judge: What did you do? 
Mr. W: I ate some cake, called Black Cake, and [now I think 
maybe] there was rum [in it]. 
Judge: But you don’t really know. Ordinarily, when you eat rum 
cake, you taste the rum. 
Mr. W: There are other spices in there. 
Judge: So you’re saying you didn’t taste the rum. 
The judge shifted her gaze to the computer monitor at her bench. From my seat in the 
gallery, it seemed she hammered out a few words on her keyboard, scrolled, clicked, and read. 
She continued: “Actually, the first ingredient in Jamaican Black Cake is rum.” The defendant 
protested, insisting that the cake isn’t always made with rum.  
Mr. Watkins explained to the judge that his sister made the cake and that she’s a 
Christian, meaning abstinent, he said, so he never thought she would soak her Black Cake in 
rum.   
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Judge: It would be incumbent on you to say, “Is there rum in this 
cake?” Does your family know that you’re involved in a treatment 
program? […] Do they know you’re not permitted to drink? 
Mr. W: I took it for granted. 
Judge: That there was alcohol in the cake? 
No, Mr. Watkins said, reiterating that the baker, his sister-in-law, is a Christian and she 
doesn’t drink.  
Judge Lazarus : Now we’re back to [...] did you drink or was there 
alcohol in the cake? [...] Here’s my problem. It doesn’t matter if 
you drank or if you ate cake. What matters is your agreement here 
that you’re not going to use alcohol. […] If you’re not committed 
enough to say, “is there rum in this Jamaican Black Rum Cake?” 
[…] that you didn’t taste it or that by not asking any questions you 
can put anything in your body and not be held responsible. […] 
I had agreed to advance you to Phase II despite not having paid 
SCRAM. As a result [of this], I’m gonna require you to go back on 
the SCRAM bracelet. 
Judge Lazarus opened this colloquy with Mr. Watkins with a familiar invitation to “tell 
me about what [happened].” This is phrased as an open-ended invitation for the defendant to “tell 
his story” – which is seen as a key aspect of the therapeutic environment of the court (Hora 
2002). This “having one’s say” or “voice” is a central component of procedural justice (Marlowe 
and Meyer 2011; Tyler 1994), which I will discuss further in Chapter 2.  
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Judge Lazarus’s quick-fire line of questions somewhat resembles a cross-examination, 
wherein an attorney tries to reveal the lacunae in a witness’s account. Judge Lazarus’s 
interrogation appears to serve a similar purpose to cross-examination, but because the ultimate 
goal is to reform defendants, not just to prove them wrong or discredit them, her questions also 
discipline his self-understanding, to make his narrative conform to responsible storytelling, 
which I analyze in Chapter 5.  She disciplines his story until it makes sense according to a 
dominant narrative framework, and in this case, the sense it makes is that he is irresponsible.  
But I want to think about evidence and flexibility and Black Cake. I want to draw 
attention to the change that Mr. Watkins’s initial “Black Cake” undergoes in this interaction. He 
introduced the cake as evidence of his innocent, mistaken consumption of alcohol.  It’s “called 
Black Cake,” he said, and, after testing positive for alcohol, he realized that “maybe there was 
rum [in it].” The judge then referred to the cake as “Rum Cake,” already changing the 
defendant’s initial utterance “Black Cake” into a token of the type “Rum Cake.” Once she had 
done some quick online research, the judge referred to this cake as Jamaican Black Cake. And 
later, Jamaican Black Rum Cake.  When Judge Lazarus takes Mr. Watkins’s token “Black Cake” 
and changes it to “Rum Cake” and then to “Jamaican Black Rum Cake,” she is misquoting – or 
correcting – him, and thereby claiming the baptismal authority to entitle (Shuman 1993). Like 
the children’s game of telephone, Mr. Watkins’s utterance changed in each reiteration until it 
was truly a transformed thing. What Mr. Watkins offered in evidence to his innocence lexically 
transformed to confirm his guilt. He didn’t innocently consume Black Cake, he – presumed to be 
in possession of cultural (Jamaican) knowledge – knowingly consumed Jamaican Black Rum 
Cake. 
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Evidence often depends on “token of the type” relationships to indexically link particular 
instances to larger categories (Mertz and Weissbourd 1985).18 As Jan Blommaert (2010) notes, 
the token/type relationship is also one of scaling. The establishment of a type from a token is an 
upscaling, from a lower to a higher scale. The shift from the defendant’s “Black Cake” to the 
judge’s “Jamaican Black Rum Cake” can be seen as a vertical shift from the momentary to the 
timeless, the contextualized to the decontextualized, subjective to objective, individual to 
stereotype. The judge performs this “vertical move” in what Blommaert (2010, 35) describes as 
“a stratified, hierarchically layered system, in which higher scale-levels (institutional and 
community norms and rules) prevail over lower scale-levels.” Judge Lazarus performs “a power 
move in which a higher level of relevance, truth, validity or value” (ibid.) forecloses the 
possibility that the cake might be made another way.  
Despite Mr. Watkins’ insistence on his and his sister’s particularity, the judge 
transformed a particular instance of a particular woman baking a cake in her own way, with her 
own recipe, into a stereotypical, online-defined, culturally marked tradition. Mr. Watkins’ 
attempt to position himself (and his sister-in-law) as an individual – particular, with some 
amount of agency that is not culturally bound to recipes, and perhaps even unaware of what the 
Judge seems to suggest all Jamaicans must know – fails in light of the cultural determinism at 
play in Judge Lazarus’s upscaling.19  
                                                
18 For instance, an example of a legal type is a class of objects that are deemed “inherently 
dangerous.” It is the job of the prosecuting attorney to establish an indexical connection between 
a particular object used in a crime (e.g. a knife or gun) and the legal type “inherently dangerous.” 
Elizabeth Mertz and Bernard Weissbourd (1985, 280) explain, “This indexical connection, a 
connection within spatiotemporal context, is a kind of ‘baptismal event’ through which particular 
events or things take on (symbolic) cultural-legal significance as members of categories and thus 
become tokens of legal types.”  
19 The Black Cake emerged in this interaction as “cultural property,” or the embodiment of 
heritage – “bounded, discrete and unique—that is, a unitary ‘possession’ of an individuated 
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The judge’s ability to introduce evidence from an unidentified online source results in a 
new sanction against the defendant entailing the increased surveillance of his activities and 
deepening his already unpaid debt for the first round of SCRAM monitoring. Defendants in 
Judge Lazarus’s court for drunk driving are fitted with a device called a SCRAM bracelet for a 
minimum of 90 days. A transdermal alcohol-monitoring device worn on the ankle that tests for 
alcohol every thirty minutes, the SCRAM bracelet, at $11/day, costs the defendant at least $990. 
Mr. Watkins, now in Phase II of his three-phase treatment mandate, was no longer ankle-cuffed, 
but he still owed the court a debt for payment on the device. To graduate and avoid his prison 
sentence, Mr. Watkins would have to pay off his debts to SCRAM.20 
But here’s the really curious thing. It’s unlikely that the small amount of alcohol in any 
rum-soaked cake would register on a drug test performed the next day, unless Mr. Watkins at 
copious amounts of cake. There is no way for me to know whether it was in fact the rum in the 
cake that the test measured, whether Mr. Watkins attempted to use the story of the cake to 
disguise his actually having taken a drink, or whether there was a false positive (unlikely as that 
may be). That the Judge “humors” him by engaging with the possibility that cake was somehow 
                                                
social unit” (Segal and Handler 1995: 397). The judge’s upscaling – her quick jump to an 
explanation of the cake through a recognition of cultural difference – “take[s] for granted an 
essentialist understanding of cultural communities as clearly bounded and internally 
homogeneous” (Good 2008, S52). It is therefore an upscaling that enacts a kind of 
multiculturalism that emerged in the U.S. approaching the turn of the century. The primordiality 
that U.S. multiculturalists attribute to “other” cultures gives credence to literary critic Walter 
Benn Michaels’ (1995, 129) assertion that the “modern” culture concept, far from being a 
“critique of racism,” is actually a “form of racism” (also Baker 2010; Good 2008; Visweswaran 
2010).  I also note that Mr. Watkins and Judge Lazarus were discussing his family’s celebration 
of the United States’ Independence Day. Had they been discussing his delinquent cake 
consumption on August 6 – Jamaica’s Independence Day – I wonder how the tenor of the 
interaction might have changed. 
20 The historical meaning of addict as one who is enslaved due to an unpaid debt (Raikhel and 
Garriott 2013; White 2004) resonates. 
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involved in his positive test is probably what makes Judge Lazarus’s court so exemplary in the 
eyes of drug court proponents concerned with therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural justice. 
To a certain extent, she does allow Mr. Watkins to narrate a story. But it appears she does so 
precisely to de-authorize him.21  
 
Conclusion 
When Frank, a middle-aged Italian-American man, who entered Judge Fierro’s drug 
court with grand larceny charges and a heroin addiction, was certain a test at his program gave a 
false positive, we were discussing his options. I said to him, “So, you know, though- you know 
that you couldn’t go in there and say, it’s [the test is] wrong.”  
Frank: N-n-n-n-n—no.  No, because the likelihood- It’s more- How 
would I put it. Better yet, um, in this country we’re innocent until 




For Frank, drug court is a reversal of the common law notion of the presumption of 
innocence that is fundamental to the U.S. and many other national justice systems. “[C]loaking 
                                                
21 Unfortunately, I’ll never know whether Mr. Watkins felt that this was a fair process, which 
would be the best measure of whether the theory of procedural justice is doing the trick in the 
drug court context. I wasn’t actually permitted to speak to defendants in Judge Lazarus’s court. 
She told me at the beginning of my fieldwork that I was not to speak to defendants without the 
permission of their attorneys (permission I received from the attorneys in Judge Fierro’s court). 
This was framed as a protection of the defendants. But it is also yet another way to channel and 
restrict drug court defendant narratives. 
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the results of a power struggle between the prosecution and the defense in considerations of truth 
and justice” (Weigand 2003, 172), adversarial trials are spectacular demonstrations of “getting at 
the truth” (ibid., 158) in their structure and organization, even if they do not ultimately get there 
and even if that is not their only or even primary goal (see Dominguez 2013). Frank may be 
naïve22 in citing this cultural ideal that the burden to make the evidence prove that a defendant is 
guilty falls on the prosecution, and that this proof entails careful consideration and deliberation 
over the available evidence, but I think there is more to his critique than that.  
Drug court proponents and practitioners tout the drug court’s divergences from other 
courts with pride, while critics of the model are often wary of the changes. While Frank’s 
critique seems to follow with others who have critiqued drug courts for corrupting or 
contaminating justice, I think we can glean something more from his critique, especially in light 
of his appreciation for the chance drug court gave him to walk away without felony charges. 
That is, like Frank, many defendants valued drug court precisely in the ways that it was unlike 
other criminal courts. Frank alludes to the ways that defendants continue to confront accusations 
during their drug court mandates, and in this sense, his critique stems more from the ways drug 
courts are like other criminal courts – namely, that like a trial, compliance is a test.  
Further, while drug court practitioners spoke little of evidence, other logics of the 
criminal justice system, like individual guilt and responsibility as well as objective standards, 
still prevailed. Samantha told me:   
                                                
22 Roger Smith (1989, 70), writing on expert evidence in criminal law mainly in the United 
Kingdom, notes, “On a naïve understanding of jurisprudence, but an understanding in tune with 
deeply felt intuitions about justice, it is common to expect the courts to give priority to finding 
out what was the case in relation to a particular event.”   
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So, it’s hard to figure out what the advocacy route is in the drug 
court [...] when you’re trained in this adversarial system. […] I 
haven’t figured out what the creative response should be, but 
there’s something about the end result - still be[ing] the heavy 
sentences just like if you’d gone through trial, and that just doesn’t 
seem right.  
She said that there is a lack of fit between the long prison sentences that hang over defendants 
and the absence of a trial or at least a “mechanism” by which defendants and their attorneys can 
challenge evidence. She said, “if you’re going to be sending someone to jail, then somebody 
should be fiercely advocating for you.”  Samantha also said, “I don’t think [drug court’s] place is 
really within the justice system, you know, [be]cause it doesn’t make sense to have a different 
idea of what’s happening, and personal responsibility, if at the end of the day you’re still just 
going to lock someone up.”  
I share Samantha’s sense there is a lack of fit between the process and the potential 
outcome of prison, but for somewhat different reasons. That is, I agree with the premise that one 
should not go to prison without an opportunity to fight.  But trials are not just imperfect bastions 
of justice, they are systematically biased – an essential part of one of the most central and 
organized institutions through which working class and people of color are subject to premature 
death (Gilmore 2006), and through which the premature deaths of people of color are deemed to 
have been reasonably justifiable. The question of “justice” here becomes central.  Might there be 
something salvageable in the drug court’s dismissal of the trial format? Instead of a place of 
justice, could it become a place of mercy? 
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I argue that the lack of fit is between punitive justice system practices, including 
“objective” standards of justice, and practices of treatment and good care. When compliance is a 
test of the defendant, it isn't just the defendant that fails, it is the care that fails. Moreover, if we 
proceed from an understanding of drug courts as spaces of care, then imprisonment is neglect. It 
is not “just deserts,” it is desertion. It is ejection from the space of care. It is abjection, abandon. 
Drug court is “not supposed to be some joke alternate sentence,” private defense attorney 
Scott told me, meaning it’s not supposed to be easy. But it’s not an alternate sentence at all. It is 
the space between allocution and sentence. A space of treatment. It is easy to lose sight, as a 
researcher, perhaps as a defense attorney, a drug court practitioner, and even a defendant, of the 
fact that drug court is not the punishment.  It is not rectification for a crime. Neither should it be 
like a trial.  
Having taken on a therapeutic aim, evidence of noncompliance might suggest to drug 
court practitioners that they need to work with the defendant to adjust her treatment plan, rather 
than to punish her. The goal would be to maximize compliance, and eventual graduation, rather 
than put defendants to the test. For instance, instead of ramping up a treatment schedule, 
absences or lateness might require that a defendant be given more flexibility to balance her 
competing responsibilities. In this way, evidence of noncompliance would engender more 
responsive care (not necessarily more treatment). In fact, defendants who have more bouts of 
noncompliance but ultimately succeed tend to engender more feelings of care among court 
practitioners, which I show in Chapter 5.  
While the drug court team has maximum flexibility, in the absence of evidentiary rules, 
what can be put forward into evidence by the defendant is actually quite tightly constricted, and 
defendants are not viewed as trustworthy bearers of evidence (beyond what their words or their 
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body – especially their urine – may betray about them). That is, currently, one of the main effects 
of maximum flexibility appears to be to de-authorize defendants and prove them to be 
irresponsible manipulators. In being deprived of the ability to produce evidence, defendants are 
restrained in the ways they may participate in their own care. This fundamentally contradicts the 
spirit of teamwork and communication in the drug courts, which I will now turn to in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2  
TEAM UP, SPEAK UP, LOCK UP:  
CREATING WEBS OF SURVEILLANT CARE 
In this chapter, I discuss the behind-the-scenes teamwork of drug court practitioners and 
treatment providers. Drug courts, which Scott, a private defense attorney in Judge Lazarus’s 
jurisdiction, characterized as a “legal black hole,” are teetering on a razor-sharp line between 
competing ethical priorities to provide care while carrying out justice. The teamwork model, in 
which legal professionals have “no roles,” as Legal Services defense attorney Gayle on Judge 
Fierro’s team put it, and little to no professional ethical guidance, poses a sense of ethical 
precarity. 
Criminal and civil trial court proceedings convene around two opposing parties (defense 
and prosecution). In the ideal, the neutral judge acts as a legal mediator between the opposing 
sides, and a disinterred trier of fact (e.g. the jury) decides which side has prevailed on the 
evidence presented. Drug courts exchange an adversarial model for a teamwork model. Instead 
of working from opposing sides, prosecution and defense are supposed to come together in 
treatment court, with the judge and a treatment staff of case managers and others, to devise an 
approach that best serves the interests of the defendant’s progress in recovery. The emphasis is 
on consensus, not opposition. In the literature, this is framed as better suiting a therapeutic 
practice (see Hora 2002). Indeed, good care often depends on collaborative work and “good 
communication” (Mol 2008, 88).  
First, I discuss the closed-door meetings in which determinations are made about whether 
a defendant is in compliance or not, and what she needs from treatment, which take place before 
defendants appear before the judges. This democratization of decisions about a subject’s care is 
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an attempt at making care decisions fairly and more effectively. It detaches decisions from an 
individual to a collective. It is a way of reintroducing the ideal of objectivity, so central to the 
justice system, into drug courts. But teamwork also significantly changes the roles and 
responsibilities of legal practitioners, especially defense attorneys, to their clients.  
I present the appearance of Mr. Turner, a defendant in Judge Lazarus’s court, who faced 
the accusation that he had “tampered,” or consumed something to thwart his urine drug test. I 
illustrate how teamwork can mean teaming up on defendants. Teams both include and exclude in 
the drug court practitioners’ efforts to tightly monitor defendants’ networks of care.  Cooperation 
extends beyond the courthouse in selective partnerships with treatment programs through ever-
evolving channels for systematic communication. In fact, according to Joel, an upper-level 
administrator at Altruist Society, one of the state’s largest treatment programs, “communication” 
is the most highly valued attribute of a treatment program for drug court practitioners.  Together, 
drug court teams and their partnering agencies seek to present a united front1 to the defendants in 
their care. 
Counselors’ reporting duties represent significantly new responsibilities for care workers 
at treatment programs. I look at the way treatment counselors’ reports on defendants are 
entextualized (Silverstein and Urban 1996) in their transit to the courtroom, where they become 
evidence of defendants’ compliance or noncompliance. This process objectifies the counselor’s 
description of the defendant’s recovery – her “attendance, participation, progress, and 
toxicologies” – and gives it the status of a “legal document.” Thus, one effect of conscripting 
                                                
1 Alan Megill (1994, 6) argues that disciplinary objectivity claims “are a way of asserting, at 
least over a limited domain, the unity of knowledge.” Theodore Porter (1995, 215) notes that “a 
discipline cannot make convincing objectivity claims when it has strong rivals.” Drug court 
teams discourage dispute of their determinations, partly by seeking to get all the caring and legal 
professionals (many of whom are both in this hybrid environment) involved “on the same page.” 
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treatment professionals at rehab clinics into timely communication is the expansion of “police 
power” (see Dubber & Valverde 2006, Garriott 2013).2 Further, as texts travel, they change, 
because contexts matter a great deal.  
Teamwork and a lot of “backstage” coordination and communication also allows the drug 
court practitioners, especially the judges, to put on displays of omniscience, which are viewed as 
practices of care. Omniscience, or panoptical surveillance, is care in the sense that it is “looking 
after,” and it is caring as a display of interest and concern. Thus, a surveillant form of care 
becomes a key therapeutic method of drug courts. But it is also key to their punitive side. 
Surveillant care allows drug court practitioner to keep tabs on defendants outside of the 
courthouse, so that more of their ordinary activities can be read through the lens of compliance 
(or noncompliance). 
In their efforts to make drug courts more effective by feeling fairer, drug court judges are 
trained to give defendants a platform to speak in court for two to three minutes. This is 
considered an “evidence-based practice,” drawn from research on procedural justice. I 
complicate this key drug court practice of giving defendants the opportunity to “tell their side of 
the story.”  
Communication, we learn from Judge Lazarus, is also a way for defendants to exercise 
care for their communities.3  But some defendants and treatment program staff operate according 
to a different ethic of care. They refuse to speak up, they refuse to see for the court. This isn’t a 
                                                
2 Historian Samuel K. Roberts (2009, 93) notes that Progressive Era public health efforts around 
tuberculosis prevention in African American neighborhoods in Baltimore, a policy of 
“[m]andatory notification […] conscripted into the surveillance effort a variety of individuals, 
including health professionals, social workers, hotel managers, and boardinghouse keepers.” 
3 E. Summerson Carr (2011) similarly found that mainstream drug treatment programs seeks to 
discipline clients to speak in more “honest,” “open,” and “willing” ways. 
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refusal to care, it is a refusal to become part of a network of surveillance that promises to get 
people into trouble. In these small acts of refusal, a defendant might give a judge “partial 
accounts” (Visweswaran 1994, 41), even when “confronted with facts at odds with her story” 
(ibid., 49). This partiality implies both the refusal of the illusion of complete, objective 
knowledge, and the possibility that all aspects of experience can be “communicated.” In 
maintaining that not all aspects of subjectivity can be known and understood, a few defendants 
interrupt the drug courts’ project of subject retrieval and broader projects of surveillant care and 
the diffusion of police power. 
Linguistic anthropologists, among other scholars, have shown that what gets 
accomplished in communication is an always emergent and contextually dependent process, not 
a foregone conclusion and certainly not an unquestionable good. Indeed, communication can be 
a boon to the coordination and administration of care, but we must be careful to be precise about 
any given communicative event. Importantly, linguistic anthropologists have questioned the term 
communication itself for potentially implying the uncomplicated relaying of a message between 
dyadic pairs (speakers and hearers) who attach the very same meanings to every word, no matter 
their position (be it social, physical, or geographical). This is simply not the case. Linguistic 
anthropologists (as well as philosophers interested in the “speech act,” like J.L. Austin [1962], 
Jacque Derrida [1988], and Judith Butler [1990, 1993, 1997]) are also attuned to the ways speech 




Defendants must appear on the stage of drug courts before the judge to be congratulated 
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for keeping up the good work or to answer to various charges of noncompliance.  But, many of 
the decisions regarding the fates of defendants are actually hashed out in private, closed-door 
conferences before defendants have a chance to weigh in.  
When I began my research, defendants in Judge Fierro’s court had to arrive all at once at 
9:30. After checking in with the treatment center, they waited, with me, in the second-floor 
lobby, which sprawled out from a quiet corner guarded by an officer, past the other courtrooms, 
which tended to have few visitors, toward the stairway and elevators. Some of us sat on benches, 
some gathered in small groups, some leaned against the window that wrapped around the inside 
of the courthouse, which encircled a rarely visited courtyard with a few wrought iron tables and 
chairs and a raised concrete bed with grass and a single tree. I couldn’t imagine who might be 
enticed to sit there in the small, panoptically-visible yard of the courthouse. Sometimes we were 
called in at 10:30, sometimes not until after 11:00.4  Waiting indefinitely is a part of the 
subjection of being a defendant (just as the destitute are perennially made to wait for the state, as 
Javier Auyero [2012] also found).  
In Judge Connelly’s court, I was permitted to sit in on these meetings, and often did. In 
attendance at these conferences are the judge and his or her law clerk, staff from the treatment 
center, a representative or two from the district attorney’s office, and the drug court’s on-staff 
public defender (who is employed by an independent defense agency, but is permanently 
assigned to the drug court). Depending on the model, there might be a probation officer and a 
                                                
4 The rule changed mid-way through my fieldwork, and defendants were told to come in at 
10:00, no doubt because of long wait times. Once defendants were called in to Judge Fierro’s 
court, they had to wait until all the cases on the compliance calendar were called, when the judge 
would dismiss them all at once. While in the courtroom, they could not read, glance at their cell 
phones, sleep, or even slouch (depending on which officers are on duty). Court time is a 
suspension, an arrest, when all other activities must cease. 
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representative from a partnering agency who works with defendants with diagnosed co-morbid 
mental health and substance use disorders.  
In each of the three courts I studied, there were one or two defense attorneys (Gayle and 
Karen in Judge Fierro’s court, Faye in Judge Lazarus’s court, and in Judge Connelly’s court, 
Pete, and sometimes Paula) who were employed to staff the drug court whenever it was in 
session – whether that was one day a week or five. Samantha, a criminal defense attorney who 
worked at an independent defense organization in Judge Lazarus’ jurisdiction, referred to this 
staff attorney – Faye in her case – as the “institutional defender.” Defendants could also be 
appointed defense attorneys (like Samantha) employed by public defender organizations, or from 
other channels carved by the state’s budgeting for public defense. Those few defendants deemed 
financially ineligible for a court-appointed attorney, or who chose to shell out the money 
anyway, were represented by a privately-employed defense attorney (like Scott). 
Theoretically, any defense attorney who has a client in drug court should come on board 
as part of the team, but in practice, the “institutional defender” was the only thoroughly team-
integrated defense attorney. The institutional defender, for instance, is generally the only defense 
attorney in attendance at these behind the scenes case conferences. Private defense attorney Scott 
explained, “the decisions are made before the lawyers really get up there” before the judge. 
Hannah, a criminal defense attorney with the independent Just Defenders in Judge Connelly’s 
jurisdiction, elaborated on this same point: 
The way that treatment court works is they do a conference before 
court even gets started in the morning for everyone’s case? And 
the defense lawyer’s not part of that conference and the client is 
not part of that conference and so it’s the treatment court staff 
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talking to the judge, telling the judge what to do on each case. So 
before the lawyer even gets up there, before the client even gets up 
there, they have chosen, sort of, whether this person is gonna be 
sanctioned and what the sanction is gonna be. They’ve chosen if 
there’s gonna be a next court date what that court date is. They’ve 
chosen – they – everything is already set by the time the client and 
the lawyer stand up there and that's why appearances can be 
shorter than 15 seconds because they say, you know, um, Ms. 
[Johnson], you’re doing well, keep up the good work, 12/16. […] 
And, like, that’s the entirety of the appearance. 
Appearances before Judge Connelly were unusually brief, compared with those before Judge 
Fierro, the longest occurring in Judge Lazarus’s court. But Hannah’s experience that decisions 
were made beforehand, and without her, resonated across all three courts. 
Like Hannah, Scott didn’t conceive of himself as a team member, telling me: “Um, many 
times I had to go in there and argue with the judge and that’s like spinning your wheels. It’s hard 
to get things accomplished. Minor victories. But ultimately, she’s gonna trust the staff more than 
me because all I can do is speak from my client’s behalf.” As an advocate, Scott fashions himself 
as partial, and therefore not as trusted by the judge as her staff is. In her interview with me in her 
office in the courthouse, Probation Officer Castillo, who was on Judge Fierro’s team, also prized 
her “objectivity” in comparison with other team members who had more “interested” roles, like 
prosecutors and defense attorneys. Unlike them, she said, she “can say ‘good,’ bad, or ‘ugly’ 
under any circumstance.” 
But Probation Officer Castillo did emphasize to me that the decisions about each 
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defendant’s treatment emerge from the collective expertise of the team members.  Team 
members spoke to me about the tensions among staff members’ expert and ethical judgments that 
come into play.  Legal Services attorney Gayle, on Judge Fierro’s team, told me, “there’s a lot of 
depth brought to the situation. And we also grapple with what is the right thing to do in each 
case.”  
Contradicting Officer Castillo’s assertion that the prosecutor and defense attorney 
maintain their traditional adversarial roles, Gayle explained: 
[A]nd what’s one of the things that’s so fascinating to me about 
these conferences is […] there are no clearly defined roles. None at 
all. You know, sometimes I think it’s important to sanction 
somebody, which of course is on tenuous ethical grounds. And 
many lawyers feel that it’s really improper for somebody in my 
position to even express that a client has done the wrong thing 
because, you know, ethically, you’re supposed to do what the 
client wants and, you know, all that, but this is really a hybrid and 
it’s not really been adequately dealt with in the ethical cannons for 
lawyers.  I- but I can’t let that affect my clients, you know? 
As Gayle made clear, the teamwork model introduces such a different that a defense attorney 
working in this team effort may  advocate that her client be sent to jail. This is part of why, as I 
explained in Chapter 1, “Compliance Trials: Flexible Evidence and Objective Standards,” 
Samantha characterized her job in regular criminal courts as “easy” when compared with her job 
in drug treatment courts. It is easy because it doesn’t open up new ethical quandaries at the 
intersection of justice and care. 
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It is not uncommon for defendants in regular criminal parts to feel that their court-
appointed attorneys are too friendly with the district attorneys and the judges. To a significant 
extent, even adversaries have to work together to move a case along (and especially to negotiate 
a plea deal, which is how most criminal cases – especially for indigent defendants – are 
disposed). But, the team places legal professionals in even more interdependent and familiar 
social relationships with one another. Gayle told me, “we have our places at the table […] like 
the dinner table?” evoking the sense that the drug court team is like a family (which I also 
discussed in the Introduction). Samantha also reflected on these new social arrangements: 
Like you're kind of up to the mercy – there’s some advocacy you 
can do but most of it is just with the treatment staff and whether or 
not that person is motivated to go through – […] Um and that’s a 
critique when you have on staff – like, I’m in a better position to do 
that - like stand up against Judge [Lazarus] because I’m not in there 
every day like [Faye] is and so I think when you have someone that’s 
always there they can be a little more like, “Oh okay, the court- 
we’re all taking vacation, like, I’ll block out this one week in August 
when court’s closed" and but I also think, like, [Faye] has a lot of 
agency there because she’s there and she knows everyone there and 
she really understands what’s going on- you know she’s just there 
all day, whereas I’m just, like, running, trying to see if the updates 
are ready and dealing with other clients.  
Because Faye has an interest in maintaining more personable, everyday relationships with the 
other members of the team, Samantha can be a more adversarial advocate than Faye, she 
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suggested. As the “institutional defender,” Faye also has a vested interest in maintaining the 
integrity of the institution itself, beyond her own individual positioning in relation to her 
colleagues. 
On the other hand, according to Samantha, Faye’s position on the team may confer on her 
both more pull and more insider knowledge than Samantha has. Given the substantial difficulty 
any defense attorney faces in challenging the team’s decisions, insider status might be more 
valuable than that outsider status Samantha maintains. For instance, Gayle sometimes helps her 
clients get into drug court by instructing them how to narrate how they use drugs to match the 
team’s expectation of how eligible addiction should present. But, with insider status often comes 
a different outlook and different ethical priorities.  
While team members negotiate personal relationships and ethical questions related to 
their professional responsibilities, what constitutes good care, and what is just and fair, by the 
time they take the stage of drug court or speak to defendants, they generally present a united 
front that is very difficult to influence or challenge. Extending the metaphor of the family that 
Gayle introduced with the mention of the “dinner table,” people often likened this unity to that of 
parents (where defendants are the “children”).5  Gayle said that she and Bob, the prosecutor on 
Judge Fierro’s team, would sometimes approach defendants together, like mom and dad, to urge 
them to do one thing or another that they felt was best for their recovery – for instance, to move 
out of their home to a different town. When we spoke in his office, Joel, an upper level 
                                                
5 The metaphor that court practitioners were like parents and defendants like their children was 
fairly common and while evincing a certain time politics that casts defendants as regressive or 
“arrested” in their development as human beings, it also speaks to those ever-present tensions 
between caring, dignity, and autonomy. As paternalistic, it testifies to the complex gendering of 
care in the drug court (as elsewhere). While infantilizing, it is also a reminder that court 
practitioners see themselves in very important positions of caring for defendants, both in terms of 
duty and affect. 
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administrator at Altruist Society, one of the largest drug treatment providers and most trusted 
drug court partner in the state, also used the pervasive parenting metaphor:  
Joel: If you think about it, it’s, um, it’s very similar to parenting. 
EM: Hm 
Joel: Don’t get split.  
EM: Mhm, mhm 
Joel: If I know that dad’s going to meet my needs then I’m not 
going to go to mom, I’m going to go to dad. And when mom’s 
gonna say no… and that’s very easy to do. 
It is notable that the defendant bouncing between mom and dad is, in Joel’s metaphor, seeking to 
get his needs met, as opposed to trying to play one parent off the other to get permission to do 
something that might be seen as frivolous or dangerous. Yet Joel still characterizes this behavior 
as sneaky and manipulative. Given the extent of their exclusion from decision-making processes 
about what is best for them, it would seem that defendants would have to creatively and 
resourcefully advocate for themselves to have any meaningful say in their care.  
 
Teaming Up  
In mid-June of 2013, Mr. Turner was called up before Judge Lazarus just before noon, 
but it was quickly determined that the team would need to conference his case. He was told to sit 
down and wait for a second call. Another defendant was called up, a young White man, who was 
“doing really well,” the Judge said. Before he was dismissed, he sought and received her 
permission to attend a large stadium concert out in the suburbs six weeks ahead in late July. 
After a bench conference among the Judge, attorneys, and treatment staff, Mr. Turner, an older 
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Black man, got his second call. Two court officers rose and walked up behind him, flanking him 
in a wide-leg stance, chests puffed up and ready for action. Whenever the court officers took this 
position, I was quickly learning, it was an indication that the defendant might be leaving in 
handcuffs. They knew to do this in advance of any action because of the backstage coordination 
of the team. Faye was talking to Mr. Turner quietly. I caught snippets: “there’s only one way 
to…” and “I’m telling you, don’t do it.” Not yet realizing that Faye was a defense attorney, I 
wrote in my notes “no defense attorney – why?” and then I wrote, “this is so depressing.” 
Recalling Gayle’s remark that there are no roles at all among the drug court practitioners, Faye 
was so thoroughly part of the team in Judge Lazarus’s court that she was unrecognizable to me 
as a defense attorney until mid-way into the following encounter. 
After discussing problems with his attendance, Judge Lazarus proceeded to talk about 
Mr. Turner’s urine sample, noting that there was “something abnormal in your urine.” She 
explained, “Now, I’ve learned over the years of being here that when people relapse and want to 
test clean, [they] often cheat on [a] drug test.” They “go to [the] store,” they “call friends.”  They 
learn that there is a “substance you can buy that promises you if you take [it, you will] test clean. 
[The] problem is, [it’s] not true.”  It’s a “myth,” she said. Whatever it is Mr. Turner took caused 
his urine to turn into a “gel-like substance,” she said.  For all she knows, she said, he had done it 
before and they didn’t catch it. But this time, his urine formed white crystals. Listening to this, I 
couldn’t help but think, I hope this man doesn’t suffer from a kidney disorder. I was embarrassed 
for him, having to stand there while a judge gave us all a glimpse into an aspect of his life most 
of us learn to keep private and hidden. Mr. Turner turned to speak quietly with Faye. The judge 
told him, “she’s a lawyer, not a miracle worker.” This is the moment I learned Faye was the 
public defender. Judge Lazarus added, “She can’t make your urine good.” 
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Judge Lazarus explained to Mr. Turner, “If you’ve relapsed,” there are “things you need 
to talk about,” things you “need to be honest about.”  You can’t “continue with [the] program 
and still use and get away with it.” “So you can stand here and deny,” she continued, “but I have 
your tampered urine,” adding, “that’s not what comes out of a healthy body.”  Her concern, she 
told him, is that his “desire is not to be drug-free and not in compliance with the mandate.”  At 
this point, she expected Mr. Turner to speak – and specifically, to admit and “be honest” that he 
relapsed and cheated on his drug test.  Judge Lazarus asked him, “So, before you say anything, 
you want to talk to [your attorney]?”  He spoke to Faye. 
Faye then said, rather drearily, “Your honor, Mr. [Turner] is adamant he did not do 
anything to cause his urine to be abnormal.” Her lack of enthusiasm punctuated her 
epistemological stance (Ochs 1990) – namely, doubt – towards Mr. Turner’s denial, and her flat 
delivery was in marked contrast to the adamancy she said he maintained. It sounded to me as if 
she was disappointed that she was not able to convince him to admit. Faye then turned to her 
client, and I, sitting some rows back, could plainly hear her say to him: “It’s objective” and “We 
know what came out of you and we know you put something in.”  
  “Alright, well, because I believe you tampered with your urine,” Judge Lazarus said, and 
at this cue, one of the officers removed the handcuffs from his belt; the judge continued, “and 
you’re choosing not to be honest about it, you’re gonna be remanded until Monday,” four days 
away. The defendant said nothing as the officer tightened the handcuffs around his wrists and led 
him out of the courtroom. 
As part of the team, Faye aligned herself with the court (as a “we”) and its firm position 
on the objectivity of urine tests. As if enacting this detached objectivity, Faye displayed an 
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embodied “hexis of disinterest” (Latour 2004a, 85) toward Mr. Turner.6  The urine drug test 
served as what Carr (2010), drawing on Joseph Dumit’s (2004) “expert image,” calls an “expert 
object.” Expert objects, like brain scans or X-rays, for instance, provide opportunities for the 
enactment of expertise. The test provided occasion for Faye to insist, “It’s objective” to her client 
above his objections, as she donned the mantle of a rational being submitting to the “absolute 
objectivity” of a scientific instrument (see Megill 1994).  
Expert objects “purport to represent what no human could see” (Dumit 1999, 177). 
Equipped with such a powerful tool, the judge also extended her expertise beyond the law into 
medicine (testifying to what kind of urine comes out of a healthy body) and decided the “what 
happened” for herself.  She narrated the defendant’s experience, based not on having been 
present at the time of the story world she created through her narrative, but on her years of 
“being [t]here” in the drug court. She enacted an omniscient figure as she narrated his 
experience: he relapsed, wanted to test clean, and therefore cheated on the drug test. She even 
filled in details about how defendants go to the store and call their friends to find out about what 
substances they can take to test clean. Not only does she see what goes on in her courtroom, she 
knows what defendants talk about on the phone with their friends; her vision extends into the 
neighborhoods where defendants live and the stores where they shop for urine-tampering 
concoctions. But those potions don’t really work, she said; it’s a myth, she pointed out, further 
positioning herself as the fact-bearing objective authority (against the duped defendant). When 
                                                
6 In fact, I wonder whether Faye’s lackluster defense was in some ways a measured choice to 
provide the best advocacy for her client. That is, was Judge Lazarus more sympathetic to Faye – 
and therefore her clients – because Faye distanced herself from them when they refused to admit 
to wrongdoing? More enthusiastic defense attorneys were sometimes met with derision from the 
drug court team, so it is indeed possible that Faye, as the institutional defender, believed that it 
was in her clients’ best interest to recede from them, and to moderate her tone to evince her 
doubts toward their counter-narratives.   
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Judge Lazarus said, “She’s a lawyer, not a miracle worker,” she reasserted the scientific basis for 
the tests against the concept of “miracle,” with its enchanted connotations. This is science, not 
magic, an opposition that will resonate once again in Chapter 4, “Testing Care: Truth Games, 
Confession, and Urine Trouble.”   
Erving Goffman (1959) noted how important teams can be to advancing the goals of a 
particular performance. In teamwork, each performer helps to validate the performance of the 
other, so that missteps or breaks in character can be quickly brushed aside. In the teamwork 
spirit, Judge Lazarus rescued Faye from her client’s apparent plea that she protect him. Faye 
appeared to save face when her client was failing. 
Now that I have had a chance to show teamwork in action, I will detail the broader 
network of care that shapes those brief but potent encounters between the defendants and the 
drug court practitioners. 
 
Communicative partners 
Joel: But communicate. Communicate, communicate, 
communicate. 
EM: Uh huh 
Joel played an integral role in the 1990s in bringing treatment courts to the city, then the state, by 
working out the terms through which drug courts would partner with treatment programs. He 
enjoyed this work immensely. “So, it just clicked. They embraced me and I embraced them and 
I- I either attended, planned or presented at pretty much every drug court conference in the state 
the last twenty years.[…] So, we just clicked, we hit it off.” He beamed as he recalled the 
planning and cooperation that went into it, fondly reciting the names of the people involved – 
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luminaries of the drug court scene. He emphasized how important “communication” was in 
making the relationship between courts and treatment programs work: “I think I just intuitively 
knew what they wanted in terms- and it was really nothing more than communication.” As 
attorneys and social workers at Just Defenders in Judge Connelly’s jurisdiction told me, albeit 
with a good measure of skepticism, the treatment providers’ “primary duty” is “reporting to the 
judge any information the judge wants to know.”  
Joel estimated that the criminal justice system was the source of “north of 50 percent of 
our referrals” at Altruist Society. Part of Joel’s account of the emergence of the drug court as a 
partnership with the private treatment industry included the detail that the industry at some point 
realized that the “criminal justice client” was one of “the biggest consumers” of substance abuse 
services; they discovered “a whole untapped market,” he said. Jerome, the treatment resource 
coordinator in Judge Connelly’s court, told me that treatment programs often solicit the business 
of the court: 
EM: It would seem like, um, having um a- relationship with the drug 
court would be profitable [laughs] for the drug courts. 
Jerome: Oh absolutely. Uh, for the programs you mean. 
EM: Right! Yeah, did I say- Yeah, for the programs. 
Jerome. Yeah. 
EM: Do they, um, do they “court” you – do they, sort of, come after 
you? 
Jerome: Oh! Absolutely, all the time. Uh, they are always telling us 
what a wonderful job they- they- they do and many programs say- 
especially residential programs – we don’t do that old stuff anymore. 
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We’re more innovative, we’ve changed. So, we’ve heard it all, you 
know. I’ve been around and [our Director, Selma]’s been in the field 
over 25 years as well. […] So yeah, they’re constantly, you know, 
reaching out and saying- giving us brochures and you know, [inaud.] 
I wanna do a presentation and you’ve heard it all. 
The key to securing the lucrative referral pathways of the drug courts was maintaining a 
good working relationship with courts, and, as Joel repeated, communication was the key to it 
all. Joel said: 
So, if you recognize that and adhere to that and managed your 
programs so that that becomes kind of first and foremost in terms 
of working with the population, the, uh, criminal justice system 
embraced you. Giving them what they want is information. 
Giving the judge what she wants, Joel explained, has meant devising more 
comprehensive and consistent methods of reporting to courts: “The most fundamental and 
detailed without creating a booklet, and that's clear, concise, giving the judge exactly what he or 
she wanted, um, electronically.” The reporting went through different formatting, changing with 
new technologies. Before the courts’ database system went web-based, to remain in good 
standing with drug courts, a treatment program might have sent a report by hand delivery. Over 
the years, the statewide Court Administration Bureau got more sophisticated, Joel told me. It 
implemented a web-based database and surveillance program.7  “You can always enter data,” 
                                                
7 Statewide drug court coordinator Jackie told me she was working on a complete overhaul to the 
system that would more fully integrate information about defendants so that it could be more 
easily be shared across the court system. Part of this overhaul included the use of risk-need 
responsivity software, the expensive COMPAS system used widely by community corrections 
agencies (i.e. probation, parole). 
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Joel said. Some jurisdictions “allow you to view data, some don’t.”  “Judges are like mayors,” he 
explained, “so they get to call the shots” and each presides over a slightly different reporting 
regime.   
Joel explained the importance of timely reporting:  
Joel: They knew we had no control over someone walking out of 
the building, walking down the street and stealing a car, they just 
wanted to know before the newspapers knew. 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: You know, these are people with the same thing we were - 
with families and mortgages and careers and- and they had an 
obligation. 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: You know, “Don’t hide it. Get it to me, quick.” 
EM: Right. 
Joel suggested that communication may be as much about containing potential public relations 
disasters that could compromise court practitioners’ job security and the institution of the drug 
court itself as it is about care coordination. And, as much about professional and institutional 
security as it is about public safety. This speaks to the precarity of the drug courts as “hug a 
thug” courts at a time when “tough on crime” rhetoric holds great sway. In the spirit of 
teamwork, the court professionals and the treatment professionals feel they must stick together. 
Further, family, mortgage, career – these indexes of liberal personhood help Joel and other court 
practitioners differentiate themselves from the addicts who should strive to want and achieve 
them. 
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I don’t want to understate what a radically new set of responsibilities this imposed for 
drug treatment professionals, and how radically it changes the relationship of counselor to 
client/patient. I ask the reader to imagine being a patient in a treatment facility in which you are 
expected to participate earnestly and openly with the knowledge that your counselors will be 
reporting to law enforcement about you. How might this shape your willingness to entrust and 
confide?  How might it shape your “participation”?  
By enlisting drug treatment counselors to report defendants’ infractions to the court, drug 
courts participate in a broader trend that scholars have identified entailing the diffusion of crime 
control measures from law enforcement professionals and courts onto civilians and the private 
sector.8 This diffusion of surveillance and responsibility for public safety also represents an 
expansion of “police power” “beyond the formal domains of ‘law enforcement’” as William 
Garriott (2013, 54) notes in his study of the impact of legislation seeking to limit 
methamphetamine production in a rural Appalachian community.  
With these new responsibilities to the criminal justice system, treatment professionals had 
not only to report, but to be consistent and foresighted bearers of knowledge about defendants.  
Joel: It was tricky because I couldn't tell everyone in the court how 
great you were doing and then three weeks later I wanna discharge 
you because you're nothing but a pain in the neck, you know? 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: So if you were a pain in the neck, I had to tell people. 
                                                
8 In this way, they are part of a larger trend that David Garland (1996; 2001) calls 
“responsibilization.”  
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Managing this temporality of reporting and the risk that down the line a defendant might do 
something that merited termination, Joel suggests, may encourage counselors to preemptively 
report shortcomings that might have resolved just in case things take a turn for the worse. Those 
smaller infractions might be read as noncompliance by the court practitioners.   
 
Word travels 
Joel specified that treatment court practitioners want the counselors at treatment 
programs to report defendants’ “attendance, participation, progress, and toxicologies” (by 
toxicologies, he meant urine drug test results). The simplicity of a one-word term like progress 
conceals the complexity of the concept and the presuppositions and interpretive work that goes 
into any counselor’s assessment of it.   
Jerome told me that reports that come in about individual defendants from their programs 
can include factual errors, and that counselors do not always appreciate the gravity of the 
consequences for a client (i.e. defendant) when writing her progress report.  
Jerome: A progress report comes in, has a positive cocaine. “No, I 
don’t use,” you know, yada yada. So we call the program again and, 
uh, sometimes we ask for a hard copy, you know, ‘cause some of 
them are tested twice to confirm – you know, and sometimes they 
make mistakes. “Oh, I’m sorry – they weren’t absent.” Or “I’m 
sorry, that was a typo. They weren’t,” uh, “they didn’t have a 
positive for cocaine.” Because they become a legal document and 
clients can go to jail if the information’s not accurate.  
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EM: Do you feel like there are times when people working at 
[treatment] programs don’t fully appreciate that reality? 
Jerome: That they’re being scrutinized? 
EM: That that’s a legal document? 
Jerome: Oh absolutely. 
Jerome’s remarks draw attention to the movement of texts across contexts, and the ways 
such movement changes their import.  This is what anthropologists call entextualization, which 
is “the rendering of a given instance of discourse as text” such that it becomes “detachable from 
its local context” (Urban 1996, 21), or decontextualized, and can thus be “projected across 
interactional sites” (Silverstein & Urban 1996, 12), where it is then re-contextualized. This 
process, as Jerome makes clear, leaves plenty of room for erasures, errors, exaggerations, and 
possibly incommensurable translations of meaning (Carr 2010; Mehan 1996; Silverstein & 
Urban 1996).  
The very idea that these reports have traveled, coming from another time and place, 
bestows on them the more objective-seeming authority of spatio-temporal distance. Linguistic 
anthropologist Joel C. Kuipers (1993, 102) explains that entextualization:  
refers to the ideological and linguistic process by which texts come 
to be more thoroughly patterned linguistically and rhetorically at 
the same time as they are increasingly detached from their 
pragmatic context of performance, such that the resulting text is 
viewed as somehow transcendent, or separated from the vagaries 
of the immediate “here and now,” even though in many ways it is 
not. It is a performance which denies its situated character.  
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Once the report is cited by legal professionals, the treatment counselor’s entextualized words 
function as a “legal document” in Jerome’s words, or like “hard evidence” (see Dominguez 
2009), even though they are not referred to as evidence, making their evidentiary value self-
evident.  
Because of its movement from a clinical setting into a legal setting, the counselor’s report 
takes on certain incongruences of the expert witness testimony that Bruno Latour (2004a) 
identified. Latour (ibid., 108) explains that courts of law press upon the expert witness to present 
“the facts as judged (res judicata),” lending the expert witness “a mode of sovereignty that 
belongs exclusively to law.”   As scientists and researchers, expert witnesses are generally not 
practiced in asserting this kind of sovereign certainty. For counselors, too, who maintain ongoing 
relationships with their clients where the goal is often progressive change, presenting the facts as 
judged may not square with how they clinically assess their clients mid-treatment.  
The counselor’s once context-bound discourse is “devoiced” and transformed into expert 
opinion (Mehan 1996, 259). Appearing on screen, the words go cold enough to have the 
subjectivity stripped from them. Karen, defense attorney on Judge Fierro’s team, whose favorite 
subject in law school, as I previously noted in Chapter 1, was “evidence,” reflected: 
Karen: I mean it’s interesting. If we were ever to have a trial on and 
have to call some of the treatment providers, um, I would love to 
hear what they would actually say.  
EM: Mhm 
Karen: Because sometimes when you – even when I speak to them 
[…] when you speak to them directly and they tell you what they’re 
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going to put in the report and then you read the report, you’re going, 
“this- this has nothing what you said was going to be in this report” 
EM: Mm 
Karen: And a lot of times it’s pressure from a supervisor to write a 
report a certain way, not to be too lenient, so it’s hard to even advise 
a client when you – even to a probation officer – you never know 
what the report is gonna really say until you see it.  
EM: Right 
Karen: So, I mean the only way that would ever come out in the 
wash would be if we had to have a hearing or a trial and the person 
[who wrote the report] would actually have to take the stand. 
Karen’s remarks suggest that were the writers of the reports to appear in person, embodied, 
imperfect, and subjective, the objectivity of the reports would fall away - washed away by the 
evidentiary scrubbing of courtroom procedure. 
Sandrine, who graduated from Judge Lazarus’s court, knows intimately how the progress 
report becomes objectified through its entextualization and can have serious legal consequences.  
Sitting in a Subway fast food franchise in the city, Sandrine talked to me about her nine months 
living inpatient at a treatment facility during her drug court mandate. She told me, “I had a staff 
there that was very antagonizing.”  The staff person was “somewhat of a bully,” but “on the low 
– not in front of other staffs.” Sandrine explained, “we had a conversation and she tried to get 
them to write a real bad letter to the court for me.”  Anticipating my discussion of how 
defendants and peers in recovery sometimes “teamed up” to protect each other from trouble, 
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Sandrine continued, “If it wasn’t for that I had other peers around that was hearing these things I 
wasn’t even hearing […] you know [laughs] she’d’ve got away with that, you know.”   
Judge Connelly’s resource coordinator Jerome further detailed the pressures, professional 
and social, that the writers of these reports face: 
Uh, yeah, um, it’s unfortunate but a lot of the progress reports are 
written by counselors and such that, for a variety of reasons, and 
because of the amount of case load that they have, they’re so stressed 
out and overwhelmed that they, you know, write reports in a 
haphazard way and, um, when they’re called, sometimes they do get 
annoyed. And they become challenging because, you know, they 
don’t want to look bad. Sometimes they– some counselors will 
apologize for the mistake and say, “Oh you’re right, blablabla.” But 
for the most part, you know, programs don’t like to, uh, look bad. 
The objectification of counselors’ reports can hide the intricate social relationships and 
power dynamics within treatment programs, spaces of intense intimacy. And counselor’s may 
not always step up to correct misinformation because, like most, they don’t want to look bad. 
 
Tight networks of care 
The drug court team takes on certain aspects of defendants’ care coordination that reach 
beyond drug rehabilitation and detoxification programs into other areas of health and health-
related care. This appears to be motivated in part by case management goals that holistically, or 
ecologically, target addiction and various co-morbid and compounding conditions. But it also 
appears to be motivated by the need to maintain good communication and reporting channels. 
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Gayle told me about the importance of getting everyone on the same page: 
And in fact, we had one situation that was very ugly because she 
[the defendant] had a therapist and the therapist advocated to her 
that she leave the program. We’re like, you know, really? And her- 
the probation officer was working with this client too. The 
probation officer and I said, “you know, nu uh. What’s the-” and 
we- I tried to speak to the therapist to explain to her- you know, 
“before you advocate this, you might want to know what the legal 
ramifications are, ‘cause they’re significant.” And it’s also we’re 
telling her- “we should get on the same page. You’re telling her, 
she’s not worth it and she can’t make it work, and we’re telling her 
she is worth it and she can make it work and you have more time 
with her than we do because, you know, you’re there for 45 
minutes and we, you know, um- we gotta- we gottta work together 
and figure out what- what’s- because it’s not fair to her” and- and 
the client was like a ping-pong ball and ultimately she opted out. 
And she got a felony conviction and then she stayed in the- […] 
She was in the program a very long time.  
This example clearly shows that the defendant suffered when she received contrary messages 
from her care workers. Not only did she stay in the program a very long time, but she left 
without graduating, so that her guilty plea was not dismissed. But also, like some drug treatment 
counselors, this therapist did not seem to be aware of the grave consequences her client faced if 
she left drug court unsuccessfully. Perhaps this should raise questions about the therapeutic value 
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of the legal leverage post-plea drug courts use to try to keep defendants compliant.  Both Jerome 
and Gayle seemed to be suggesting that these other care workers did not realize what a 
dangerous plea defendants took (to echo Samantha’s words from Chapter 1). 
Controlling networks of care also entailed exclusion.  At Just Defenders, I was told that 
drug courts work with treatment programs based on “who the judge trusts and who he doesn’t” 
and “treatment court doesn’t like contact with social workers from our office.” Because the 
court’s treatment center wouldn’t communicate with them, the Just Defenders social workers do 
their “advocacy with actual treatment providers” at the private programs defendants are 
mandated to, perhaps like the defendants who Joel likened to manipulative children. Treatment 
court practitioners, Just Defenders social workers told me, “don’t take kindly to [our] advocating 
for our clients.” One of the social workers told me that the director of Judge Connelly’s 
treatment center flat out wouldn’t talk to her or return her calls.   
Further, controlling defendants’ networks of care meant that defendants were scolded and 
punished for taking their care into their own hands. Phoebe, one of the attorneys at Just 
Defenders, told me: 
Phoebe: I was working with a client [...] who had relapsed, and did 
what he felt like was the responsible thing which was checked 
himself into a detox? And that totally backfired on him because he 
hadn’t contacted the court. The court didn’t want him checking 
himself into a detox. They wanted to control that process. 
EM: Right 
Phoebe: Whereas- and the client was totally flabbergasted? 
Because he was actually sanctioned. He was stepped in to jail 
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because he had done what he thought was the best thing possible 
for him, which was to acknowledge that he had, you know, 
relapsed, and tried to seek help. 
EM: Mhm 
Phoebe: Um, and instead it was viewed as abdicating his 
responsibility to the court-mandated treatment. 
EM: Mhm 
Phoebe: Because he was seeking out outside help. And I’ve seen 
things that are less extreme when people seek either, you know, 
similar kinds of services or additional services from non-court 
providers, the court sort of, wants to control and monitor the entire 
process? Um, whereas I think our clients may feel like they have 
very legitimate reasons for seeking out the additional help [...]  
Phoebe’s client’s experience shows how defendants are excluded from the coordination of their 
care and decisions about what they need and what is best for them. It also demonstrates, once 
again, how broadly noncompliance can be defined in drug court. 
 
Panoptical, surveillant care  
All of this controlled coordination, communication, and teamwork is necessary for the 
drug court to develop its panoptical, surveillant form of care.  Judge Lazarus explained to me that 
she tries to give defendants the impression that she is somewhat omniscient. As they appeared 
before her, she would pull up a database that culled together her own notes on each defendant 
with those of their case managers and counselors both within the court’s treatment center and at 
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their treatment programs. She would ask them about significant personal happenings they had 
previously mentioned to her or a case manager – a parent who had fallen ill, the birth of a child, 
an upcoming surgery. That way, she appeared to remember each defendant even if she only saw 
them every few weeks. Somewhat differently, Gayle told me, “We know people – we get to 
know people really, really well. And I don’t bring any files with me – I do it, I mean first it 
would be impossible for me to get them there. But I do it intentionally because I want every 
client to know that I remember- and I really do, just ’cause, you know, they’re important.” 
The cultivation of a sense that the court is omniscient and watching over them in all 
aspects of their lives is part of what is said to make drug courts therapeutic. Defendants are made 
to feel that they are watched over in the double sense that they are being held accountable for 
their actions and are being cared for. Many defendants, court practitioners sometimes 
empathized, never had anyone watching over them “like that.” Sandrine, a defendant who 
graduated from Judge Lazarus’s court, told me: 
Just the fact that they're here means a lot - and you remember the 
things I said to you. And, like, Judge [Lazarus], [when I] started 
going every other month and she would remember what I said two 
months ago-- [laughs] and that used to stick with me […that she 
would] pay that much attention. [laughs] It meant a lot for me. 
In fact, Judge Lazarus told me that she doesn’t really remember every defendant.  But Sandrine 
came to feel taken care of by the judge and by her case manager like they were parental figures.  
Maintaining networks of communication also allows the court practitioners to more 
closely and broadly monitor defendant compliance. In consequence, more dimensions of 
defendants’ daily living come up for a reading under the compliant/noncompliant binary. Leslie 
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Paik (2011, 42) similarly found that in juvenile drug courts, “Through its close monitoring of the 
youth, the drug court staff inevitably finds out more ways that the youths are misbehaving (e.g. 
arriving later for school or drug treatment sessions, disrespecting their parents/legal guardians).”  
Not just “bad behavior,” Paik points out, for drug court defendants, these acts of noncompliance 
are considered sanctionable (ibid.). Kerwin Kaye Brook (2010, 89) explains that this 
omniscience responds to the “need for ‘certainty’ in the sanctioning process — to instill a sense 
that all (or nearly all) violations of policy will be found out and punished.” Citing former 
NADCP president Jeffrey Tauber (1994: 6) who called this coordinated surveillance a 
metaphorical “chain-link fence,” Kaye Brook (2010, 90) points out how drug courts extend the 
panoptical gaze of the prison ward out into community life.   
And while some did, not all defendants experienced this surveillant care in positive ways 
or even as care at all. Isaiah said being in drug court is like “having a foot on you.” He said he 
“felt like a rag doll,” with somebody always “telling you, you know, ‘you need to go here and 
you need to go there’ […] and, ‘you can’t do this, you can’t do that, you can’t do-’” He said it 
was a “fight within myself to report every move.” At his graduation, which was “exhilarating,” 
when Judge Fierro asked what was next for him, Isaiah said he was planning a trip to Jamaica. 
But then later he told me, “I’m not really going to Jamaica […] I don’t even have a passport.  
[…] But it was just a shot [laughs] […] They can’t tell me where to go, what to do […] ‘I’m 
outta here, I’m going to Jamaica.’ […] It just felt good just to be able to say it. If I was actually 
going, it would have felt even greater.” Because of its stereotypical, iconic image as a land of 
bountiful marijuana, Isaiah’s “shot” might have made practitioners feel he was challenging their 
message of sobriety and question whether he planned to use just as soon as the court’s 
surveillance of him lifted. 
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Giving “voice” 
Jackie, the statewide drug court coordinator, called Judge Lazarus’s court a “BMW” 
because it was so well-funded. But also, Judge Lazarus was one of the most highly regarded 
judges in the drug court world. While Judge Connelly barely spoke to defendants, Judge Lazarus 
engaged each and every defendant that stood before her in colloquy. I’ve presented many 
examples of this already.   
In our interview, Jackie referred to research by social psychologist Tom Tyler that led 
drug court professionals to the conclusion that an “evidence-based practice” judges should 
implement is to engage the defendant for two to three minutes. This shouldn’t be a three-minute-
long judicial soliloquy. This time should be spent allowing the defendant to speak, and “be 
listened to,” Jackie reminded me. A simple way to operationalize “procedural justice,” giving 
defendants the opportunity to have a “voice,” it is believed, will help ensure that the defendant 
feels the process is fair.  
But a defendant’s attempt to communicate with the judge can backfire. Hannah, a defense 
attorney and Catherine, a social worker, at Just Defenders, recounted a story in which the drug 
court practitioners’ suspicion of a defendant’s motivations for communicating with the judge – in 
this case, writing a letter – led them to ascertain that he was a sociopath. I had asked them, “Do 
you ever advise your clients about a, kind of, certain way of performing to appeal to the judge’s 
empathy or [inaud.] or have you ever seen your clients sort of shift, uh, like, shift personae in a 
sense to, kind of, try to elicit that kind of empathy?” 
Hannah: Yeah- I feel like most of the efforts that I’ve made 
through-- about that have to do with me advising clients to in some 
cases even write letters to judges. Not to shift who they are but to 
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show the judge who they actually are. Because, you know, in court 
clients are given such limited opportunities to talk openly, to, sort 
of, explain to the judge and the treatment court staff, like, who they 
are and, um, so sometimes and– and that’s unusual? Like, I don’t 
have clients [laughing] usually writing letters to judges in- in most 
courtrooms? Um, but– but it’s not really about, you know, trying to 
get one over on people. 
EM: Mhm 
Hannah: Or changing, like, their life story. 
Catherine: Well also that will backfire. Like with– 
Hannah: Right. 
Catherine: [Darryl]. Because then the Judge thought he was a 
sociopath–  
Hannah: Right. 
Catherine: Who was trying to manipulate him because he wrote 
him a very heartfelt letter about wanting treatment. 
Hannah: That’s true. [laughs] 
Catherine: So, it cuts both ways 
Hannah: [laughs] […] Sorry, it’s not funny. 
Catherine: Yeah, it’s disgusting.  
Hannah and Catherine demonstrated how perilous any “genuine” communication can be for a 
defendant. They were very careful to maintain that their clients were presenting authentic selves 
to court practitioners, in reaction to the deep suspicion court practitioners regard defendants with. 
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This suspicion seems to inure them against Darryl’s plea for care, deeply misunderstanding his 
intentions.   
I asked Hannah and Catherine to tell me more about their client, Darryl, who they 
mentioned was also living with HIV. 
Catherine: That situation was just a mess. I don’t even remember 
all the things that happened, but this guy sat in [jail] for […] over 
nine months […] after he had been approved for treatment. 
Hannah: Right, he’d been approved for treatment and [Catherine] 
helped with that – through written advocacy, got him a chance at 
treatment even though he had a long [criminal] record. Um, and it 
didn’t work out and what we realized is that he had, sort of, 
longstanding mental health issues that–  and had been placed in a 
non-[CAMI]9 setting; had been placed just in straight drug 
treatment. And so he really wanted to do a treatment program, was 
willing to do a residential program that incorporated both 
substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment. But to get 
that shot, we had to a lot of, sort of, you know, bringing past 
records to the judge and advocating and the client wrote a letter or 
two and the judge decided based on what he said that he was sort 
of self-promoting 
EM: Mmm 
                                                
9 CAMI stands for Chemically Addicted, Mentally Ill. Hannah here referred to special treatment 
programs that admit and specialize in treatment for people with these “co-occurring disorders.” 
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Catherine: And that he was trying to manipulate everyone. 
Hannah: I had several conversations with the judge and with the 
treatment court staff, saying, “Well, he’s trying to manipulate you 
into getting him treatment.” Like it’s not some crazy thing. 
Group: Right. Right. It’s so fucked up. 
Hannah: Like, this a person who has a documented mental health 
history, who has no violent record, who was arrested for a drug 
sale, this is – I mean there’s nothing really that you can manipulate 
about that. Like that- those are the facts.  
Group: [laughter] 
Hannah: Everyone agrees he’s non-violent and should not be in 
jail, but you know, they took it very personally that he was like 
trying to advocate for himself and talking about, like, why – you 
know, so – the challenges he encountered in his life and how he 
could- 
Hannah was interrupted by a loud sigh. Mia, another attorney, facetiously said, “Because he 
wasn't taking responsibility, [Hannah]!”  Hannah responded seriously, “But he was! I mean, but 
he was trying to.”  Catherine agreed: “But he was!”  Just “not their version of personal 
responsibility.” 
Hannah suggested court practitioners’ care veered too far away from a detached 
objectivity: “they took it personally” when they felt the man was trying to manipulate them.10 
                                                
10 In another instance, Allen, the prosecutor in Judge Lazarus’s court cited letters submitted by a 
defendant’s family members seeking clemency for their loved one when he opposed the young 
man’s entry into drug court. Judge Lazarus sided with Allen’s opposition and did not extend the 
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Catherine, a social worker, said she still wouldn’t talk to one of the team members “because she 
told me to tell him to be patient” while he waited to be released from jail to a treatment program 
for a total of eight months. She added that now, Darryl was “doing amazingly well and– a year 
since transition to outpatient after they called him a sociopath.” Darryl’s story suggests that 
while defendants are invited – even compelled – to speak at moments, they must be careful not to 
speak out of turn. Further, they are caught in a bind where they must be “self-responsible,” but 
not self-advocating.   
This bind hardly sends a clear message to defendants about what is safe to say in court. 
As a result, many defendants may practice small acts of resistance (see also Cohen 1999; Kelley 
1994; Scott 1985). Take Mr. Nelson, a young Black man, who appeared to be in trouble with 
Judge Lazarus. He was under suspicion for not pounding the pavement hard enough in search of 
an on-the-books job. He said he had recently had an interview. Her questions drilled into the 
banal details of his interview. She asked if he had scheduled it in advance, or had he just shown 
up. “What was the address?” she asked him. After what appeared to be an unsatisfactory 
exchange as to the details of his job search, Judge Lazarus switched her focus to his clothing.  “Is 
this what you wore to the interview?” He replied that he had worn “some slacks and some 
shoes.” “What kind of shirt?” A “button up shirt,” he told her. “How come you dress like that for 
an interview and [like] this for court?” At that moment, two court officers sidled up behind the 
defendant, indicating he might be taken to jail. The judge answered her own question, “Because 
the interview is important to you.” By implication, court was not. Mr. Nelson was reprimanded, 
                                                
treatment offer, sending his case back to a regular arraignment part (where he would either have 
to plead out or take his case to trial).  The letters described how dependable, reliable, and 
responsible this young man was - including how valuable he was to the family as a caretaker of 
younger children. The judge and the ADA agreed that if he was so responsible, he was not an 
appropriate candidate for the treatment court. 
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but he didn’t go to jail that day. Instead, he had to come back for the next two days and sit in the 
empty jury box, watching the court proceedings play out. Perhaps the rationale for this was that 
he would see patterns of success among defendants who dress respectfully versus those who 
don’t (although I never caught these patterns). But it certainly wasn’t going to help him find a 
job.  
Kamala Visweswaran (1994) argues that a liberal humanist notion of agency tends to be 
somewhat reducible to speaking, or this notion of having a voice. But silences can be agentive, 
too (ibid.). This defendant’s brief responses to Judge Lazarus’s questioning provided answers 
and yet left out specificities that seemed to drive Judge Lazarus to seek more information. That 
is, his unsatisfactory answers performatively constructed “the apparent cause of the refusal”: the 
judge’s “craving to know” (Saldaña-Portillo 2003, 172f., quoting Sommer 1991,34). He slowly 
unfolded only a partial account that never quite amounted to a straight story. He held back, 
reserving some of the details of his life.  Meanwhile, the threatening encroachment of the 
officers reminded that punishment is always imminent, even for a young person’s perhaps 
ambivalent hunt for a low-paying job in a scarce and discriminatory job market. 
When Mr. Stokes, a Black man in his twenties, appeared before Judge Lazarus in early 
October of 2014, he was living at a residential treatment program. Judge Lazarus asked Mr. 
Stokes how it was going.  He said things were okay, but that his entire “house” was in trouble. 
The judge said, “So …you’re saying they’ve discovered of lot of negative activity and they’re 
holding everyone responsible.”  She pointed out that he had been in a residential program before. 
“Didn’t they have same rules?” 
Mr. Stokes said, “yeah, but it didn’t affect me.” He continued, “when you remanded me 
[sent me to jail], I was the only one standing.” Mr. Stokes seemed to mean that in going to jail, 
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he only had to be accountable for his own actions, not those of his peers. He said that he didn’t 
feel like he should be punished because he has done as Judge Lazarus tells him: as he put it, 
“stay away from drugs, don’t leave.”   
Judge Lazarus said, “So if you see other people getting high…”  
“I don’t see,” he jumped in.  
“I’m just saying, if you saw one of your roommates getting high, what do you think your 
obligation is?” she asked. 
“I don’t know,” Mr. Stokes said.  
“You don’t know?” Judge Lazarus asked. “You know. You may not like it…” 
Mr. Stokes pointed out, “They also tell you, ‘Go to the program; Worry about 
yourself’…It’s hard to worry about myself and the next person.” 
“I don’t think it is,” she disagreed, adding, “He’s putting you at risk. […] Taking care of 
yourself is watching out for roommates.” 
Mr. Stokes reiterated that he was just looking to take care of himself and follow the rules. 
“But the rules are, you’re not an island, you live in a community.”  Judge Lazarus 
elaborated, “He smokes. He’s got extra stuff, puts it in your drawers and you’re gonna say, ‘It 
wasn’t me.’” 
Mr. Stokes said, “I don’t think anyone will do me like that.” 
“But you’re wrong,” the judge said. “But that’s silly.” As she continued, Mr. Stokes’ 
attorney whispered to him, seemingly advising him how to extricate himself from this exchange 
with the judge. “Just say ‘I understand,’” the attorney appeared to tell him. Mr. Stokes wasn’t 
ready to do that. The judge continued, saying, “I understand it’s an unfair rule, but they’re trying 
to teach you...” It’s “not being a rat or a snitch […] It’s being a part of a community where you 
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care about each other […] They’re trying to teach you a different way of dealing with the 
community you live in.” 
Mr. Stokes said, “I’m just used to always worrying about myself.” 
“Right,” Judge Lazarus agreed. She continued, explaining to Mr. Stokes how his actions 
affect others in his community.  
“I understand,” Mr. Stokes finally said, pleasing his attorney and seeming to satisfy Judge 
Lazarus. 
“I know I’m going overboard,” she said, “but it’s just a different way of being and that’s 
why they punish everyone.” From there, she went on to congratulate him on a good report from 
his program and to discuss his progress toward getting his GED.  
Ellen Moodie (2010, 116-17) shows how a social imaginary of a national community of 
care is tied to a particularly privileged position and experience of the world. In her analysis of a 
crime story of a privileged young woman in El Salvador, Moodie explains that the woman’s 
narrative moves among four separate zones of care: that of the patriarch, the community, the 
state, and God or the supernatural (or to use “secular” recovery language, a “higher power”).  I 
think in Judge Lazarus’s optimistic vision of Mr. Stokes’ community of care, social care extends 
across zones ensuring mutual protection and the good life for all. Yet for Mr. Stokes, as 
evidenced by his position as a criminal defendant and the unjust pervasiveness of the criminal 
justice system in his “community,”11 care does not cross community and state zones without 
becoming degraded or morphing into punishment. 
                                                
11 In the U.S., the term “communities of color” is ubiquitous and the word “community” on its 
own often indexes African Americans in a similar way that “urban” does. In addition to its warm, 
social, caring feel, the term can presume homogeneity, solidarity, and boundedness, doing 
similar work to the term “culture.” 
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Judge Lazarus was coaching Mr. Stokes how to play the game to succeed in his treatment 
program. Her sense of a community of care emerges from an ideology of the responsible citizen 
who consents to be law-abiding and to report “suspicious” or criminal behavior to the governing 
authorities and, in return, is rewarded with a secure life in community. But this is an empty 
promise for young Black men like Mr. Stokes who, because of pervasive racist ideology, are 




Defendants began their drug court journeys with consent, so they were not ones to make 
grand refusals.12 But in the limited ways that their prior consent leaves room for, some, like Mr. 
Stokes, made small refusals of the panoptical surveillance that they were urged to cooperate with 
and commune around. Still others perform small acts of resilience that make community while 
refusing penality. Carole McGranahan (2016) explains, refusal is not just a stoppage or ending, it 
is generative; not merely antisocial, but also social. Refusal can forge community (just as 
teamwork can exclude). According to Audra Simpson (2016), refusal is critique with historical 
consciousness. It is revenge against the failed promise of consent. 
Joel told me about a former treatment worker he supervised that similarly refused to be a 
capillary of police power. As noted, treatment professionals’ reporting duties significantly 
changes their relationships and responsibilities to their clients. It changes their roles as caretakers 
altogether. This change did not go over easily for everyone.  Joel told me: 
                                                
12 For instance, like the Mexican youths Gilberto Rosas (2012) studied in the Free ‘Hood (Barrio 
Libre) did. 
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Joel: And I think we struggled, some of our staff in the early days 
about what to communicate and how to communicate 
EM: Mhm, mhm 
Joel: I think that we had a value system amongst a paraprofessional 
group of people that said, “hey, uh, if I tell Judge [Kirchner] that 
Emily is dirty, she may go to jail!” 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: Yeah, you might. She might. 
EM: Mhm, mhm 
Joel: That’s not your decision. 
EM: Mhm, right. 
Joel: You know? You don’t have a decision. You have to do it. I 
think people did struggle. 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: I do. I do.  
Joel continued to tell me about one employee he supervised who had an especially 
difficult time with this.  
Joel: Um, I had someone who, actually when I was running a 
parole program, he had done time, and I sort of oriented him to one 
of the details in the parole contract with the state that- that, um, if 
you have knowledge of one of the parolees committing a crime? 
You have to, uh, you have to communicate that. He resigned. 
EM: Hm 
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Joel: He resigned. He resigned on the spot. He said, “I can’t keep 
this job any longer.” And I kind of had a conversation with him. I 
said, “You know, I think you really need to rethink your career.” 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: “Because if you’re still subscribing to that value system-- 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: --you know, about being a rat or a stool pigeon, um, you’re in 
the wrong business.” […] “You can’t- if you can’t- if you can’t 
teach people to be honest-- 
EM: Mhm, yeah. 
Joel: --you’re in the wrong field.” I don’t know what happened to 
him, but that’s a true story. 
EM: Mhm 
Joel: He resigned pretty much on the spot. He says- I- I said, I 
think I once told him, “take a couple days to think about your 
decision here.” But he ultimately came back and said, “I can’t 
work here.” 
EM: Wow. 
Joel: I said, “Well, I hope you don’t end up somewhere else 
because if you’re gonna go in and tell them you can’t do that and 
they hire you anyway, it’s a pretty scary organization.” 
I was moved by Joel’s story of this care worker who chose to give up his job before he would 
give up his clients. Interestingly, I think while he condemned this employee’s actions as 
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dishonest, the way he told me the story also suggested to me that he admired or respected the 
man’s integrity to, and personal sacrifice for, his values and his clients’ protection. Employment 
opportunities for a formerly incarcerated person (“he had done time”) are few and far between. 
In fact, for the formerly incarcerated, getting the credentials to be an addiction treatment 
counselor, for which one needs a high school or equivalent degree but not an associate’s or 
bachelor’s degree, is often one of the best and few options for employment. His ethical refusal 
endangered his livelihood.   
Joel said this “scary,” “dishonest” “value system has no place in drug treatment – 
although, truly, it is more accurate to state that it has no place in a drug treatment that is 
beholden to the criminal justice system. Of course, in other care settings, even those that receive 
state funding, mandatory reporting requirements are far more limited. But I suggest that this 
refusal comes out of the sense that speaking the truth sometimes “hides the real workings of 
power” and “supports domination,” as Michel Foucault argued (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 
169). This is an ethic that refuses to see the moral and the illicit as necessarily opposites. Angela 
Garcia (2014, 51) similarly “encountered experiences that blur the boundaries of vice and virtue, 
alienation and connection, injury and care” in her work on addiction and family life. It is a small 
refusal that grows out of a historical consciousness and experience of being under surveillance 
and subject to punishment (and not part of some maladaptive “street culture” or “culture of 
poverty”). 
Gayle told me about a client who was told he wasn’t “making enough progress” at his 
treatment program because he didn’t “know how to trust people.”   
Gayle: And he said that he said to his counselor, “I’ve been in state 
prison five times, what am I supposed to know from trust?”  
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EM: Mhm 
Gayle: So, I was talking to him about just the – “you don’t have to 
trust, you just have to open yourself up to seeing things in a 
slightly different light” – and I was talking to him, I said, 
“Remember, were you there that day when [Isaiah] gave [Imogene] 
his vest?” And he said “yeah,” and I said, “You know, that was 
really a beautiful thing – and he- he was sensitive to her and she 
trusted him and he trusted that he knew the right thing to do and he 
didn’t ask for a lot of accolades, he just did it – and uh, see I would 
now trust [Isaiah] because he did a solid for [Imogene].” So, you 
know, and I said to him, “We see that every single day; somebody 
doesn’t have a [public transit fare card], somebody else gives them 
their [fare card] and there really is a community […]”  
Her client’s reference to repeated incarceration as a basis for his mistrust should not be glossed 
over too quickly. Given his experience and how that shapes his expectation, it would be a 
wonder if he felt he could trust counselors who report directly to the court.  
Placing Gayle’s descriptions of a caring community of defendants against Mr. Stokes’ 
refusal of Judge Lazarus’s vision of a caring community helps me to illustrate the care that many 
defendants exercised, which is care that refused trouble. When Isaiah gave Imogene his 
reflective vest, it was because he recognized that she could get into trouble if she walked into the 
courtroom scantily clad. When one defendant gives another fare to ride public transportation, 
aside from being generous, it is likely in part out of the recognition that if he misses or is late for 
an appointment, he will be deemed noncompliant. This is coalescing against trouble. This is 
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collective responsibility against personal responsibility. Like Mr. Stokes and the wayward 




In this chapter, I showed how the mission to care brings the court actors together into 
teams, bringing together usually oppositional (attorneys) or distant (judges) parties, as well as 
independent care professionals at cooperative – i.e. communicative – treatment providers. It 
introduces new responsibilities on nearly everyone involved, and it poses especially thorny 
ethical questions for defense attorneys and treatment professionals. Still, collaborative work may 
indeed have promise in this therapeutic environment. But that potential is only diminished by 
strong discouragement of dissent, including from those who are not seen as being part of the 
“we” of the team.   
Psychologist Tom Tyler’s (1994, 2003, 2004) studies have found that people will 
perceive a process as fair if they get to have a say, even if their say does not ultimately count. If 
they think they have had some role in the decision-making, even if they haven’t, they perceive 
the process as fair.  I will leave to the side the specter of “false consciousness,” of whether 
people are duped into thinking a process is objectively fair or whether this question is eclipsed by 
the notion that fairness is entirely subjective. I will put this to the side because, again, what this 
suggests to me is that fairness, writ here as justice, can compromise the goals of therapeutic care. 
False consciousness or not, if defendants are made to feel that the process is fair, but their 
                                                
13 I feel the need to assert that evading punishment is not the same thing as evading 
responsibility. Equating punishment with responsibility presumes that every punishment is just. 
What if the punishment is unjust? What if it doesn’t fit the crime (or the noncompliance)? 
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knowledge is excluded from the design and coordination of their care, effective care will suffer. 
Anthropologists have shown again and again, in various settings, how programs meant to ensure 
the health of people that exclude the lived realities of those people and the meanings they make 
of their treatment, care, and well-being are not only less effective, but also often oppressive 
(Adams, Burke & Whitmarsh 2014; Baer, Singer, & Susser 2003; Biehl & Petryna 2013; Heald 
2006; Heath 2016; Kleinman 1988; Knight 2015; Krieger 2011; Rapp 1999).14  If the “we” of a 
network of care excludes the subject of care, it is not likely to be very sustainable, which may 
help to explain why practitioners lamented that defendants often relapsed just before or just after 
their graduations. The goals of care might be served well by collaborative teamwork, but not 
when teams “team up” on the subjects of their care. 
“Good communication is a crucial precondition for good care,” writes Annemarie Mol 
(2008, 88). But we must be careful about what constitutes “good” communication, and what are 
the contextually relevant achievements of any communicative event. Drug court practitioners 
could be more attuned to the way they use information as evidence to form judgments about 
defendants.  Instead of “judging addicts” (Tiger 2013), where judgments that may lead a 
defendant’s attorney to decide that it is in her best interest to jail her, court practitioners could 
use information to tailor regimens of care with an eye toward making care accessible, affordable, 
and available (rather than testing to see whether defendants have the grit and determination to 
overcome obstacles to care). When communication is mainly used as a tool of surveillance, and 
less as feedback about which aspects of a care regimen are working and which aren’t, it is care 
that can really get someone into trouble. 
                                                
14 It is also crucial to point out that historically, anthropologist have helped oppressive regimes 
specifically by gaining local knowledge (Scheper-Hughes 2002).  
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Teamwork is a way of striving for justice, in that it detaches decision-making from 
individual practitioners and their individual biases (although taking bias to be individual 
misconstrues the fact that bias works at much deeper, higher, and more pervasive levels than the 
individual).  In this way, teamwork recognizes the fundamental sociality of responsibility. If such 
a shared vision of responsibility could be extended to defendants, this could have real promise in 
the drug court environment. In fact, like court practitioners, defendants also sometimes created 
community through a refusal of personal responsibility, sometimes by remaining silent, 
sometimes by “covering up” a friend.  Perhaps, if the threat of punishment were removed from 
this care environment, collaborative work could transcend the divide between defendants and 
their care workers so that responsibility for care could be viewed as a collective responsibility. 
In this chapter, I complicated the claim that two minutes of communication between 
judges and defendants can be seen as an unquestioned good. As noted, this is touted as an 
effective, evidence-based practice. In the next chapter, I will discuss effectiveness and how it is 
and isn’t measured by evidence-based proponents, and how it might swallow up other ethical 
considerations in the ethically fraught context of drug court.  
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CHAPTER 3  
BEYOND EFFECTIVE:  
THINKING ETHICS, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 
 
At a cocktail party of drug policy experts and activists in January of 2015, a mutual 
friend introduced me to a colleague who worked for the Open Society Institute. OSI has a 
significant harm reduction mission with global reach and has taken a public stance in its 
opposition to the drug treatment court model. When I told him about my project, he expressed 
critique of and disdain for drug courts. Midway into my fieldwork and feeling far away from 
conclusions, all I could muster to say to him was something along the lines of, The practitioners 
really do mean well. Disgust might be too strong a word for what I then read on his face, but he 
dismissed outright my allusion to “good intentions.” I sympathized with what I think was 
frustration on his part, and took part in that frustration, too. Best intentions, I thought? The 
civilizing mission? Is all that this research coming to the rather effete observation that drug court 
practitioners generally mean well?  
It occurred to me that, in spite of their different conclusions, advocates on either side of 
the drug court debate are working to make drug policy more “evidence-based,” and thus more 
effective and ethical. “Evidence-based” is an ethical stance on the proper route to knowledge and 
from there, to policy-making and practice. That is, what I wanted to communicate to the OSI rep 
was that I wasn’t finding that drug courts were merely “the cynical playing out of strategies and 
interests in competitive games of power and prestige” (Lambek 2010, 7). Rather, they emerge, in 
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part, from an ethical framework that guides much of OSI’s work, and much work that I find 
laudable.  
I have been thinking about “evidence-based” treatment and policy since well before I 
embarked on this dissertation.  As an activist in the overlapping AIDS, harm reduction, and sex 
worker rights movements, I, among fellow activists, demanded that policies and programs 
affecting or targeting people living with HIV/AIDS, people who use drugs, and sex workers be 
“evidence-based.” The evidence, we would insist, showed that the introduction of needle 
exchange programs had been one of the most effective public health measures in stemming the 
spread of HIV.1 Among us, there were probably “true believers” in the public health-focused 
evidence-based message, those who recognized its tactical value in the evidence-based epistemic 
moment, and probably those of us who moved between those two positions.  
To me, advocating for harm reduction programs like needle exchange was very much 
about the ethical. At the time, I distinguished between a moralism that condemned drug users, 
sex workers, and PLWHA and an ethical position that sought to step aside from these particular 
morals. Now, years later, I don’t know that I would make a strong case that morals can be 
defined one way and ethics another. I had wanted to claim the superior position, and the “ethical” 
had that rarified air to me. In fact, ethics seemed to carry the authority of universality, while 
morality was drowning in particularisms. Programming we called “evidence-based” was more 
ethical, and it was more ethical because it was liberated from particular forms of authority that 
sought to impose their moral frameworks on others who might be harmed by them.  
                                                
1 See, e.g., DesJarlais, Perlis, Arasteh, et al. 2005 
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In this chapter, I look at two slippages in very key terms in the evidence based movement 
in the drug court context. The first slippage is between “effective” and “ethical”; the second, 
which I argue can be partly explained by the first, is between “practice” and “implementation.”  
I reconceptualize a meta-discourse among drug court practitioners about drug court as 
“theater.” I argue that this metadiscourse allows court practitioners to fashion themselves as 
ethical, self-consciously acting performers, and it sets the stage for evaluation, a specialized 
mode of research that seeks to measure and determine the effectiveness of programs and 
interventions.    
Then I turn to the question of “effectiveness,” or the claim that “drug courts work.” I 
argue that the evidence used to prove that drug courts are effective is ambivalent. Further, 
evaluation research rarely gives due attention to questions about whether drug courts work for 
defendants who face greater hardship and discrimination in the criminal justice system: poor and 
working class people, people of color, women, gender non-conforming and transgender people 
(Alexander 2010; Davis 2003; Gilmore 2006; Spade 2011).  
According to drug court literature, drug courts are “evidence-based” programs for two 
reasons that I think are important to differentiate. First, drug courts are evidence-based because 
they demonstrate, through the burgeoning science of evaluation, that they are effective (which is 
an index for a few broad measures like reduced recidivism, reduced substance abuse, and cost-
efficacy). Drug courts are also said to be “evidence-based” because practitioners implement 
“evidence-based practices.” To some small extent, evaluation research and practice inform each 
other. But most drug court evaluations of the last couple of decades have been outcomes-
oriented, not process-oriented, and this trend in evaluation has for the most part kept actual drug 
court practices, and whether they are effective or not, stowed away in what many have termed 
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the “black box” of treatment courts (Paik 2011; Turner, Longshore, Wenzel et al. 2002). Many 
evidence-based practices are formulated from research performed in other contexts. While 
context does matter, and interventions of various sorts are destined to have different applications 
and effects in different contexts, I think it is important that drug court professionals consult 
evidence produced outside of the criminal justice setting, devoid as it is of non-criminalizing 
models for treatment.   
When practitioners spoke to me about patterns they had observed or concerns they had 
about the effects of their work in the drug court, they would often qualify that they did not have 
the numbers to back up their impressions. I suggest that this evinces the limits of the extent to 
which the evidence-based framework has provided meaningful evidence of effectiveness to 
them, and that effectiveness itself is an insufficient measure of their work. 
Some argue that the evidence-based drug court model is sound, and that the problem is 
simply implementation of evidence-based practice. But this slippage (between practice and 
implementation) hints at the ways that the practices of drug court practitioners vastly exceed the 
few mechanical instructions that evidence-based proponents in the drug court professional world 
hold up as best practices.  Further, this discrepancy might lead us to question whether there is 
something insufficient or impracticable about the ideal model, given practitioners competing 
ethical commitments.  
Ethics tends to carry a normative, noble, and universal valuation as the good and the 
right. But as anthropologists have shown, ethics are situated in particular historical and social 
and cultural contexts (Das 2015; Lambek 2010; Mahmood 2004). In the next section, I lay out a 
brief history of the evidence-based movement, and drug courts’ place within it.  
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The rise of evidence-based policy 
“Evidence-based” was first coined and developed by physicians working to improve 
diagnostic and treatment practices and medical education in the 1980s, much of that work taking 
place in Canada and the U.S. (Lambert 2006, 2009). Briefly, evidence-based medicine seeks to 
give physicians the tools to make the most effective clinical and diagnostic decisions based on 
meta-analyses of peer-reviewed population health studies and clinical trials that use the 
randomized control trial (RCT) research design. These meta-analyses compare the evidence of 
effectiveness of different interventions, enabling the medical professional to integrate the 
findings of a range of studies into her clinical decision-making, along with her professional 
judgment and the needs of her patients.   
Evidence-based treatment often promises to detach care decisions from morality and 
subjective bias that might weigh them down or render them ineffective. Those traditionally in 
positions to make decisions on behalf of others, like doctors, are to base those decisions on “the 
evidence,” instead of relying on their own medical and experiential knowledge and expertise. 
Evidence-based, as opposed to “ego-based” or “eminence-based” practice (Ecks 2008). Scholars 
attribute the strength of the evidence-based paradigm to a general cultural mistrust of expertise 
and of the elitism that the expert status entails. We see this mistrust not only in medicine, but 
also in all sorts of public interventions, programs, and policies in the U.S. and the U.K. (Lambert 
2009; Power 1997). The “evidence-based” movement was, in certain respects, a further step 
away from “traditional” authority (even in a Weberian sense). In fact, drug court proponents 
often refer to regular criminal case processing and to trial courts as “traditional,” whereas drug 
courts are represented as “innovative,” and as Chapter 1 discussed, “creative.”   
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The term “evidence-based” itself communicates the normative value placed on 
“evidence” (Nichter 2013), as it leaves out just what the evidence is supposed to show, which is 
that a particular treatment or intervention is effective. Both of these terms, evidence and 
effectiveness, have very particular meanings in the “evidence-based” context, and indeed in 
different contexts where “evidence-based” practice has gained authority. In the context of drug 
courts, evidence of effectiveness is produced by quantitative evaluations that primarily measure 
rates of recidivism among drug court participants and compare them with comparison groups. 
Evaluations also attempt to gauge the real and potential cost-savings of drug court participation 
versus traditional criminal case processing. In some cases, evaluations have also set out to 
estimate whether drug court participation reduces drug use. Some evaluations cite the rate of 
retention of drug court defendants in treatment as compared with those who enter treatment 
voluntarily.  
The evidence-based movement gained steam in criminal justice policy following the 
sense, since the mid-1970s, that “Nothing Works.” This disenchantment emerged after the 
publication of the discouraging results of a survey on penal practices called “What Works?” 
(Martinson 1974; Phelps 2011.) It essentially ended a period of penology marked by the 
rehabilitative ideal, giving way to the “zero-tolerance” policies and warehouse-like prisons 
devoid of rehabilitative programs (see Irwin 2005; Simon 2007) throughout the 1970’s and 
thereafter. Evidence-based policy tries to systematically offer a retort to the idea that “nothing 
works.”  Drug courts work, its proponents insist. Drug courts emerge less on a resurgence of the 





After five years working in Judge Lazarus’s court, helping it to get off the ground and 
running, the chief administrative judge of the state convened a group of stakeholders to “look at 
how courts handled cases dealing with drugs and drug addiction.” “Out of that work came a 
fairly sizable document,” Jackie told me, and the “end result was there was a call to 
institutionalize drug courts around the state. A big piece of that effort was training - engaging 
jurisdictions to want to start a drug court.”  Jackie was then hired to do that work, which 
involved building “an infrastructure that included technology, training, staff that could work with 
the jurisdictions on the ground to help them move through the process of creating drug courts in 
their jurisdictions. For a few years,” she said, “we really trained hundreds and hundreds of 
people.” In trainings around the state, they “covered the full panoply of drug court components,” 
including “how to assess, how to target the right populations,” how to design “sanction and 
reward” schedules, “graduation and termination criteria,” and “recommended practices – a set of 
effective practices.” “I did a lot of other national work as well,” “developing resource tools,” and 
writing “applications for federal funding that would help support these initiatives.” Around 2010, 
Jackie’s work turned even more towards national efforts in training and technical assistance, 
working with other states and even other countries. The broad reach of Jackie’s efforts to 
inculcate evidence-based practice among drug court practitioners nationwide and beyond are 
impressive. Jackie told me: 
My priorities right now and main reason I agreed to do this job is 
to build a statewide strategic plan for drug treatment courts in [the 
state]. You know, when drug courts first started they were- the 
court system was really rich, you know, it had a lot of resources, it 
 159 
had a lot of money to support training and drug testing and staff in 
drug courts and you know, you name it. And then the fiscal crisis 
hit about four, five years ago and there's massive layoffs, all travel 
stopped, all training stopped and so while there are still a lot of 
very good drug courts they're, you know, a little bit off the tracks 
and we have a new chief judge coming […] and so it was very 
important to me to have a- at least a plan in place that could show 
that there are people around the state who really care deeply about 
this and these are the things we think we need in place to have a 
strong institutionalized drug court plan.  
 Drug courts are sustained by a group of professionals who “really care deeply” about the 
drug court project. Jackie and her colleagues also care about an ethics of decision-making and 
practice that emerges from an “evidence-based” movement in medicine and public policy.  
Understandably, it was very important to Jackie, in her role as the statewide drug court 
coordinator, to get drug courts on board with the best of new research – to blow the dust off ideas 
about medication assisted treatment, for instance, held by certain people “still living in the dark 
ages.” This was how she characterized courts that resisted allowing clients to use maintenance 
treatments like methadone or buprenorphine (both pharmaceuticals in the synthetic opioid family 
that are used to stave off cravings for heroin and other opioids). The evidence-based professional 
aligns herself with a celebrated canon of enlightenment thinkers – modern, rational, and 
scientific. 
Jackie: I’m beginning to think of like medication assisted treatment 
like same sex marriage […] Like, it’s over. Do you know, like, you 
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can like stop crying about it because it’s-- that fight is over and 
[laughs], you know, in another five years, people are gonna go, 
“What?! they couldn’t - there wasn’t same sex marriage?” Um, so I 
think- I’m hoping M.A.T. follows that […]paradigm. 
EM: Mhm 
Jackie: Um, because it’s really- because too many people are 
dying. 
As Jackie linked changing attitudes toward medication-assisted treatment as evidence-
based practice with same-sex marriage, she drew an arc of progress moving forward to a 
brighter, more ethical future when our dark past will be unthinkable. In this story, evidence-
based drug courts are helping to propel this arc of enlightenment forward.  At the same time, 
Jackie’s analogy to same-sex marriage invites us to see how the effective and the ethical collide 
in the evidence-based movement around drug courts. Where “too many people are dying” could 
easily be a problem for effectiveness to solve, the analogy with  same-sex marriage makes it very 
clearly also an ethical problem to her.    
While in the Introduction, I traced a history of “effectiveness” that emphasized it as a 
managerial preoccupation in a neoliberal era of cost-benefit analysis, it is also an ethical 
commitment in its own right, to be sure. In addition to a handful of outcome measures, including 
recidivism rates and drug use among drug court defendants, as well as by the tax dollars saved by 
drug courts, proponents of evidence-based policy in drug courts have other, explicitly ethical 
aims that are wrapped up with effectiveness, too. Drug court proponents strive to reduce the 
racial disparities of the War on Drugs. This is a moral/ethical commitment that it is hoped will be 
fulfilled by evidence-based practices. Proponents strive to provide addicted defendants with 
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solutions that work better than incarceration. This is a commitment to effectiveness that is also 
concerned with the ethical principle of just deserts. As discussed in the previous chapter, drug 
court proponents and practitioners seek to do procedural justice2 better than criminal courts do it, 
by giving defendants more opportunities to speak and by stripping proceedings of arcane legal 
jargon. This is an ethical commitment to justice that, it is supposed, makes drug courts more 
effective. Jackie explained: 
Basically, the notion that if the system treats you with respect, you 
will have more confidence in the system. […] [I]f the rules of the 
game are fair, if you felt that you were treated with respect and 
dignity, if people communicate with you and inform you of what is 
going on, then you will not only have more faith in the system, but 
you will be more compliant with court orders. 
Yet practitioners also have competing ethical commitments in a broader ethical 
landscape. For instance, in a webinar for drug court practitioners posted to the National Institutes 
of Justice website titled, “Addiction, the Brain, and Evidence Based Treatment,”3 Dr. Redonna 
K. Chandler explains to her virtual audience that addiction is a “chronic condition.” Chandler 
says that from a scientific perspective, addiction should be treated more like asthma, 
hypertension, and diabetes than is typically thought. Because of addiction’s deeply moralized 
                                                
2 Based on the philosophy of John Rawls originally laid out in his 1971 A Theory of Justice, 
procedural justice emphasizes fairness in the processes of justice administration. Certain 
elements of procedural justice are central to the procedural rules in criminal and civil trial courts. 
Researchers in social psychology, like Tom Tyler (1994, 2003, 2004), have subsequently taken 
up questions about perceptions of fairness in procedural justice. The therapeutic jurisprudential 
movement has also sought to further develop principles of procedural justice in the courtroom 
(see Hora, Schma, and Rosenthal 1999).  
3 Accessed August 22, 2017. https://www.nij.gov/multimedia/presenter/presenter-
chandler/pages/presenter-chandler-transcript.aspx 
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past (and present), this medical model represents not only a scientific perspective that fashions 
itself as more objectively true to life and the nature of addiction (and therefore more effective), 
but also as more objective in the sense that it is detached from the heavy judgment of a moral 
model of addiction (although many have argued that the medicalization of addiction has not 
ameliorated its stigmatization [Seear 2017]). This mirrors the strivings for objectivity of 
evidence-based research – blending the objectivity of effectiveness with the ethical stance that 
objectivity represents.  
In providing treatment to people who are thought to be ill, the ethics of what constitutes 
good healthcare come into play – bioethics like autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and 
distributive justice (Muller 1994). Due to the drug court’s institutional location, a slew of ethical 
commitments related to criminal justice surfaces, too – rectification, objectivity, equality, 
fairness. Further still, there are the professional ethics of judges (like objectivity, dispassion, 
impartiality, among others), defense lawyers (to provide the best possible legal defense of their 
clients, among others), and prosecuting attorneys (to ensure public safety and to avenge the 
victimization of innocents and of “decent society” by punishing wrongdoers, among others). As I 
have shown in the previous chapters, the hybridity of drug courts vex these conflicting 
commitments. Evidence of “effectiveness” culled from the limited field of mostly quantitative 
research that counts in the “evidence base” alone cannot assure ethical practice in this ethically 
fraught field.  
 
The theater of effectiveness 
Scholars of drug courts have argued that they are theaters (see Nolan 2001; Kaye Brook 
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2010).4 Set apart in time and space (see Carlson 1996, 15),5 drug court proceedings involve 
precise staging: the judge enters consistently from either stage left or right, costumed in her robe, 
and climbs two steps up to sit at her bench. As she does this, the bailiff speaks her or his most 
well-known line: “All rise, the honorable Judge [Fierro] presiding.” The bailiff may give 
directions to the audience to turn cell phones off, as theatergoers are likewise now accustomed 
to. The defense attorney stands facing the judge at her desk, stage left, and the assistant district 
attorney rises from his desk, stage right, also facing the judge. They shuffle the various props on 
their desks - file folders, papers, a computer mouse. Defendants sit and watch the show until they 
are called up, one by one, to take their turn on stage with the cast.   
That I and my fellow researchers of drug court view this as theater is one thing. Drawing 
on Johannes Fabian’s (1983) work, Anne McClintock (1995, 122) notes that the highly 
“objectivist” stance of the researcher who maintains a “high point of view” “is enjoyed by those 
in privileged positions in the social structure, to whom the world appears as spectacle, stage, 
performance.” However, the extent to which official drug court texts and drug court judges 
describe drug courts as theater is somewhat more surprising. In her chambers one summer 
afternoon in 2013, Judge Lazarus told me, “Drug court is theater.” Another drug court judge has 
written, “A Drug Court judge performs on the courtroom stage before an audience full of 
offenders” (Tauber 1994, 15 quoted in Kay Brooke 2010, 98).  Yet another stated: “Drug courts, 
it has been said many times, are theater. And the judge is the stage director and one of the 
                                                
4 Jean and John Comaroff (2004) have likewise pointed to the way law enforcement performs a 
kind of spectacle of the state that helps to define and legitimize its power to its publics: these 
spectacles are the state’s way of making statements.  
5 They are also “social dramas,” as Victor Turner (1964, 1969, 1974) defined them. The drug 
court rite involves phases of separation, transition, and reintegration. At this third stage, the 
defendant will either be reintegrated with his community, or the breach will be determined to 
have been “permanent” – in which case, he will be incarcerated.  
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primary actors” (quoted in Nolan, 2001, 61). Even state judicial manuals liken drug courts to 
theaters (Kaye Brook 2010, 99, citing Herrick, Abriano, Baldwin et al., 2004, 30-1).  
The somewhat Shakespearian idea of Erving Goffman’s (1959) The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life is that all the world is a stage. Compelling as this analytic approach is, those 
who self-consciously take the stage of drug court are not saying that their whole lives are 
performances, or that they move from one stage to another, enacting different roles. They are 
holding drug court apart as a special space of performance (see Bauman 1993, 182).  While 
Nolan (2001) applies a Goffmanesque analysis to the discourse on drug court as theater, I want 
to heed the metacommunicative work in my interlocutors’ framing of drug court as theater and/or 
performance.  
Self-consciousness is one of the defining aspects of performance (Bauman 1989; Carlson 
1996; Schechner 2002). A performer is conscious of how well she is performing, and of her 
audience’s reception of her performance. This is what Bauman calls the “doubleness” of 
performance. Doubleness separates actor from action. One thinks, reasons, assesses before she 
does. Like René Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am.  This is the doubleness that 
Charles Taylor (1989, 163) refers to as a disengaged, and radically reflexive stance of control, 
transposing “first-person experience into an objectified, impersonal mode.” Taylor explains: 
Instead of being swept along to error by the ordinary bent of our 
experience, we stand back from it, withdraw from it, reconstrue it 
objectively, and then learn to draw defensible conclusions from it 
(ibid.).  
The drug court performer is thus an ethical, conscientious modern according to liberal 
Enlightenment thought. 
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“Doubleness” also refers to how the actor is separated from her audience, and how her 
actual performance is evaluated against an ideal. This brings us to evaluation. With the transit of 
the evidence-based movement into public policy, it has become increasingly important for 
programs to show that they are “constantly evaluated” (Goldenberg 2006, 2622), and these 
evaluations must show evidence that the programs are “effective” (Lambert 2009, 17).6 Drug 
courts are no exception to this. In fact, drug court practitioners expressed the sense that their 
work is under more scrutiny than their colleagues in “traditional” courtrooms. Judge Lazarus, 
who took on the drug court project in the mid-1990s, told me: 
For the I-don’t-know-how-many years before I was in drug court 
that I was sitting in a traditional felony court part, sending people to 
prison, um, taking pleas, sending them to prison, doing trials, 
sending people to prison – nobody ever said, “What’s your 
recidivism rate?” You know, “Is prison successful in getting people 
to stop committing crimes?” The only way drug courts have been 
                                                
6 One of the “ten key components” of drug courts, put together by an interdisciplinary group of 
court professionals seeking to standardize and cement a “best practices” approach, is: 
“Monitoring and evaluation to measure achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness” 
(Hora 2002, 1478). Judge Hora writes, “Only with rigorous evaluations and constant assessment 
can problem-solving courts, such as drug treatment courts, be seen as more than just ‘feel good’ 
experiments’” (ibid.). In his study of drug courts, sociologist James Nolan also quotes 
democratic U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill, formerly a prosecutor for a Missouri drug court and 
board member of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, giving the following 
piece of advice to drug courts: “evaluation, evaluation, evaluation. If you think you are going to 
get money in the future without evaluation, you aren’t awake” (Nolan 2001, 64). Nolan quotes 
Judith Kaye, who served as Administrative Judge for the State of New York from 1993 to 2008 
and was integral in the implementation of problem-solving courts, saying, “Courts today face a 
public that, by and large, is cynical and distrustful of all government, including the judicial 
system. Courts can no longer assume they enjoy the public’s trust and respect. We have to 
achieve it a new-fashioned way: we have to earn it” (quoted in Nolan 2001, 58). 
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allowed to continue, the only way they’ve been funded, is by 
proving [laughs] that our recidivism rate is effective. 
In addition to a hint of ressentiment, Judge Lazarus’s words also evince the almost 
totalizing value that the term “effective” has taken on. Rarely confronting questions as to what 
and who decides what measures combine to create the “effective” stamp of approval, 
effectiveness can take on a quality of “self-evidence.” As Sally Engle Merry (2011, S84), 
concentrating specifically on numerical “indicators” used in the international NGO sector to 
measure and rate a country’s performance on massive and complex social phenomena like 
“poverty” or “rule of law,” explains, these sorts of measures “typically conceal their political and 
theoretical origins.”  
Judge Lazarus continued to demonstrate how drug courts have drawn upon the public 
appeal of numerical measures of effectiveness:  
Yeah, I think that speaks to how difficult it is to change institutions, 
practices, you know this is how the courts do it and if you want to 
do it different, you have to – how, how do you move the institution? 
And drug courts chose to use statistics to move – persuade peoples’ 
minds. They [drug courts] kind of naturally persuade peoples’ 
hearts. […] But I think from the very beginning it was clear that if 
you just said, “Look at the lives we save. Look at the good we do,” 
that would not get you big change. […] So if you’re looking to move 
– make a substantial impact in the system, you need to figure out 
how you’re gonna do that and drug courts decided it was gonna be 
through numbers. 
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That numbers are the mechanism for change is implicit in the assertions that drug courts 
are “evidence-based.” Outside of evaluations, there are multiple empirical studies of drug courts 
by scholars in the social sciences and humanities using various ethnographic methods (Burns and 
Peyrot 2003; Kaye Brook 2010; Mackinem and Higgins 2007; Nolan 2001; Paik 2011; Wolf 
2002, among others). These studies each contribute to a growing body of critique of these 
courts.7 But in the drug court literature, none of the evidence from these studies seems to count, 
or to count as “evidence” that is supposed to shape drug court practice.  
But further, Judge Lazarus pointed to what kind of story the numbers are put to work to 
tell, and to whom. Not so much lives saved as taxpayer-dollar saved; and much more 
specifically, and perhaps more measurably, than “the good we do,” evaluations focus on rates of 
recidivism. The audience who is supposed to be moved by drug court effectiveness is the 
“public,” normatively imagined as the typical, reasonable, “responsible citizen,” so often 
represented as “victim” since the 1970s (Garland 2001, 11).8  These measures of effectiveness 
                                                
7 Legal scholars, too, have put forward their grave theoretical concerns about drug courts (Bean 
2002; Boldt 2002, 2010; Bowers 2008; Gross 2010; Hoffman 2002, O’Hear 2009). 
Nongovernmental organizations working in drug policy advocacy (Drug Policy Alliance, Justice 
Policy Institute, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Open Society Institute) 
have also released official positions condemning the model.  
8 “It is future victims who are now ‘rescued’ by rehabilitative work, rather than the offenders 
themselves” (Garland 2001, 176). Under this new paradigm of rehabilitation as control in Britain 
and the U.S., Garland continues: 
Offenders can only be ‘treated’ (in drug abuse programmes, anger- 
management groups, offence-reduction programmes, etc.) to the 
extent that such treatment is deemed to be capable of protecting the 
public, reducing risk, and being more cost-effective than simple, 
unadorned punishment. Rehabilitation is thus represented as a 
targeted intervention inculcating self- controls, reducing danger, 
enhancing the security of the public. In the new framework 
rehabilitation is viewed as a means of managing risk, not a welfarist 
end in itself. If the treatment programme does not work, one can 
revert to other, more effective means, such as close supervision or 
prison custody (ibid.). 
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indicate that the aims of drug court are ultimately to protect this public from further 
victimization. But while drug court practitioners are supposed to be working to ensure that that 
defendant can no longer waste taxpayer money or victimize the innocent public, they also have 
their audience of defendants, the immediate subjects of their care.  
Judge Lazarus’s words also hint at what several scholars have found, namely that 
evaluation of performance is itself a kind of performance (Merry 2011; Nichter 2013; Power 
1997). James Nolan (2001) views evaluation as a key component of the “front stage” 
performance of the drug court movement. Merry (2011) argues that the mere performance of 
performance evaluations has come to be taken as “evidence of accountability,” regardless of 
what the evidence produced by the evaluation may suggest. I look now at some of the evidence 
that evaluations have produced, and what conclusions researchers have drawn from it. 
 
Ambivalent Evidence 
It is somewhat maddening to set out to do a responsible, representative (if not 
comprehensive) review of the drug court evaluation literature. Despite the often “mixed” 
findings of evaluation studies, drug court proponents state unequivocally that drug courts “work” 
and that the evidence proves it.  Douglas Marlowe, Chief of Science, Policy & Law for National 
Association of Drug Court Professionals and a drug court researcher, taps two powerful sources 
of authority (science and law) as he asserts, “The effectiveness of adult Drug Courts is not a 
matter of conjecture. It is the product of more than two decades of exhaustive scientific 
research.” Moving from the authority of science to law, he continues, “We know beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Drug Courts significantly reduce drug use and crime and do so with 
substantial cost savings” (Marlowe 2010).  Marlowe’s reference to the highest evidentiary 
 169 
standard in trial courts is somewhat ironic, given the fact that drug courts themselves don’t use it, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, “Compliance Trials: Flexible Evidence and Objective Standards.” 
Further, going by the strict hierarchy of evidence of the evidence-based movement that Marlowe 
and colleagues draw upon to boost the authority of their claims, most of the research produced 
over those two decades has not quite measured up.  
There are some encouraging numbers, however. For instance, a study commissioned by 
the Center for Court Innovation found that among six drug courts in New York State, recidivism 
reductions averaged 29% in the three-year post-arrest period, and 32% in the one-year period 
after program completion (Rempel, Fox-Kralstein, Cissner et al. 2003, x).9 A recent, multi-sited 
evaluation of U.S. drug courts (the “MADCE study”) found that drug courts administratively 
spend more on defendants than regular case processing, but that the potential benefits they pose 
to society (especially through reduced “victimization”) provide a $2 return for every $1 spent 
(although this finding was not statistically significant) (Downey and Roman 2011). A U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2005, 5-6) meta-analysis found that, for 23 programs 
reporting recidivism data in the U.S., lower percentages of drug court defendants were rearrested 
and reconvicted.  
                                                
9 A number of drug court evaluation studies have shown that following participation in drug 
court, drug court participants recidivate at lower rates than comparison groups. The least 
legitimate of these studies include only drug court graduates in their experimental sample instead 
of graduates and “failures” together. But I am not aware of studies that seriously weigh the 
positive effects of the dismissal of felony charges as a potential contributor to this finding. Given 
the extent and severity of collateral consequences for any felony conviction (amplified by repeat 
convictions), from voter disenfranchisement in some states to exclusion from public housing, 
Pell grants for education, employment opportunities, and professional licensing, it would seem to 
me that felony dismissals themselves could produce reduced recidivism rates. This hypothesis 
ought to be tested. 
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However, in a 2011 report to Congress, the GAO stated that the previous 2005 analysis 
drew from studies that “often had methodological limitations, such as the lack of equivalent 
comparison groups and the lack of appropriate statistical controls” (ibid., 8-9). Evaluators and 
other researchers argue that most evaluations have been empirically and methodologically 
unsound (see Belenko 2001, 6; Chriss 2002; Gross 2010, 162). Most, as Steven Belenko (2001, 
6) points out, “have been relatively small-scale local process evaluations mandated for [] 
grantees, which include program and client description, with some retention and outcome data.” 
These sorts of process evaluations do not truly evaluate, they describe, giving a range of 
descriptive statistics. Colorful pie charts and bar graphs throughout ensure that the reports 
themselves perform a certain quality of objective effectiveness [Wolfgram 2016]. Turner, 
Longshore, Wenzel et al. (2002, 1507-08) similarly observe, “process evaluations dominate the 
field; few studies provide methodologically strong findings on longer-term recidivism and other 
outcomes. Weak, or nonexistent, comparison groups, short follow-up periods, limited outcome 
measures […] are typical.”  
Many of these studies, from descriptive to weakly evaluative, it is argued, are often 
conducted by program managers with little research expertise instead of independent 
researchers.10 It is argued that their research questions, what they measure, and thus their 
conclusions, are shaped by ideologies about addiction and addicts (Tiger 2013) and that they do 
not measure the most relevant indexes of effectiveness (Kaye Brook 2010). For example, while 
some evaluation studies have found that drug courts have improved “retention” rates in drug 
treatment, for instance at one year from baseline, as compared with those in drug treatment 
                                                
10 See “Drug Courts are Not the Answer.” Drug Policy Alliance. Accessed August 22, 2017. 
https://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/Drug_Courts_Are_Not_the_Answer_Final2.pdf 
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outside of the criminal justice system, Rebecca Tiger (2013) argues that the citation of this by 
drug court proponents simply evidences the addiction ideology that more treatment is always 
better (and that coerced treatment is better than voluntary). Indeed, the fact that people mandated 
to treatment by drug courts are still in treatment after a year cannot be taken as evidence of 
effectiveness in and of itself. That is, if coercion works to coerce, that doesn’t necessarily mean 
that it works as treatment. 
Sometimes, the findings of quantitative evaluations are incongruous. For instance, the 
authors of the MADCE study cannot explain why: 
Providing drug treatment in the first month of drug court […] was 
associated with increases in numbers of crimes and a slight 
increase in drug use reported at six months. Increases in the 
number of support services similarly was related to increases, not 
decreases, in number of crimes and days of drug use at 18 months.   
Overall, however, the MADCE authors conclude that drug courts work, citing reduced criminal 
activity and drug use among drug court participants. It is crucial to note that this study went to 18 
months after a participant’s entry into drug court. If the defendant sailed through, which only a 
small proportion do, 18 months out only represents a few months beyond their graduation. For a 
significant number of drug court participants, 18 months in, they are still in drug court. These 
sorts of studies with short follow-up periods tell us little about even the short-term effects on 
recidivism and drug use of drug courts.  
When drug court proponents state that drug courts are effective, it is important to note 
that this is invariably a comparative measure, but rarely stated as such. What drug court 
proponents and evaluators are really saying is that drug courts are more effective than regular 
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courts in reducing recidivism rates; they are more cost-effective than regular courts; they reduce 
drug use more effectively than regular criminal courts. In no way does this imply that drug courts 
are the most effective model for reducing crime, saving tax dollars, and improving the lives of 
drug users and/or helping them reduce their drug use. Drug court proponents and evaluators 
could be more precise in their conclusions. That is, if they want to make evidence-based claims, 
they should hew more closely to what conclusions the evidence can reasonably point to. 
That said, as recent national politics in the Trump era have made abundantly clear, 
differently positioned people can encounter the same evidence, and come to vastly different 
conclusions (about whether the evidence is reliable and about what conclusions the evidence 
points to). The ambivalence of the quantitative evidence for drug court effectiveness further 
drives this division between critics and proponents with competing ethical (and ideological) 
concerns.  Paradoxically, given the utility of quantification as a “technology of distance” (Porter 
1995, ix) used to standardize, commensurate, and help people across geographical and cultural 
distances all see the same things, numbers can also generate ambivalence.  
There could hardly be any figure more ambivalent than the national average rate of drug 
court participant graduation of roughly 50% (Rempel, Fox-Kralstein, Cissner et al. 2003). If 
nothing else, and with the knowledge that the 50% who fail will be worse off than they would 
have been had they opted out of drug court, this indicates that drug court is indeed risky. As 
Richard Boldt (2010, 56) contends, the evidence “support[s] the conclusion that some treatment 
courts can be efficacious for some participants” but not “the more ambitious conclusion that this 
model is effective generally.” The evidence should point us to more ambivalent, as opposed to 




The randomized control trial (RCT) is the gold standard producer of legitimate and 
reliable evidence in “evidence-based” medical research. In an RCT, one group of people gets the 
experimental treatment, the other gets the current standard treatment (which is sometimes no 
treatment, ineffective, or less effective treatment). Just as clinical trials must be, evaluations are 
hampered by competing ethics of autonomy. That is, defendants can’t ethically be randomized 
into treatment and control groups. Because of this limitation, sampling poses a unique challenge 
to the drug court evaluator, especially when it comes to selecting comparison groups (Boldt 
2010, GAO 2011, Turner, Longshore, Wenzel et al.  et al. 2002). A comparison group must be 
comparable – that is, at a minimum, they should be comprised of people with a similar 
demographic profile, similar criminal histories, similar criminal charges, and similar addictions 
to drug court participants. But these must be people who went through standard case processing, 
not drug treatment court.  
One option for evaluators is to select a comparison group from another jurisdiction where 
there is no drug court. But this method discounts the importance of place to people’s lives.  
Different jurisdictions subject people to different penal laws and different policing practices, and 
have different local economies and social and political dynamics. The best option, according to 
prolific drug court evaluator Michael Rempel,11 appears to be to compare the drug court 
participant sample with a similar group of offenders that entered the system before the 
introduction of a drug court in the same jurisdiction. But as drug courts age, the oldest now 
approaching its thirtieth year, this option becomes increasingly problematic. Can a group of 
                                                
11 Rempel, Michael. 2005. “Recidivism 101:Evaluating the Impact of Your Drug Court.” Center 
for Court Innovation. Accessed August 23, 2017. 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Recidivism_101%5B2%5D.pdf 
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offenders from the 1980s or 1990s be legitimately compared with a group in the 2010s? Laws 
change, policing practices change, moral panics wax and wane, economies change, crime rates 
change, treatment options change, and drug markets, technologies, and “epidemics” change.12  
Further, while evaluation studies compare rates of recidivism among drug court 
participants with those of a comparison group, they often ignore how much time drug court 
participants spend incarcerated compared with their similarly-situated peers outside of drug 
courts (Kaye Brook 2010). Troublingly, several researchers who have set out to answer this 
question have found that drug court participants do spend more time behind bars (Bowers 2008; 
O’Hear 2009; Rempel, Fox-Kralstein, Cissner et al. 2003), as Jackie and several of my 
interlocutors also confirmed.13 This is because most plea-bargaining in criminal courts reduces 
sentences substantially. In drug courts, a guilty plea might wind a defendant up with a longer 
sentence than had he pled out in regular criminal court or even allowed his case to go to trial.  
Jackie: That can be true. Um, that is a legitimate criticism. 
Because, I mean, many don’t spend any time and have their cases 
                                                
12 In response to such concerns and critiques, evaluators tout an elaborate statistical toolkit of 
weighting, regression, and other “tricks” that account for seemingly irreconcilable differences 
among comparison groups. I clearly reserve my doubts about whether they are truly capable of 
collapsing the deep web of social distinctions that could compromise the validity of a 
comparison group into numerical indexes. But I want to highlight how the inaccessibility of the 
statistical methods that are called for to fix the problems engendered by the demand for 
particular kinds of evidence ultimately produces authority based more on trust than on evidence. 
Most of us do not possess the skills to analyze and assess these studies, to evaluate the 
evaluations. I received high marks in graduate level courses in biostatistics, epidemiology, and 
evaluation methods and I still struggle to evaluate the evaluations. Most people have not had 
graduate training in statistical methods and evaluation science. Paradoxically, as Peter Pels 
(2000, 142) also argues, “the stated goal of making the inner workings of organizations more 
visible goes together with a positioning of the audit process itself as an increasingly private and 
invisible expert activity” (citing Power 1994, 26). Most of us are simply left to trust that 
researchers are using valid techniques and methods.  
13 This finding may not even take into account those jail sanctions administered during 
defendants’ mandates (Kaye Brook 2010). 
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dismissed. But it is true that you know, not infrequently somebody 
if they fail will experience a longer period of incarceration than if 
they had just gone through the system normally. 
Illustratively, Jackie went on: 
Um, if this works for you, lots of really good things are gonna 
happen [laughs]. If it doesn’t, lots of bad things are going to 
happen. And yes, you might get more time than if you just went 
right back to the old system. But, you know, do you want to get 
treatment? Do you want a shot at something that’s gonna be really 
good for you? 
Multiples parties are involved in assessing the risk drug court poses to a defendant. 
Defense attorney Samantha with a public defenders’ organization in Judge Lazarus’s jurisdiction 
pointed out that cases are often based on “terrible [police] searches,” and private defense 
attorney Scott noted that he sees a lot of “trumped up charges.” If he doesn’t take the drug court 
option, how good is the prosecution’s evidence against the defendant? How likely is a grand jury 
to indict him? What kind of a plea deal would the prosecution be willing to make? Judge 
Lazarus, a former defense attorney herself, explained what a tricky assessment this is for the 
legal professionals involved. “But it’s so hard," she said.  
Judge Lazarus: Because if the [District Attorney] said, “I don’t have 
a case,” he’d have to dismiss it. So, the DA says, “You know, this 
case is weak; I don’t know whether we can prove it.” From that 
statement until the case is resolved could be six months or a year. 
The case could get stronger for whatever – a witness who refused to 
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come forward now comes forward – a video surveillance video you 
didn’t know existed comes forward. 
EM: Right. 
Judge Lazarus: More likely, as the case is pending, the defendant 
continues to use drugs and gets rearrested. 
EM: Mhm 
Judge Lazarus: Or stops coming to court and is warranted and is 
brought back and he’s in jail. So, when you stand and look at the 
person, even though the DA is saying this is such a weak case, there 
is a reason why maybe despite the weakness of the case you should 
still take drug court. 
Judge Lazarus suggested that drug courts may have the effect of sometimes rescuing 
prosecutors’ weak or nonexistent cases, which might otherwise have been dropped or pled down 
to minor charges.  
As Judge Lazarus also indicated, part of the assessment on the part of legal professionals 
about whether a defendant being offered drug court should take the risk has to do with “looking 
at the person.” I once watched Faye, Legal Services defense attorney on Judge Lazarus’ team, 
strongly discourage a young Black man from taking his case before a jury. He was planning to 
decline the offer against her advice. She told him something like, “You go in there with your 
tattoos and your [designer clothes]” (and let a jury decide, she implied). I think she was 
attempting to communicate an awareness that juries may conclude that a young Black man with 
tattoos and expensive clothes is a gang member. But to me, and I think to the young man, her 
warning came off as contemptuous of him, not of racist jury tendencies. The defendant then sat 
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down at the back of the courtroom, a few rows behind me. Faye’s back was to us both as she 
turned to face Judge Lazarus as court proceedings continued. Then, although uttered under the 
young man’s breath, the sharp epithet “Racist bitch” sliced through the low mumble of the 
courtroom.  
Perhaps this young man perceived his risk to be greater in the drug court than before a 
jury. Even Rempel, Fox-Kralstein, Cissner et al. (2003, 269-71) conclude that “there is a risk 
involved in entering drug court, in that failing the program generally leads to a less favorable 
outcome than would have been received without the drug court.” This fact would seem to 
mitigate the claim that it is effective.  It also begs the question, who does drug court tend to help? 
 
Deracinated data 
Marlowe (2013, 47), writing under the aegis of NADCP, contends that drug courts were 
established “to correct certain social injustices emanating from the War on Drugs.” Yet, as 
Marlowe notes, “African-American” and “Hispanic and Latino/Latina” participants “are 
considerably less likely than Caucasians to graduate from a plurality of drug courts.” This 
finding alone should be quite disturbing, if not surprising. It is even more disturbing given the 
widely acknowledged fact that defendants who enter and then fail drug court are often worse off 
than if they had allowed their case to be processed in the standard way.  
The research into drug courts and racial disparity has been scant but telling. Nicosia, 
MacDonald, and Arkes (2013) find that in California, there are significant disparities in diversion 
to drug treatment for Black and Hispanic male defendants. White men are more likely to be 
offered the treatment option. This is very much in keeping with the historical division of addicts 
into criminal versus ill categories. According to Robert Russell, a founder of the drug treatment 
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court in Buffalo, NY and former chairman of the board of the National Association of Drug 
Court Professionals, drug courts’ eligibility criteria sometimes has the unintended effect of 
excluding people of color (Wolf 2009). Because Black and Brown people are stopped, frisked, 
and arrested at drastically higher rates than White people are, when eligibility criteria excludes 
repeat offenders, its effect will be to exclude those under heightened police scrutiny. If drug 
courts define their eligibility criteria with the intent of excluding those deemed too “high risk,” 
this also privileges White and middle class defendants (Wolf 2009; also see Harcourt 2007).  
In fact, the MADCE’s finding that drug courts have good potential for cost-efficacy, the 
authors point out, is driven by only a small handful of more prolific offenders, as most drug-
related crime is relatively inexpensive to society. This might just be one of those scenarios where 
ethical commitments to effectiveness and racial equity overlap. If drug courts aim to save tax 
dollars through the potential cost to society of future recidivism, this finding supports a 
recommendation that drug courts revamp their eligibility requirements to include participants 
who have been arrested and convicted more often and on more serious charges. This is one way 
to take into account discriminatory law enforcement practices with the aim of somewhat 
mitigating their racist effects. Unless, of course, once people of color get into drug court they 
have a harder time graduating and are left worse off. 
Drug court may be most attractive to defendants who have short or nil criminal histories. 
Legal Services defense attorney on the team in Judge Fierro’s court, Gayle, told me drug court is 
“a very hard sell to people who’ve been repeatedly incarcerated.” For those who already have 
multiple felonies on their record, other than the potential to avoid a prison sentence (but no 
guarantee), drug courts do not have much in the way of legal incentive to offer those with felony 
records already. Because of the stark racial disparities of this mass incarceration era, if drug 
 179 
courts aim to reduce those disparities, they must consider ways not only to be more inclusive but 
also more attractive to those with longer criminal records. 
As Gayle pointed out, too, her clients who are poorer people of color spend more time in 
jail between their arrest and a treatment offer because they cannot afford to make bail conditions.  
After someone gets arrested, Gayle told me, they can spend five or six months in jail before she 
can get them into the drug court program, during which time “they hear a lot of chatter in jail; 
people saying, ‘don’t do it.’” She explained, “if you let people sit in jail too long, they lose the 
desire for help. And they also, the legal incentive that is supposed to be a motivating factor 
disappears because they’ve spent so much time in jail [that] their time’s practically done.” More 
affluent defendants with retained private attorneys, she said, have “family support and access to 
resources, shorter records, um because – not that they haven’t been doing bad things, but their 
families have been covering them for all that time,” while her clients’ “families can’t cover 
them.” For those five or six months, the poorer defendant waits in jail, while the wealthier 
defendant waits at home. Because of this time in jail, they are more likely to decline the 
treatment offer. As a result of this and the precluding eligibility requirements that Wolf (2009) 
noted, Gayle had noticed that her courtroom appeared Whiter and more affluent than the overall 
population of defendants in the county. 
Some authors have put forward concerns about “net-widening” (Gross 2010; O’Hear 
2009). This is the idea that when a drug court is introduced into a community, police will have 
more reason to arrest the low-level drug offenders they otherwise might have left alone. Because 
of existing practices of discriminatory law enforcement, this could further exacerbate racial 
disparities within the criminal justice system. It is worth investigating to what extent and under 
what conditions – geographical, demographic – this bears out. It could depend to some extent on 
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whether a community of arresting officers are themselves moved by the idea that users would 
have a treatment option. But directives to sweep and target low-level offenders could also come 
down from unit heads and precinct chiefs, who in dialogue with county prosecutors might learn 
that drug courts will bump up conviction rates for higher order offenses as opposed to the 
standard plea bargain that most low-level offenders take (which often involves much reduced 
charges and thus reduced sentences).  
Whether they widen the net or not (again, an empirical question in any jurisdiction), drug 
courts are more finely tuned sorting machines than even the broader criminal justice system is. 
Drug court proponents concerned with the racist practices and ideology of the War on Drugs are 
correct to worry that this sorting may hew along racial divisions. To sum up the findings and 
concerns of researchers and court practitioners themselves on racial disparities in drug courts that 
I have touched on, much like in the criminal justice system, from police stops to arrest to bail 
setting to convictions to sentencing, drug courts may inadvertently reproduce racial disparity at 
each administrative step. It appears that White people get the treatment offer at disproportionate 
rates. White people may have more incentive to take the treatment offer. White people may be 
more likely to graduate. That drug courts in urban and suburban areas are still mostly full of 
Black and Brown defendants merely testifies to crushing disparities in the criminal justice 
system at large (and possibly also to the fact that White defendants move more quickly and 
successfully through them).  
But several researchers conclude that there is not enough data to determine unequivocally 
whether drug courts are reducing or exacerbating existing racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system (Marlowe 2013: Wolf 2009). Indeed, Annual Reports (i.e. those “process evaluations”) 
about drug courts around the state in which I conducted my research count the race of 
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participants, along with a breakdown of the court participants by “gender” (a binary 
male/female), “drug of choice,” and age. The reports list graduation rates, and voluntary and 
involuntary termination. But there is no cross-tabulation of graduation rates with race, gender or 
the other variables. Such cross-tabs would tell us something, if not the “whole story.” 
Still, I’m not entirely certain what purpose the conclusion that we lack evidence of racial 
disparity serves. There does seem to be good evidence that there are problems and disparate 
effects that are to the detriment of people of color and poorer defendants. Researchers should 
continue to devise innovative questions and ways of studying differential effects of drug court 
practices in order to make them more equitable across social difference based on race, class, 
gender, sexuality, able-bodiedness, and an “embarrassed ‘etc.’” (Butler 1990).  Because of their 
location within a system that is such a profound embodiment of institutionalized racism, drug 
courts absolutely must implement anti-racist checks on their practices if they want to diverge 
from the broader system.  
Further, drug courts are more deeply enmeshed in a broader web of institutions than 
regular U.S. courts are, insofar as they compel defendants to get jobs, housing, and education. 
This means that drug courts could further marginalize defendants who suffer discrimination on 
multiple fronts, as their “failures” elsewhere translate to legal consequences and criminal 
punishment in the drug treatment courtroom. It means that those who face discrimination in 
housing, employment, and education have a steeper climb towards compliance than those who 
do not. It means that relatively affluent defendants have less “work” to do to become responsible 
citizens on the courts’ terms. It may help to explain disparities in graduation rates. 
Marlowe (2013, 47) suggests that the finding of racial disparity in graduation rates “does 
not appear to be a function of race or ethnicity per se, but rather a function of other socio-
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demographic characteristics which [sic] may be correlated with race or ethnicity” (ibid.). But 
what is “race or ethnicity per se”? Inherent ability? Culture? Perhaps Marlowe imagines that 
racial disparity in drug courts would be primarily driven by the individual animus of court 
practitioners – judges who just hate Black people; treatment coordinators who can’t stand 
Latina/os. If it were so simple, the data would be straightforward. Statistics on race would be 
enough to point us to those bad courts run by bad actors and root them out by the stench of their 
smoking guns. This is a dangerous misconstrual of how institutionalized racism operates.  
Isolating “race or ethnicity” from “other socio-demographic characteristics” misunderstands the 
way centuries of racial dispossession have entrenched other socio-demographic characteristics 
across racial difference.  For instance, when researchers find that drug court participants who 
earn low wages, are less educated, or are unemployed have lower graduation rates and lower 
retention rates (Wolf 2009, citing Bryan 2006), these other socio-demographic characteristics are 
key to thinking about how institutionalized racism from institutions other than the criminal 
justice system shapes disparate outcomes within the criminal justice system. Critical race 
theorists have made the point that social identity must be considered intersectionally as multiple 
axes of social difference articulate and deepen privilege and dispossession (see, e.g., Crenshaw 
1989, Schulz and Mullings 2006).  
Research should also continue to look at the interactional dynamics of drug courts to 
discover how compliance is defined, what makes a defendant legible as compliant and as 
responsible, and consider who is the ideal typical citizen drug court defendants are supposed to 
aspire to become. Is that “reasonable man” someone who certain defendants – because of race, 
class position, gender, sexuality, physical ability – could never become? Research should 
investigate to what extent certain personal transformations that the drug court practitioners seek 
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are meaningful, desirable, and useful to defendants in their everyday lives. To that point, and to 
the question of compliance, research must look at what are differently positioned defendants’ 
competing responsibilities and how they weigh these against court directives.   
These are not questions that current evaluation science sets out to answer, and I think my 
drug court interlocutors shared the sense that the evidence they were supposed to value of their 
programs’ effects was not reflecting the effects of their work back to them. 
 
Citing the limits of effectiveness  
It was relatively common during our interviews for drug court practitioners to qualify 
certain observations about patterns they had perceived over the course of years working in the 
drug court. Before sharing their perceptions, they would preface them by saying they didn’t have 
the statistics or the numbers, but.  Every time drug court practitioners said things like this to me, 
it hinted at the limits of the “evidence-based” research focused on a quantitative measure of 
effectiveness, smoothing out the ragged stories of lived life.  
Resource coordinator in Judge Connelly’s court, Jerome, told me he “like[s] to believe” 
that they are having positive effects on defendants’ lives. He continued: 
And I think that’s an important statistic that we should, uh- I’m 
sure there’s numbers for recidivism, but in terms of people that 
don’t come back? […] Um, but again, I’ve seen people that are 
very- that- get- walk away from here and they become very 
responsible and they hold good jobs, and they reunify with family. 
Um, ideally, yeah, I- I hope that that’s happening. You know, I 
wish we knew- we were able to track people when they leave and 
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see, you know, in five-year timespan what they’ve done after they 
finish, but we don’t, you know. 
Jerome’s remarks show that current measures of effectiveness fail to capture what people do over 
the course of five years after leaving drug court.  As Gayle said of recidivism rates, “not that 
that’s really a measure, because you don’t-- you don’t really know.”  
Gayle fretted to me on two separate occasions, months apart, about the welfare of her 
successful clients after graduation. In response to one such instance, over lunch at a diner near 
the courthouse, I asked her: 
EM: Are you seeing an uptick in recidivism? 
Gaye: I don’t know- I don’t know because I don’t keep the 
numbers, but I hear things about people. Anecdotally. 
EM: Right 
Gayle: I’ll, you know, meet a client, um, and they’ll say to me, 
“Oh, did you hear about so and so? So and so relapsed,” or, you 
know, that kind of thing. 
Anecdotally. The word probably makes many anthropologists grimace, as one of the 
touchstones of many participant-observation-based ethnographies is the “vignette” (sometimes 
dismissively referred to as an anecdote), which is carefully selected for the way it represents 
patterns recorded by the ethnographer, not because it is an interesting one-off. Just as here, I 
select only a couple of instances of a practice I encountered many times over. 
Gayle’s concerns, and her care, exceeded the numbers. And, in fact, while she qualified 
her “anecdotal” knowledge, she also demonstrated that evidence produced through social 
networks has certain advantages, especially for the demands of care. It can travel fast. It is 
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personalized. The numbers wouldn’t tell Gayle that a particular individual relapsed. This “social” 
and “people-centered evidence” (see Engelke 2008, Biehl and Petryna 2013) and intersubjective, 
situated knowledge (see Duranti 2010, Fabian 2014; Haraway 1988) implicates people in each 
other’s lives, making them more responsible to one another (not less “accountable,” one of the 
key values of the evidence-based evaluation movement). 
Court practitioners fashioned themselves as responsible thinkers and ethical bearers of 
knowledge by explicitly bracketing off their “subjective,” expert impressions from objective, 
official numbers as fundamentally different, and perhaps hierarchically unequal, kinds of 
knowledge. This goes to my point that the evidence-based episteme is an ethical position about 
how one should come to knowledge. But it is also a framework that they had to exceed to make 
meaning of their work in drug courts. 
Gayle once introduced me to a colleague of hers as a researcher who was there to suss out 
“the magic of drug courts” and I suspect the more affective and perhaps less measurable, or 
unmeasured, dimensions of drug court are part of what she meant by “magic.” In fact, magic is 
often understood as a phenomenon that is separate and apart from evidence, which I will discuss 
in Chapter 4, “Testing Care: Truth Games, Confession, and Urine Trouble.” It is the ways that 
drug court practices exceed the limited field of evidence of the “evidence base.” 
 
The uneven implementation of practice 
Jackie: I mean, the drug court model – there are bad drug courts 
out there. I think the drug court model is fairly solid. Is it 
implemented in a sound way with evidence-based practices 
everywhere? No. So, there are bad drug courts and they’re doing 
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bad things and I wouldn’t deny that for a minute. Um, so what you 
have to try to do is ensure - and that’s one of the roles of this office 
is to try to make sure that they are good drug courts […] So, for 
every drug court that does[n’t], I can give you a drug court that 
does a good job. […] Um, so to me the criticisms are about drug 
courts that are poorly implemented. It’s not the model. […] It’s 
bad implementation.  
Jackie energetically explained to me that there were “evidence-based practices” that drug 
court practitioners, especially judges, could do to better their programs.  She said, “and so there 
are these- these things that show better outcomes and so part of what the field and myself are 
trying to do are to promote those. […] It’s also not hard to say [to judges], ‘Okay, the research 
says: better outcomes if you talk to someone 2 to 3 minutes, so you can force yourself to do that. 
You’re gonna have better outcomes if you look people in the eye, so try to do that, you know.’ 
There are things you can do.”  As Gayle told me, “When we go to drug [court] training school? 
They tell us that the judge should optimally engage the client for two minutes … so there’s that 
bond, or whatever.”  Drug court practitioners are taught to enact these somewhat mechanical or 
rote practices to make their courts more effective.  
Jackie reserved separate places for evidence-based practices on the one hand and 
implementation on the other. This separation of ideal and practice is what makes much of 
performance evaluation possible, in that practice might be evaluated against some ideal.14 But 
notice that the terminology used isn’t evidence-based ideals versus evidence-based practice. Here 
                                                
14 Recall that this doubleness of practice and ideal is central to the self-conscious quality of 
performance (Bauman 1989). 
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evidence-based practice is actually the ideal and something called implementation is the practice.  
Actual practice simply exceeds the guidelines put forward by interpreters of the evidence base, at 
the very least when the evidence base is so narrowly defined.  
Jackie talked to me about how she and her colleagues evaluate and teach judges how to 
implement evidence-based practices, including those that promote procedural justice: 
Jackie: Procedural justice is something that a lot of drug court 
judges don’t do very well […] and some do, are great, and some 
are not, and so there certainly are efforts around trying to 
inculcate- 
EM: How do you do that? [laughs] 
Jackie: Eh, training. Um-- [clicks her tongue against her teeth] 
EM: Like, role playing? 
Jackie: Court observation- yeah, role playing. [We] developed a 
court observation tool and it measures time spent with each 
participant, how many minutes, is there eye contact, what is the 
setup of the courtroom, is there a lot of furniture cluttering it up? 
[…] Does the defendant or participant speak? And there’s this 
whole scoring system that takes place and you can, when [my 
colleague] and I do technical assistance with drug court teams 
there’s a court obs- we use these forms. […] And even if different 
people do this scoring, you nearly always come up with the same 
score. […] Because it seems like it would be subjective, but it’s 
really not.  
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Perhaps anticipating a criticism that this observation instrument would seem to produce 
subjective findings (which I wouldn’t have made), Jackie’s assurance that “it’s really not” 
demonstrates what a dirty word “subjective” is in this evidence-based framework. You can’t 
count on subjectivity. Perhaps you can’t count it easily, either. A subjective observation form 
wouldn’t allow Jackie and her colleagues to objectively evaluate drug court practitioner’s 
practice – especially, their implementation of evidence-based practice. As Jackie made clear here 
again, researchers are evaluating, and even scoring, drug court practitioners and the courtrooms 
they keep to determine how well they are implementing their training in evidence-based practice. 
Her description of what is being scored – the setup of the courtroom, the placement of furniture, 
whether the players are making eye contact – resonates again with the idea that drug courts are 
theaters. But also, these vague “stage directions” of evidence-based practice mean that 
implementation necessarily entails improvisation. As the previous chapter made clear, what gets 
done over the course of two minutes of communication is its own empirical question. 
Contrary to enthusiasm for the effectiveness of procedural justice and perceived fairness, 
the authors of the MADCE study (Rossman, Roman, Zweig et al. 2011, 5) suggest that some of 
their more surprising findings were that neither defendants’ perceptions of the fairness of their 
court outcomes, nor “a broad measure of procedural justice” were associated with desistance 
from drug use and crime in their sample. They suggest this might be explained by inaccurate 
self-report and that despite assurances from the drug court practitioners surveyed, “treatment was 
not implemented in these drug courts in a manner consistent with effective evidence-based 
practice.”  
The problem of “implementation” raises questions about how professionals enact 
“evidence-based” therapeutic interventions in ways that are faithful to the intent of the design or, 
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more accurately, to the precise ways they were carried out in studies that produced evidence 
about their efficacy elsewhere. Representing this as a problem of “self-report” preserves the 
legitimacy of “evidence-based practice” as “best” or “effective” practice even when it is not 
being practiced, is impracticable in certain contexts,15 or when it is an insufficient guide for 
practice. The difficulty of self-report also gestures at the limits a standardized evidence-based 
framework imposes on what can be represented to evaluators. In fact, researchers who conducted 
a meta-analysis of evaluation studies over a decade of drug court research found that “a major 
reason for poor quality studies may be the relatively poor ‘evaluability’ of the programs 
themselves[…]” (Turner, Longshore, Wenzel et al.  et al. 2002, 1507-08). There are aspects of 
complex social interventions like drug courts that do not lend themselves easily to the kinds of 
quantitative study sought in their evaluations (see Turner, Longshore, Wenzel et al. 2002, 1408; 
also Lambert 2012). 
Although drug courts have in-house treatment centers, defendants get most of their 
treatment outside of the courthouse at private facilities than within it. To what extent does the 
extent to which drug courts are evidence-based – and ethical – depend on whether the programs 
they mandate defendants to are? 
 
 
                                                
15 For instance, the National Drug Court Institute advises drug court practitioners that “the most 
effective and cost-efficient Drug Courts perform urine drug testing no less frequently than twice 
per week on a truly random basis for at least the first several months of the program,” including 
on weekends and holidays (See https://www.ndci.org/wp-
content/uploads/BehaviorModification101forDrugCourts.pdf. Accessed August 22, 2017). It 
may be a banal point, but most drug court practitioners are unlikely to get clearance or 
compensation to work on weekends and, even less likely on national holidays, to call defendants 
in to watch them pee into a cup. In certain cases, “best practices” appear to be somewhat 
impracticable. To use a classic anthropological metaphor, court practitioners must therefore be 
bricoleurs and bricoleuses of evidence-based practice, implementing what is practicable, if not 




According to Jerome, the quality of the drug treatment program she is mandated to is 
paramount to any given defendant’s success. Defendants must comply not only with court rules, 
but also with their programs’ rules, their treatment plans, and conform to their expectations, too. 
“It can be a very enlightening experience. And it can be horrible,” Jerome said.   
Because of Jackie’s enthusiasm for making drug courts follow evidence-based practice, 
and because of how important the quality of treatment defendants received from partnering 
treatment providers, I became curious about how much attention drug court proponents were 
paying to the practices of the providers. I asked Jackie if as the statewide coordinator she looks 
into the programs or if she leaves that up to the state’s Division of Substance Abuse and 
Alcoholism Service Provision (DSAASP). She told me she rarely visits any treatment providers. 
Echoing concerns about self-report, she said: 
Jackie: Um, they, as I say, they do have to be licensed. Um, 
[DSAASP] is certainly an imperfect, um, bureaucracy, um, but I 
think they’re getting better. But the problem is that what you really 
want are manualized, uh, evidence-based treatment practices […] 
and if you ask treatment providers, do you do evidence-based 
treatment, they go, "Oh yeah!" you know, without-- like 
“everybody” does evidence-based treatment. Well, the fact of the 
matter is, they don’t. Um, so that's, you know, that’s an ongoing 
process and struggle. 
The label “evidence-based” has become such an imperative that it can overtake a 
program’s narrative, while as Jackie suggests, it may not be based on study that stands up to 
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scrutiny (or any study). Similar critiques have been made by others, for instance that many of the 
programs on the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s National 
Registry of Evidence-Based Programs have not proved to be effective through rigorous empirical 
study, or have been grandfathered in as “legacy” programs.16 Yet, even despite efforts, it seems 
that whether a program is evidence-based can defy measurement (and therefore the principles of 
accountability and transparency that evidence-based programming is supposed to reflect).  
If professionals like Jackie are not monitoring the providers, it is up to the court 
practitioners themselves to assess the quality of the treatment programs. Jerome explained, 
“More or less, when we start seeing a pattern of clients coming in and complaining and, um, or 
we see a certain program developing a pattern of- of poor reporting or, uh, becoming too punitive 
with clients,” he tells the court treatment director so that they can approach an administrator at 
the program and/or stop referring defendants to the program. After several months or up to a 
year, they may approach the program again to “see if the administration changed or any of the 
philosophies have changed.” If so, they will start referring defendants there again (“until they 
stop doing what we require them to do”). 
But Jerome lamented the current state of drug treatment: 
There’s nothing out there that’s revolutionary17 – that I’ve seen, 
anyway. […] I mean, I hope. I’m always hoping that, you know, 
                                                
16 Szalavitz, Maia. 2016. “How Wall Street Dehumanized Teenage Inmates with Scientology-




17 I want to flag the term “revolution” because it calls up Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) analysis of the 
ways scientific revolutions upheave the received beliefs of scientific communities that keep any 
given paradigm chugging along. Kuhn’s work would certainly provide a relevant backdrop for 
thinking about evaluation science, the limits of effectiveness, and the evidence used to prove it. 
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new residential programs pop up with a different, you know, 
outlook and I’m—[…] We need more resources. We’ve closed the 
door on a lot of programs because they don’t do what they say 
they’re gonna do. 
Something of an organic historian of treatment modalities, Jerome told me about the 
evolution of therapeutic communities’ (TC) rehabilitation philosophy. We sat across from each 
other at his desk in an open area of the treatment center, with an eclectic medley of music 
streaming from his desktop computer to create a wall of sound in which to enclose our interview. 
We had just discussed the fact that cleaning the facility remains a common punitive strategy for 
many TC programs: 
Jerome: Back in the ‘80s, they used to put people on contracts but 
it- it was very punitive. They used to shave heads. 
EM: Oh! 
Jerome: They used to put signs around your neck. […] Cardboard. 
Like, let’s say you got caught stealing somebody’s socks, you 
know, you had a cardboard sign that said, “I’m a thief. Family, 
help me.” And it was humiliating. 
EM: Yeah. 
Jerome: And, but exaggerated to the point where, you know, 
you’re being humiliated by your peers but hopefully helping you to 
modify that behavior and not do it again. […] They stopped doing 
that years ago because, uh, they realized people would come into 
treatment with a lot of baggage and were already abused if you 
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were-- family dynamics-- and by doing that, just kind of 
[exacerbated] the, uh, the abuse. 
I’m not aware of studies that have sought to test the effectiveness of such programs, although I 
do wonder if such studies’ findings would rival the modest benefits that drug court evaluations 
have shown. Surely many, many recovering addicts over the last several decades have sworn by 
the effectiveness of such “humiliating” and “punitive” practices. But Jerome also seems 
concerned that these practices are not ethical in the context of treatment. If studies could show 
that these practices are somewhat effective, would that make them ethically acceptable? How 
effective would they need to be to quiet concerns about their ethicality?  
Jerome assured me, “This is way before courts got involved. […] We’re talking about 
the- like I said – long time ago.” Way back in the 1980s. But practices that have the distinct feel 
of “a long time ago” may be in our midst. When I worked in needle exchange in the late 2000s, I 
had colleagues who had come up in therapeutic communities, often as clients and subsequently 
as treatment professionals – a particularly common trajectory in the addiction treatment sector. In 
fact, I met at least one drug court practitioner that had previously worked in needle exchange, 
and several practitioners (as well as defendants) that had worked in drug treatment facilities.  
I first learned from one of my needle exchange colleagues with a TC background of the 
drug treatment ideology that you must “break someone down” so that you can “build them back 
up.” Its resonance with tactics of abusive partners in intimate relationships aside, more salient at 
the time for me was how contrary it was to the principles of harm reduction I so earnestly sought 
to abide by. This case manager had taken a member of our exchange who hadn’t bathed in some 
time into the bathroom, and made him disrobe and wash with water from the sink. This startling 
collision of intimate care and intense humiliation is reminiscent of other drug treatment practices, 
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which are far from retired. In fact, Jerome said, “There are some programs that still hold onto, 
uh, very antiquated practices.” Fashioning himself an ethical modern, Jerome casts these as 
“antiquated practices” that “still go[] on” – reminiscent of E.B. Tylor’s (1871) “survivals.” This 
allows him to discursively (and spatio-temporally) distance himself from them, even while he 
concedes that they continue, and his work is – and the defendants he works with are – bound up 
with them.  
Further, similar ideas permeate drug treatment court practice, too.  If the practices of TCs 
spur one to ask, how can we have punitive and humiliating confessional practices in a space of 
treatment, the same could be asked of drug court, a space of treatment in which defendants are 
made to fess up and show remorse in a room full of their peers as well as their superiors, and 
routinely sent to sit in jails, not just for stealing socks but even for things that in the official 
narrative of addiction as a disease are out of their control – like relapse and the denial of relapse. 
The structure of drug court, beginning with a guilty plea and waiver of some due process rights 
can be seen as a “breaking down.” From that bared moment of a defendant’s life, the drug court 
aims to “build them up” as sober, law-abiding, and self-responsible members of society. 
 
Conclusion 
An invitation to join a march on Washington to demand evidence-based drug policy 
appeared in the Inbox of my email account recently. It came from the Drug Policy Alliance, an 
organization asking its members and affiliates to join with thousands of other pro-science, pro-
evidence demonstrators, the majority of whom attended in order to support climate change 
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research (the march was scheduled for Earth Day 2017).18 The Drug Policy Alliance firmly 
opposes the drug court model, a fact which several of my drug court interlocutors were aware. 
And yet, drug treatment courts have emerged in the same evidence-based epistemic moment and 
that they are evidence-based is vital to their existence and a point of pride for their proponents.  
It is quite significant that organizations like the Drug Policy Alliance demand drug policy 
that is based on evidence, but also on “compassion,” “health,” and “human rights.” Leaving to 
the side the nebulousness of these terms, I contend that the DPA is demanding drug policy that is 
evidence-based and that meets some further ethical standards. Effectiveness is not a sufficient 
requirement for good care. There are ethical concerns that exceed the focus on “effectiveness” – 
ethical concerns not only about what is just, but also about what comprises good and ethical care. 
That means there must be further ethical criteria to consider in program design and 
implementation. The specificity of what else is guiding drug court practice other than a 
commitment to effectiveness is key. What are the ethical commitments of the courts and the 
practitioners themselves? To what extent does evidence-based practice offer ethical solutions?  
Ethics implies a striving to the right and the good as they are defined in specific 
sociohistorical contexts, but not necessarily an achievement of those ideals. What I find most 
appealing about ethics is that they are never settled. They are always the basis for questions, 
rarely answers. It is in the interstices among the uncertainties, ambiguities, and polyvalence of 
ethical selfhood (Lambek 2010, 7) that an ethical practice might be changeable. 
 
                                                
18 The March for Science, as it was called, was said to be nonpartisan. But I have no doubt it was 
precipitated by the Trump administration’s hostility to scientific research, especially when such 
research threatens to undermine its economic and political goals. 
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There is nothing at all that I object to about seeking to determine the best treatments and 
the best care based on the best available evidence, but it is important to interrogate our 
presuppositions about what counts as good and sufficient evidence. Drug court professionals like 
Jackie may say that the drug court model is solid, and that the problem is bad implementation of 
evidence-based practices, but this should give us pause. It may be that the currently limited scope 
of the evidence base for drug courts provides an insufficient guide for practice, which is vexed 
by conflicting ethics of justice and care.  
Evidence, generally speaking, is more selective than it is “objective.” This brings forward 
important questions: With an ever-increasing “evidence base,” how and why are particular “best 
practices” selected? The concept of evidence requires the presence of an interpreter. Evidence 
points to conclusions – it is not the conclusion in and of itself.19 As I have argued, the same 
evidence might point differently positioned people to different conclusions. To me, as to many 
drug court researchers, the evidence that drug treatment courts are effective is at best ambivalent. 
But I think more importantly, the drug court practitioners themselves find the evidence produced 
by standard evaluations lacking. In terms of practice, this lack manifests in a discrepancy 
between “best practices” and actual practices as court practitioners try to balance and weigh 
competing ethical demands on their work. 
Writing of the evidence-based movement in medicine, anthropologists have raised 
concerns that the processes of standardization of evidence that are necessary to compare 
evidence across large meta-analyses promote a conservatism about what counts as “good 
                                                
19 Legal practitioners hardly need this articulated. A detective interprets the evidence that can be 
discovered within constraints (technological, temporal, etc.). The handling of evidence can 
change its reliability in an instant. The attorneys make the evidence point to one claim or 
another. And then the jury members once again interpret whether that evidence supports those 
claims or something else. 
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evidence” (see Ecks 2008). An effect of this conservatism is that due to funding streams, 
institutional power imbalances, privileged research design models, and even laws that impose 
limits on what kinds of treatments can be studied, already well-established treatments and 
interventions, often with strong corporate backing, are the only ones that can be considered 
“evidence-based” (ibid.).  Evidence-based research, like all research, is subject to politics of 
knowledge production, such that before the evidence has been produced, politics, law, capital, 
morality, and bias have all crept in, in one way or another, to the research. What are touted as 
“evidence-based practices” are limited by research methodologies and large funding and 
regulatory bodies at the federal level, like the National Institutes of Drug Abuse [NIDA], 
National Institutes of Justice [NIJ], and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration [SAMHSA]). The interventions thus often reflect the values of these institutions 
and not just “what works,” broadly construed.  
In fact, any research discipline may have its own conservatism about what counts as good 
evidence, and research programs that are constrained by the influence of power and capital in 
knowledge production. But recognizing these limits, “evidence-based” proponents should remain 
open to multidisciplinary forms of evidence. To date, the proponents of evidence-based drug 
courts very rarely dip in to the sociological or anthropological literature on drug courts, which 
has been quite full of empirical insights (see Burns and Peyrot 2003; Chriss 2002; Kaye Brook 
2010; Mackinem and Higgins 2007; Nolan 2001; Paik 2011; Tiger 2013; Wolf 2002, among 
others). 
I want drug court practitioners and proponents to consider my work as they seek to 
develop “evidence-based” best practices. I want to expand the “evidence base.” By forming 
relationships and friendships with court practitioners and defendants over time, I was able to 
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record their knowledge of, their concerns about, and their hopes for drug treatment court practice 
in ways that the current “evidence-based” evaluation science, and its narrow measures of 
effectiveness, does not. Ethnographic analysis of these everyday practices and priorities should 
be a crucial source of evidence for the design of not just effective, but also responsive and ethical 
drug policy.  
João Biehl and Adriana Petryna (2013, 19) eloquently explain how ethnography can do 
this: 
Ethnographers are uniquely positioned to see what more 
categorically minded experts may overlook: namely, the empirical 
evidence that emerges when people express their most pressing 
and ordinary concerns, which then open up to complex human 
stories in time and space. […] The argument that ethnography is 
not replicable tends to solidify a technocratic monopoly on truth 
and, really, misses the point of what ethnographers can convey. 
The simple fact that we are interested in particularities, contexts, 
awkward scales, and even the virtual, does not make the work of 
ethnographers any less rigorous. On the contrary, it raises the bar. 
The complex social realities of “target populations” and the 
midlevel actors on whom the burden of implementation lies beg for 
analytic frameworks that weave them together, and for innovative 
genres that will allow people-centered evidence to add up, to 
travel, and to matter publicly and comparatively.  
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As such, ethnography can speak directly to the “evidence-based” epistemic devaluation 
of “people-centered evidence.” My court interlocutors often conveyed in different ways to me 
that they recognize that the “excesses of lives and stories are often smoothed over or averaged 
out by coarse-grained statistics and plans” (ibid., 17). I hope my work raises questions. I hope it 
“raises the bar” (and I hope my courtroom interlocutors appreciate the pun). 
In the next chapter, I look at another of the drug court practitioners’ most privileged 
forms of “objective” evidence of defendants’ compliance: urine drug tests. I discuss the way 
these tests are at the center of truth games. My discussion should further shade in the complexity 
of what can go on during two to three minutes of discourse between judges and defendants. But 
also, it is worth keeping in mind questions about what are ethical uses of evidence, and how 
competing missions of justice and care depend on very different uses of evidence. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TESTING CARE:  
TRUTH GAMES, CONFESSION, AND URINE TROUBLE 
Frank and I had become good friends over the course of his mandate. He was always 
kind, thoughtful, talkative, and earnest with me, with court practitioners, and with other 
defendants. For these reasons, he was a model drug court – and research – participant. But about 
two-thirds of the way through his minimum one year mandate, a bit harried before court, he told 
me that recently, feeling famished while racing between his job and his treatment program, he 
hastily grabbed some “Italian cake” at a bakery.  He ate his Italian cake quickly in the car, he 
explained. Frank’s vivid storytelling had me picturing the cake crumbling in a torn cellophane 
wrapper, his fingers slightly greasy on the steering wheel, yellow crumbs across his lap. When he 
arrived at his treatment program, he produced urine for drug testing. When the results came back, 
they reported the presence of a very low level of an opioid substance. The cake, he realized in 
retrospect, must have had some poppy seeds in it, he told me.  
That afternoon, standing before Judge Fierro, Frank took responsibility for having 
absentmindedly eaten poppy seeds. Onlookers chuckled as he, with tongue in cheek, promised 
the Judge he would simply not eat for the rest of his mandate.1  The judge said she was required 
to treat the test result as “a positive.” Eating poppy seeds was against the terms of the contract he 
had signed the day he pled guilty to grand larceny in exchange for a chance at treatment instead 
of incarceration. His “sanction” would be to write an essay about why it is important to pay 
attention to what he puts into his body. In the essay, he told me later, he continued to play up his 
                                                
1 While his jocularity reflects his good-natured charm, I also recognize a critique in this remark. 
Frank obviously could not abstain from food. By offering to do so, he pointed to the ways the 
rules and strictures of the drug court may feel like obstructions or impossibilities for living life.  
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shared Italian-American heritage with the Judge and with Karen, his lawyer, through reference to 
food. He told me he had to avoid some of his favorite dishes while in drug court – anything 
cooked with alcohol, like chicken marsala, cacciatore, tiramisu.  He enunciated the names of 
these dishes, lingering over the long vowels as if savoring them vicariously through their lilting 
sounds.  
Because he had a positive drug test, Frank knew he might also be penalized with an 
extension of the length of his mandate. Judge Fierro didn’t specify how much extra time Frank 
would have to commit to the drug court that day in court. His hope at the time, he told me, was 
that she didn’t mention it in court, in front of a full gallery of other defendants so that she could 
reserve herself some leeway to be more lenient with him – because it was only poppy seed cake.  
Frank saw how court practitioners might be caught up by the demands of objective justice, even 
when being “fair” might not have seemed “right.” But this leniency never came through, and 
after graduating, Frank told me he was ultimately set back three months for the poppy seed 
episode, which was a much longer extension than he had anticipated. Even though this had been 
his only indiscretion, Frank did 15 months instead of the 12 he would have but for that cake. 
This chapter builds on Frank’s story as a scaffolding to think through the role of urine 
drug tests in therapeutic practice. So far, I have discussed various practices and structures of the 
drug court model that have therapeutic intent. I have argued that these practices are often 
compromised by the drug court’s placement within the justice system, and by extension, 
practitioners’ attempts to maintain principles of justice – fairness, objectivity, rectification, 
penality – while caring, or administering and coordinating care. In the previous chapter, I 
complicated this argument by looking at another ethic that informs drug court practice, but I 
argued that evidence-based practice guidelines provide insufficient guidance to practitioners and 
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an insufficient explanation of what drug court practitioners do.  I continue now by turning again 
to all of that practice that exceeds the evidence-based ethical framework, arguing that the 
therapeutic aims of drug tests are diverted by their proximity to punishment and the subjection of 
incitements to “confession.” 
Drug testing makes the body speak, to borrow a phrase from Saidiya Hartman’s (1997, 
22) Scenes of Subjection. It is supposed to compel defendants to confess. It is a form of 
interpellation, in that it hails defendants through the presumption of their guilt (see Althusser 
2001).2 The drug court’s rule to “believe the test” sets up a paradigm example of what Foucault 
(1997, 297) called a “game of truth,” which he defined as “a set of rules by which truth is 
produced.” “[I]t is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its 
principles and rules of procedures, may be considered valid or invalid” (Foucault 1997, 297). 
Insofar as my interlocutors did on occasion speak of a game, of play, and of performance, there 
is an emic basis to this analysis. But framing it in these terms might also be my own form of 
play. Further, while I initially counted myself outside of this game as neither defendant nor 
practitioner, I have come to see how I inserted myself into it, and practitioners and defendants 
alike also pulled me in sometimes, as something of a referee, albeit one with no authoritative say 
in any outcomes. 
This chapter looks at what sorts of practices and play are set in motion by this truth game. 
I show how the truth game of urine tests has effects that exceed its therapeutic intentions. First, I 
explain why drug tests are valued as objective measures and important pieces of unchallengeable 
                                                
2 In Louis Althusser’s (2001) discussion of interpellation, the subject is formed through language 
and on its terms. In his example, this occurs through the “hey you!” of the police officer, and the 
subject’s turn to the call, which forms her subjection through guilt. Subjection requires the 
acceptance of guilt (much like drug court does), and the continuous process of acquitting oneself 
of that guilt in the eyes of the law (again, like in drug court). 
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evidence by court practitioners. Then, I explain specifically why poppy seeds are contraband. 
Importantly, as industry texts explain, the legitimacy of the drug tests depends to a certain extent 
on the collusion of defendants, including that they abstain from consuming substances that can 
cause false positive test results (like poppy seeds).  
Even though drug treatment courts do not run trials, they are engaged in processes of 
truth-making just like other courts, including because they are spaces of law. Legal scholar Jack 
M. Balkin (2003) writes, “law is continuously proliferating truth into the world.” Laws do not 
simply refer to truths that exist independently in the world, but rather they actively produce 
them, in several ways. Balkin’s description of the performative power of the law applies equally 
well to the drug court, even if it is a “legal black hole” according to Scott, private defense 
attorney in Judge Lazarus’s jurisdiction. Balkin (2003, 7) writes:  
It is making things real. It is making things true and false. […] First, 
the proliferation of legal truth shapes, directs, and constrains how 
people live their lives. […] Second, the proliferation of legal truth 
shapes people’s beliefs and understandings. Law has power over 
people’s imaginations and how they think about what is happening 
in the world. Third, the proliferation of legal truth is important 
because law’s truth is not the only truth, and law’s vision of reality 
is not the only reality. Law’s power to enforce its vision of the world 
can clash with other practices of knowledge and with other forms of 
truth. 
But, law is only performative, speech act philosopher J.L. Austin qualified (1962), so 
long as “felicity conditions” are met. For a court of law in the United States to meet felicity 
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conditions, some general collusion is necessary. R.P. McDermott and Henry Tylbor (1995, 222) 
argue that some measure of collusion is essential to any conversation (or other interactional 
event). Participants (not to say strategists, McDermott and Tylbor point out) will tend to collude 
“as to the nature of the world they are talking about, acting on, and helping to create” (ibid., 220) 
and this collusion tends to be bound by institutional constraints.  
To a significant extent, many of us quietly and respectfully sitting in the gallery during 
court proceedings were colluding.  When an audience member lets a cellular phone ring out and 
then loudly answers it while court is in session, it is jarring. Such a moment might spur two 
perfect strangers to catch each other’s gaze and smile. We are reminded that we are colluding. 
Just imagine if we all colluded in a different endeavor to noisily disrupt court proceedings. 
Imagine if the entire audience sat with their feet up on the bench in front of them, chatting loudly 
with each other, while knocking back a few beers. It would seriously undermine the legitimacy 
of the court. The officers could haul us out, the judge could charge us with contempt, and jail us. 
Indeed, and unsurprisingly, coercion exerts more power in courtrooms than collusion does. But if 
we were to stop colluding, we would make it impossible for the drug court to continue to 
operate, at least in any way resembling its current operation.  
A collusional analysis helps to reveal the constraints that institutions impinge on what 
can and cannot be said or communicated. Keeping quiet when court is in session is a form of 
collusion with the institutional powers of the court. Collusion is not so much voluntary as it is 
strictly enforced and often necessary for survival. Collusion is thus a defensive tactic, but, 
McDermott and Tylbor argue, it is one that preserves what they call the “deception system,” the 




Drug court professionals see urine testing as a critical component to the success of the 
drug court model, and even to recovery itself, for several reasons. First, it is considered an 
objective measure of the defendant’s drug use. It is the drug court practitioners’ “principal 
measuring stick of noncompliance and accountability” (Paik 2011, 76). It standardizes the 
measures of defendants’ progress in treatment, both holding all defendants to an objective 
standard to be “clean and compliant,” and potentially providing outcome data for would-be 
evaluators. In Chapter 1, “Compliance Trials: Flexible Evidence and Objective Standards,” I 
discussed the absolute evidentiary value that drug tests enjoy as seemingly objective, neutral, 
machinic inscriptions (Latour and Woolgar 2013). Second, the urine tests are supposed to serve 
as a deterrent to drug use. Third, the drug tests obviate the need to rely on defendant’s 
attestations of compliance (Paik 2011, 76). Yet drug tests are also said to have “the therapeutic 
effect of promoting honest and frank discourse between the participant and the treatment team, 
including the judge” (Hora 2002, 1476). In fact, the drug tests are thought to do the initial truth-
telling, compelling defendants to confess their missteps and relapses.   
Judge Lazarus wanted to hear defendants admit to noncompliance, especially relapse, 
preferably with remorse.  
Judge Lazarus: I do enjoy when I have somebody break down and 
cry and admit it [to having relapsed] – I mean, it’s very satisfying. 
EM: Mhm 
Judge Lazarus: Um, but that’s not really why I’m doing it. I really 
believe that – because I’ve seen it – because I know I’m not putting 
you in jail for that – if you deny it and you walk out the door, you 
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will walk out the door saying, “I got— ” the disease part – “I got 
away with it,” and you’ll do it again. 
EM: “And I can do it again.” Mhm. So, you enjoy it because there’s 
kind of a healing or a catharsis? 
Judge Lazarus: Well, I feel like at least I’ve got to try to get them to 
admit it, because if they admit it and the treatment program puts 
them on a contract3 or increases the days, they don’t walk out saying, 
“I got away with it.” 
EM: Mhm 
Judge Lazarus: So it’s a different. It’s a- it’s a – I mean, my goal is 
not to have them do it again. They’ve already done it.  
EM: Right. 
Judge Lazarus: I mean, I can’t erase what they did. They’ve done it. 
So, accept responsibility, figure out why – that’s why I hate the “it 
happened in the blink of an eye,” I mean it’s never a blink of an eye. 
EM: Something precedes-- 
Judge Lazarus: Right, you decided, or you saw somebody and he 
had drugs and you asked for the drugs or you needed – you went and 
you were having a horrible day so you went and you took money 
and you left the house and you looked for somebody selling drugs 
and you negotiated and you bought the drugs and then you had to 
                                                
3 A “contract” is the term therapeutic communities use for when a client has violated a program 
rule and must make up for it, for instance, by having extra facility cleaning duties for a particular 
span of time. It is more serious than a “learning experience.” 
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take them to a place where – you know, it’s always – it’s not, it just 
happened. So, I mean, there are things that I want them to be 
conscious of. 
For Judge Lazarus, admitting is the first step in a process of self-knowledge that will 
ultimately serve to deter future missteps. Through this confession, defendants will become more 
conscious, she suggested. This self-consciousness will enable defendants to work on themselves, 
to “figure out why” they used, to work backwards chronologically to determine what steps and 
decisions led to a relapse.4  Judge Lazarus’s words here call to mind Foucault’s work on the 
modern technology of confession. Through acts of naming and describing, Foucault argued in his 
History of Sexuality, subjects (and their desires) can be “known, measured and regulated” 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 176), such that they become governable and policeable. Dreyfus 
and Rabinow (ibid., 174) note that “the individual was persuaded that through such a confession, 
it was possible to know himself,” and that confession could “reveal our deepest selves.” At the 
same time, a confessional practice provides authoritative bodies with the stuff necessary for 
modern governance. According to Rosalind Shaw (2007), a medical metaphor of healing 
pervaded the Christian confessional.  This healing through speaking truth further “seeped into 
American and European consciousness” (ibid., 192) through the growth of the disciplines of 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis and a resulting “therapy culture.”   
The drug court policy on drug tests can be viewed as a truth game (Foucault 1997; Ning 
2005). In this game, there is one group of people who know something, to varying degrees, about 
what they may have consumed, and another group of people who feel they must know exactly 
                                                
4 Although defendants may not have been conscious of these things, as Judge Lazarus indicted, 
Judge Lazarus’s court still stressed that relapses – and just about everything else – were the 
results of defendants’ choices. 
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what that other group of people consumed, and why. There is a significant institutional power 
differential between these two groups, and it continues to be reestablished and reinforced in such 
interactions as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2.5 Looking at it in this schematic way, it is a 
fascinating scenario where the less powerful possess the knowledge that the more powerful seek 
(perhaps something like a modern master-slave dialectic). Since the less powerful have an 
interest in concealing their knowledge, the more powerful have recourse to extract traces and 
residues from them, process those residues into information, and then interpret that information. 
Then, in a final step, whatever the powerful group has determined to be true, they insist that the 
less powerful group confirms that truth and does not provide contradictory information.   
The game structures a discursive field, wherein defendants have “two choices” when 
faced with a positive urine test. In broad strokes, these choices are: Option A, admit to having 
used drugs, which will inevitably lead to more intensive treatment; or option B, deny use and get 
thrown in jail for a few nights and even up to a couple weeks. This is how Samantha, a public 
defender who works in Judge Lazarus’s jurisdiction, explained it:  
There was a client I was covering for [a colleague] and I was like, 
“Listen, I don’t- I don’t know you, like we don’t have to get to 
whatever your truth is right now, but here are the two things that are 
gonna happen: one, you admit to it. You know how, like, this is this 
court’s big thing: it’s like, personal responsibility. You admit to it 
that you did it. If you didn’t do it, you shouldn’t admit to it, but like 
                                                
5 These differentials must be understood intersectionally (Cohen & Jackson 2016; Crenshaw 
1989; Schulz and Mullings 2006), but for my schematic here, I will reduce a multitude of social 
differences with the strong caveat that there are complex power differentials not only between 
groups but within them. 
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it– know that these are the two choices. I’m not gonna ask you what 
you want, like which is true for you, but if you admit to it, [and] you 
didn’t do it, you’ll get a second chance, you know? [You] won’t go 
to jail. Or if you don’t admit to it, you’re gonna get thrown in.” The 
person admitted to it, and told me afterwards they still hadn’t done 
it.6 
Samantha clearly articulated the rigid rules of the game, in which confession is equated with 
honesty, and denial with lying. Although she started to entertain a third possibility (“If you didn’t 
do it, you shouldn’t admit to it”), she explains that that is not really one of the two choices. 
Contesting a positive test is not an option, confirmed Allen, the assistant district attorney 
in Judge Lazarus’s drug court.  Allen explained to me that he and his colleagues do not accept a 
defendant’s argument that a urine test may give a false positive. If a defendant wants the court to 
doubt the truth of the positives, then “I’m going to say [I] can’t trust the negatives.” Trusting the 
testing technology was a prerequisite for drug court participants. Allen’s comment also implicitly 
threatens that this trust has a fragility. One false positive upends it, and to the detriment of all 
defendants. In fact, this trust, which Judge Lazarus called a “very strong belief” in Chapter 1, is a 
faith based on consent perhaps as much as it is on certainty. 
 During my fieldwork, defendants would often deny having used when their urine test 
came up positive. They certainly denied relapse more often than toxicology produces false 
positives.  I asked Scott, “Do you have clients who tested positive, but who say, ‘Oh! But I didn’t 
use’?”  “All the time,” he said.  
                                                
6 It is worth exploring the resonances between this truth game and the common practice among 
indigent defendants of pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit, knowing or being told they 
cannot successfully contest the charges, in exchange for some leniency. 
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EM: So, [laughs] how- how do you counsel them? 
Scott: It’s tough, uh, you know, my– the defense attorney in me 
wants to challenge everything, but like the realist in me– it’s easy 
to believe that– that they can't all be screwing these tests up. You 
know, you’re just lying to me. 
EM: Yeah 
Scott: […] I just make my client aware they have little power. 
“You’ve already pled guilty, you’re at the whims of the judge.” I 
tell them before they come up with this– before they lie to me, I 
tell them, “Everyone here is well aware of what drugs can do and 
the amount of relapses that can happen. Um, and the courts, they’ll 
excuse relapses– they won’t excuse lying, and so I feel like it’s 
always better to tell the truth.” Sometimes, afterwards, they [my 
clients] still tell me they [test administrators/interpreters] screwed 
it [the test] up.   
It is important to note that the court doesn’t so much “excuse” relapses as take them as evidence 
that a defendant needs more treatment – whether it is a more intensive treatment modality, more 
hours or days in treatment, or moving to a residential facility. As Scott notes, even after the court 
has made its determinations about what a positive test will mean, sometimes defendants still 
maintain that the tests were wrong.  And indeed, tests can and do give false positives from time 
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to time.7 This leaves the question of what the “truth” is, and whether it is always better to tell it, a 
bit more open than Scott and the truth game allow. 
My purpose is not to question the drug tests’ accuracy in general, but I want to show how 
they do much more than “refer” to pre-existing truths. Used as evidence, they also index; they 
point. And they produce new truth effects. In his book The Mangle of Practice, Andrew 
Pickering (1995, 6) notes that “science is not just about representation.” If we view science in the 
“performative idiom,” it will suggest to us that “we should explore the many different and 
interesting ways in which knowledge is threaded through the machinic field of science…it is a 
rebalancing of our understanding of science away from a pure obsession with knowledge and 
toward a recognition of science’s material powers” (ibid., 7).  
One of those material powers is extending the panopticon. Leslie Paik (2011, 76) 
observes how drug tests “allow courts to see what could not be seen previously, extending the 
court’s surveillance inside the body and for more periods of time.” In this way, too, the drug 
courts join a broader trend of the times in which, Theodore Porter (1995, 196) argues, courts 
“exert unremitting pressure to turn private knowledge into public knowledge, and in this sense to 
expand the domain of objectivity.”  
Judge Lazarus told me, “you know, we have this whole procedure: you look at the cup, 
you make sure it’s yours, you pee in the cup, I mean bla bla bla, and you’re watched.” Direct 
                                                
7 It is surprisingly difficult to find estimates of drug testing accuracy in drug treatment court 
setting specifically. Experts will point out that drug testing has variable reliability in different 
contexts – forensic, workplace, and clinical – but as Judge Lazarus notes, drug treatment courts 
rely upon drug testing from mixed settings (i.e. those done in the courthouse and those done at 
treatment programs). Further, accuracy varies according to specific substances.  Assuming rates 




observation by the person who administers the test is considered a critical step in the testing 
process, so that a defendant cannot swap out a “clean” urine sample for his own. As drug court 
Judge Peggy Hora emphasizes, “Participants are required to provide a fresh, clean, personal, 
unadulterated, undiluted observed urine sample” (2002, 1476). I’ve always been amused by this 
litany of values for good urine.  
As Paik (2011) notes, this direct observation is hardly conducive to the therapeutic 
relationship.8 In fact, there were defendants who insisted they simply could not produce urine 
while being watched – a condition sometimes medicalized as “shy bladder syndrome.” But when 
a defendant claimed he had shy bladder in Judge Fierro’s court, she did not buy it. Instead, he 
was suspected of trying to dodge testing – and responsibility – because of undisclosed drug use. 
Another material power of the urinalysis is providing a font of authority, including a 
register with which to make authoritative personae performable (Agha 2007, 81). 
Anthropologists argue that “expert objects” that are incomprehensible to laypeople “generate 
high degrees of expert agency” that is drawn on by the scientists, or in this case, the court 
practitioners, who wield them (Carr 2010, 22, citing Dumit 2004; Kelty 2008; Traweek 1988). 
Lab reports of urinalysis results are prime examples of these expert objects.  Frank explained: 
You see, drug court – there’s a certain theatric about it, okay?  You 
know, like [Marilyn, the treatment resource coordinator,] could 
have said “Yeah your honor, listen, he had a positive for poppy 
                                                
8 This, of course, puts everyone involved in a potentially uncomfortable situation (whether or not 
testers actually look, in the light of strong social taboos against doing so). In certain drug testing 
settings, a mirror is installed on the ceiling above the toilet or urinal so that the observer can 
avert her or his eyes to the ceiling instead of looking directly at the testee’s (excuse the pun) 
genitals. Drug court treatment center bathrooms that I made my way into were not equipped with 
these ceiling mirrors.  
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seeds. He ate some crap,” right? No. [She said,] “Your Honor, his 
toxicology report came back positive for opiates.” No, it didn’t. 
[…] The judge knows what it is, but for everybody that’s sitting 
there in the audience – all the participants, you know, they can’t 
make it seem like it’s so simple, like we’re just gonna overlook 
things, so it has to– everything has to be [dramatized].   
For Frank, drug court practitioners had to dramatize because while the judge and Marilyn 
both “know what it is,” i.e. poppy seeds, they adhere to the more formal (and illicit-sounding) 
“opiates,” which according to Frank are not the same thing (“No it’s not”). Frank suggested that 
“his toxicology report came back positive for opiates” is a different way of saying, “He ate some 
crap.”  The scientific register of the first rendering is part of an authoritative and “strategic 
stylization” (Agha 2007, 187) that Frank associated with dramatization, I think because he 
identified it as a kind of performance of expertise and authority. 
Yet another material effect of the drug test is the outlawing of otherwise licit substances. 
As I have discussed, drug courts borrow the concept of “noncompliance” from the therapeutic 
realm. Compliance imposes an additional set of legal limits on defendants’ behavior, such that 
drug courts can “outlaw” otherwise licit activity, like eating poppy seeds – not illegal, but 
noncompliant, and thus subject to punishment in a court of law.  In the next section, I examine 
the process through which poppy seeds become illicit in drug court.  
 
Seeds of doubt 
While ethnographers of drug courts (Mackinem and Higgins 2007; Paik 2011) have observed 
court practitioners interpreting what different concentration levels might mean, my interlocutors, 
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following recent professional guidance, had worked out a more simplified “believe the test” 
policy. This strict policy emerged from the complexity of the interpretation that urine testing 
technology requires (Reisfield, Goldberger, and Bertholf 2009, 943). Toxicology interpretation 
requires knowledge not only of the testing science, but also multiple other considerations, 
including the defendant’s health and physical size, recent water consumption, recent use of 
prescription, over-the-counter, and herbal remedies, potential cross-reactivity, the drug 
metabolism, and other “analytical sensitivities and specificities” (ibid., 937).9  Stevens and 
Addison (1999) note that levels can also be affected by weight loss. Drug metabolites are fat-
soluble and, as a person loses weight, those metabolites can be released into the body, causing 
concentration levels to go up even without new use. 
Importantly, while drug court practitioners wield the expertise and objectivity they 
borrow from the tests, they are laypeople, and do not have the scientific expertise to interpret the 
machinic inscriptions of gas-chromatography-mass spectrometry. In light of this, toxicologist 
Paul Cary10 strongly advises drug court practitioners against attempting any interpretive practice. 
Under the aegis of the National Drug Court Resource, Policy, and Evidence-Based Practice 
Center, Cary’s “Drug Court Practitioner Fact Sheet” states: 
because courts rarely have the necessary toxicology expertise, the 
routine use of urine drug levels by court personnel in formulating 
drug court decisions is a practice that in most cases would not 
                                                
9 Also see “Drug Testing in a Drug Court Environment,” National Association of 
Drug Court Professionals, accessed July 28, 2017, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/181103.pdf 
10 Paul L. Cary, “Urine Drug Concentrations: The Scientific Rationale for Eliminating the Use of 
Drug Test Levels in Drug Court Proceedings.” Drug Court Practitioner Fact Sheet 4 (2004): 1-8, 
Accessed July 27, 2017, http://ndcrc.org/sites/default/files/urine_drug_concentrations_2.pdf. 
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withstand scientific or judicial scrutiny. It is hoped that this fact 
sheet will serve as the foundation for those drug court programs 
routinely interpreting urine drug levels to transition to a strictly 
qualitative (positive or negative only) result format. (1) 
The policy adapted by the courts I studied to go “qualitative” and wade less into the potential 
meanings of different concentration levels is thus in keeping with “evidence-based practice.”  
The qualitative positive or negative result of a drug test is the end result of an interpretive 
and deliberative process. Lorraine Code (2015, 9) points to the epistemological erasure of “the 
work required in order to establish the persistent, stubborn data…. to limit ‘facts’ to the final 
stage in a long process of elaboration” (citing Latour 2004b, 95ff.). This erasure “expunges 
genealogical traces from scientific practice,” Code (ibid.) writes. In order to come to a qualitative 
positive or negative fact in that final stage of toxicology analysis, cutoff concentration levels for 
various substances must be defined, and this is based on contested biochemical science. 11 
In an issue paper, forensic toxicologists Robinson and Jones (2000, iii) explicitly address 
drug court practitioners as “lay persons” who are using sensitive and expert scientific 
technologies in their day-to-day activities with great consequence for defendants.  Robinson and 
Jones (ibid., 13) advise drug court practitioners to “Recognize Situations That Can Create 
Positive Test Results That Challenge the Integrity of the Testing Process.” The authors explain, 
“Situations can occur that may result in positive drug tests that potentially do not reflect illegal 
drug use” (ibid.).  They advise the lay actors in drug courts to “Develop Contracts With 
                                                
11 Robinson and Jones (2000, 11) advise that in order to screen out false positives, “cutoff 
concentration levels must take into account that some small traces of a drug metabolite may be 
present in a person’s system without a determination that the individual has used illegal drugs 
(e.g., opiate levels below 2,000 ng/ml may be associated with the ingestion of poppy seeds and 
not necessarily indicative of heroin use).” 
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Participants That Increase Responsibility for Eliminating Situations That Challenge the Test 
Results” (ibid.) The contract should ensure that defendants “agree to refrain (1) from being in 
environments where drugs are used because passive smoke could affect their results; (2) from 
eating poppy seeds; and (3) from participating in activities (e.g., using toiletries, over-the-counter 
medications, or other products) that could create a false positive” (ibid., 13).  Compliance with 
these three prohibitions, the authors state, “would decrease the chances of false positives” (ibid.). 
The third provision is rather expansive, in fact. The issue paper notes: 
The Physicians’ Desk Reference provides a list of more than 350 
medications that may produce positive test results for 
amphetamines, PCP, cocaine, or opiates, ranging from cough 
suppressants and antihistamines to antibiotics and medications for 
asthma, hypertension, lymphomas, and irregular heartbeat. (ibid.) 
The responsibility should fall on defendants, the authors suggest, to abstain from these 350-odd 
medications to ensure higher rates of testing accuracy.  
Samantha described a client’s experience with this prohibition: 
Samantha: I’ve had clients who will swear up and down that they 
did not use and they have a dirty urine. It’s like– one of the clients I 
was telling you about in [Judge Lazarus’s court] was doing so well– 
he was– had all this shoulder pain and needed surgery but he wasn’t 




Samantha: He ended up getting a heavy-duty ibuprofen from 
someone and he got kicked out of his first treatment program 
because he had taken it. And he was in so much pain and I was just 
like “this is not—” you know what I mean- and he has all this time 
hanging over his head. 
By “all this time hanging over his head,” Samantha meant that her client is facing a long 
prison sentence if he can’t manage to comply with treatment and graduate from drug court. Also, 
in most drug courts any positive test extends the minimum length of a defendant’s mandate by at 
least 30 days (and as noted, like in Frank’s case, sometimes significantly longer). While this is 
more time for treatment (and learning how to become a better liberal subject), it is also more 
time under intensive surveillance that subjects noncriminal behavior to criminal punishments.  
As Samantha illustrated, while drug courts rely on urine drug tests above all other evidence as an 
objective measure of a defendant’s progress in recovery, they may not always provide such a 
measure. It may be, like in this defendant’s case, that the defendant is doing well in recovery, but 
takes something for pain.  
Laboratory reports are highly technical documents that require expert interpretation. 
Authoritative institutions advise drug court practitioners that they lack the appropriate scientific 
expertise to interpret the quantitative levels reported on these documents and should thus 
consider tests qualitatively – that is, as positive or negative.  The solution to not knowing how to 
confidently interpret levels in drug courts has been to go with Robinson and Jones’s advice to 
prohibit consumption of any substance that could compromise the integrity of the tests – that is, 
compromise their integrity in the eyes of those watching, like practitioners, defendants, and the 
occasional ethnographer and evaluator. What this makes clear is that the legitimacy of drug tests 
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requires defendant collusion, too. If defendants would consume poppy seeds en masse, with 
every test coming back showing traces of opioids, the objective sheen of the tests might start to 
dull. 
 
Whizzinators and other unintended effects 
When confronted with positive urine test results, many defendants either admitted or 
denied, conforming to the “two choices” I observed and Samantha explained. But defendants 
also often creatively engaged the rules of this game, such that admissions often challenged the 
concept of personal responsibility. Some defendants emphasized the social or professional 
contexts in which drug or alcohol consumption take place, intimating that over-broad prohibition 
might be damaging to their family and work relationships. Some defendants scrambled to find 
“hard evidence” or “proof” that their consumption was mistaken, and therefore innocent. There 
were other creative responses; effects of the truth game that far exceeded the therapeutic intent of 
the drug tests. Some defendants carefully calculated what substances they could use based on 
when they thought they might be tested next and how sensitive they believed the tests were. And 
some of them “tampered,” attempting to prevent their bodies’ waste from betraying what they 
wanted to keep secret. Still, I stress that the ways they played this game were ultimately 
structured by the constraints the drug court policy imposed.  
In Chapter 2, “Team up, Speak Up, Lock Up: Creating Webs of Surveillant Care,” I 
discussed Mr. Turner, who may have consumed something to invalidate the drug test that turned 
his urine into gelatinous white crystals. Those who tamper with the tests attempt to appear 
complicit with the court while they subvert its aims (Ning 2005). Private defense attorney Scott 
told me about his client who had been using “The Whizzinator,” which, Scott explained, “is like 
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a prosthetic penis […] He only got caught because eventually he was testing positive and then 
not testing positive and so they eventually started monitoring him more and saw him using this 
mechanical thing.”12 As E. Summerson Carr (2011) observed in a Midwestern U.S. treatment 
program, clients who were subjected to bodily surveillance like urine tests “manage their bodies 
so they are always in creative process and therefore never subject to acts of perfect reference,” 
foiling the drug treatment counselors’ demand for honesty, openness, and willingness. 
In the treatment center of Judge Lazarus’s court, a poster made by an intern advised, 
“Don’t Flush Your Recovery Down the Toilet,” implying that any kind of tampering or self-
modifications would not only compromise the test results but also jeopardize a defendant’s 
recovery. In addition to some of the concoctions that people use to try to disguise traces of illicit 
substances in their urine, the poster warned against “water loading,” which is when a defendant 
drinks too much water13 before a urine test and as a result, the urine sample is too diluted for the 
testing instrument to detect chemical levels. Based on the suspicion that a defendant is trying to 
disguise a positive result for drug use, diluted urine can be taken by drug court practitioners as 
evidence of drug use. Defendants accused of water loading often explained that they drank a lot 
of water after working out, or because they were nursing a cold, or so that they could produce 
urine for the test. This could be a marginally effective foil of the drug test if used sparingly. 
                                                
12 Prior to that, the staff hadn’t been “invasive looking,” Scott said. “They might stand behind 
you to make sure you’re not like, uh, like pulling a bag [of urine] out of your pocket or […] or, 
you know, holding a lighter underneath it [swapped out urine] to warm it up […] you know, the 
various tricks.” 
13 According to Robinson and Jones (2000, 22n3), citing Health and Human Services and the 
Department of Transportation, consuming more than 40 ounces of water during the three hours 
preceding a drug test would make one’s urine too diluted to test.  I never encountered this 
specification in participant handbooks. 
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Judges tended to be more lenient with a first water loading offense, but would become suspicious 
of repeat instances. 
In Judge Fierro’s court, each defendant was assigned a color. Each defendant had to call 
in to a phone line with an automated recording that stated which color was being called in for 
“random” drug tests that day. Most defendants didn’t believe these calls were truly random. Sam, 
the highly educated disbarred attorney and Orthodox Jew who was a defendant in Judge Fierro’s 
court, kept a spreadsheet tracking the colors to see if he could detect any patterns. He told me: 
Sam: Speaking of taking drugs, they gave me this color gold.  
EM: Uh huh 
Sam: I don’t know if this is like a Phase 3 color and they’re just 
like, “Okay, this guy’s low risk.” Do you know, I’ve been in that 
program now, what is it, 25 days? 
EM: Uh huh 
Sam: They haven’t called my color yet. They never called gold. 
EM: Uh huh 
Sam: They haven’t called gold yet. 
EM: I was hearing some people talking about some colors being 
called more than other colors. 
Sam: Yeah, we were talking about that. So, black is called most, 
and then like turquoise and grey, so every time I [hear] the “g” for 
gray I’m like, “Oh finally,” but that’s not—and it doesn’t matter 
because they’re testing me twice a week randomly between 
Monday and Thursday.  
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EM: At [your treatment] program 
Sam: In- at the program.  
Though most defendants didn’t develop a spreadsheet, many seemed aware of patterns that 
suggested certain colors were called more often. I personally always wondered why the court 
practitioners determined that “black” should be one of the high-risk colors that gets called in 
more often, a choice that seemed to ignore not just the racially insensitive “optics” but also the 
actual harm imposed by pervasive associations between blackness and risk. 
 Sam went on to tell me why tracking these patterns mattered to him.  
Sam: But, like, if I hadn’t found out that, like, the drugs last in my 
system six or seven days, I probably would- might have tried 
something-- 
EM: Mhm 
Sam: Like Thursday night – maybe, maybe. 
EM: Mhm, mhm 
Sam: Because one- not at the beginning, but now that I see that 
they never call my color, the chance of them calling gold on a 
Friday, like, what are the chances of that? 
EM: Mhm 
Sam: Like they’re gonna call black on a Friday or nothing. I mean, 
like they’ve also called no colors a lot of times. Like I just – it’s 
become laughable, frankly. It’s just become completely laughable. 
Like, they never call my color! 
EM: Mhm, mhm 
 222 
Sam: […] If I really knew that- that the cocaine and molly 
[MDMA] would only last in my system two days, and I weren’t- 
and I didn’t keep Shabbos let’s say? So then [laughs] so I would 
probably be, like, Friday, I would go– let’s say I’d wait until 
Friday, I’d go in and I’d piss Friday morning and then I’d have the 
whole weekend, like I could– well not the whole weekend, just 
Friday and then make– like I probably would do that– 
EM: Mhm 
Sam: […] I mean they even have to remind themselves – you need 
a stick to test for molly. The instant cup doesn’t test for molly. It 
doesn’t test for MDMA. So it turned out that my drug program was 
never testing me. They never told me they weren’t testing me for 
it, but the first time they tested me for it, it came back positive 
[laughs]. Like I said, if you would have done it [the stick for 
MDMA] the first week, I never would have done it [taken MDMA] 
since then. 
EM: Mhm 
Sam: But I thought I was testing negative. So, I just kept on doing 
it. Thursday night- once a week. 
Sam said that luckily, he had learned by trial and error in his treatment program before his 
mandate began that it takes his body six or seven days to metabolize MDMA (also known as 
“molly” or “ecstasy”), despite what he had read on the internet (but “those internet numbers are 
never right,” he said), making it too risky to try to pull off while his program was testing his 
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twice a week.  But months into his mandate, Sam told me he had figured out how many drinks he 
could have, for instance at a concert, and still piss clean the next day. Paik (2011, 97) similarly 
found youths in drug courts who altered their drug consumption, turning to drugs, like alcohol, 
that were more difficult to detect.   
John, a defendant in Judge Fierro’s court, was in trouble for three positive alcohol tests. 
What happened, he said, was he was drinking a health elixir at a juice bar near his treatment 
program. He had had no idea, but there was alcohol in it, he said. Treatment court practitioners 
didn’t seem to know whether to believe him or not.  He explained, “Like the incident now, you 
know. ‘[John], your levels is high! You’re drinking – ah!’ So, I gotta show proof, I got to go with 
it.” John told me he was going to go back to the juice bar to see if he can get some of the 
packaging from the elixirs. If they threw them away, he would go to Chinatown to find them, he 
said. At $40 a pop, he would buy a couple of boxes, and bring them to his counselor. “And I'll 
give them to my counselor, and let her know, ‘this is what’s going on,’ and she can tell [my case 
manager in treatment court].” John was no doubt aware that by enlisting his counselor to report 
his words, they would take on an authority he himself could never imbue them with. He had 
already given his attorney information on the product, he said. Listening to him planning his own 
defense, it was clear that he wanted to be exonerated.  
John also told me he wanted to write a letter to Judge Fierro explaining what happened. 
“It has to be kind of a good apology, though. With specifics,” he tells me. “Not long. Short and 
sweet […] And I hope she won’t use that against me [laughs].” I was worried for John when he 
told me he was planning to write a letter because I had never seen an unsolicited letter from a 
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defendant go over well (as we saw in Chapter 2). I suggested to him that he might want to run 
the letter by Karen, his attorney, before presenting it to the judge.14 
Scott told me about a client who got anxious when his program told him he tested 
positive for a drug he doesn’t use. He was so anxious that he had to calm his nerves with the 
drug he does prefer: 
Scott: I mean, my guy– last time we were in court he was 
first- or he first tested positive for this, like, “wizard smoke” 
or this fake marijuana. 
EM: Uh huh 
Scott: Spice, it’s called spice. I don't know if it was spice 
but– 
EM: Or K2? 
Scott: Yes, K2 was it. Um, and he swears he didn’t do it, but 
he could smell it in the area and he’s telling me the night 
before, “I was kicked out of the program, you need to come 
to court tomorrow for me,” and I’m like, “Shit! What 
happened?” and he’s like, “Well, the first [test] said I was 
smoking but I wasn’t, so they sent it to the lab and it came 
back negative.” I'm like, “Okay, it’s simple.” Of course, I get 
in there and the real story is while he’s awaiting the lab 
result, he’s so nervous about it coming back positive, even 
                                                
14 Because Karen is a team member, she might be able to give better advice about how a letter 
would be received than Hannah and Catherine, whose client, Darryl, was accused of being a 
sociopath for writing to Judge Connelly (see Chapter 2). 
 225 
though he claims it's not gonna be positive, that he goes and 
gets really high, you know on his own– on what he normally 
does. Um, and so you know, he thinks I can tell [Judge 
Lazarus], “Look, it’s because they– they screw with him and 
told him he had [...] that he used.” And the judge is like, 
“Okay, that still shows that he has a problem– after all these 
months your first reaction to any bad news is just to use.” 
And you know, it’s– and that’s true and there’s not much he 
can really do about that. And it’s hard– I would imagine it’s 
pretty hard to get around that test because by the time you 
get to that test [in court] and you learn that he tested positive 
a couple weeks ago, you can’t retest him to see if it’s true or 
to challenge that. 
EM: Right. 
Scott: […] and again, it’s like, my guy, he actually ended up 
admitting to using at those times and the judge wasn’t going 
to hang him up on the K2, I don’t think, because they 
couldn’t prove that actually was positive. They gave so much 
other rope to hang him– 
EM: Yeah. 
Scott: –that it didn’t really matter at the time. 
Scott’s client maintained that he hadn’t used K2, but when he tested positive for it, he used 
“what he normally does.” By the time this came up in court, too much time had elapsed to retest 
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the initial urine sample that may have falsely tested positive for K2. It didn’t matter, though, 
because his subsequent use shows he still has “a problem.” The truth game is very rigid, but it 
gave enough “rope to hang him.” While the game structures a field in which defendants have two 
options, defendants play in multiple creative ways.  Still, they rarely win.  
 
Collusion 
Like Frank, Nick, a middle-aged White defendant in Judge Fierro’s court, was always 
friendly and encouraging with me and his fellow defendants. He and Nathaniel, a Black man in 
his early thirties, seemed to share a special bond. They often sat together in the courtroom. Over 
time, I became part of this clique, too, often sitting beside Nathaniel. Nathaniel had a style that 
was irresistibly both playful and cool, and he seemed to be respected widely among defendants, 
as he moved rather effortlessly among circles of friends.  
But Nathaniel was often in trouble, and Nick once told me how he worried about him. He 
would snack, signal to his friends, and provide a running commentary on court proceedings. He 
always had his phone out in the courtroom, despite repeated warnings from the court officers. He 
seemed subtly bemused, but undeterred, when they would become flustered with his silent 
resistance to their demands. He was, one might say, incorrigible. Bewildered by Nathaniel’s 
flouting of the rules, Nick told me, “You gotta play the game.” I was surprised that Nick, a true 
believer in the twelve-step model, which can sound starkly ideological if not hokey at times, 
would distill the drug court as a game. 
During fieldwork, I would often give Nathaniel rides back into the city, to housing 
projects where his family and friends lived, or to a station where he could pick up public transit, 
instead of taking the expensive commuter rail. Our conversation would frequently jump around 
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from my insistent questions about his drug court experience, to our personal lives, the 
notoriously brutal police precinct near his mother’s apartment, my pregnancy, his work, and his 
girlfriends. But sometimes he just took a call from a friend or his boss while I drove – moments 
when I felt a bit sheepishly un-colluded with. He had not graduated by the time my fieldwork 
ended. I would get in touch with him every so often to ask if he had a graduation date set. I 
wanted to be there. It kept getting put off, though, and eventually I worried I was just a reminder 
of the unendingness of his mandate, rubbing it in, and stopped asking. I don’t know whether he 
ever graduated. I hope he did. 
Weeks after Frank stood before Judge Fierro and apologized for having eaten some 
Italian cake with poppy seeds, as we chatted over thick slices of cheesecake at a chrome-paneled 
diner near the courthouse, Frank told me he had lied.  
EM: Oh! So you don’t actually think you ate something. 
Frank: No. I know for a fact I didn’t. I didn’t eat nothing that day. 
EM: You didn’t have this Italian cake– 
Frank: No. 
EM: –that had poppy seeds in it. 
Frank: Nothing! But I had to make something up. 
Because the report said that the most probable cause of the low levels detected was a bakery 
product, Frank made up the story about the cake. Recounting the story about the Italian cake to 
me before court was just a dress rehearsal.   He explained, “Okay, so what I did was I chose the 
path of least resistance. […] Sometimes in order to win the game, you have to play the game on 
their terms.”   
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McDermott and Tylbor (1995, 232) note that collusion is often about “what people have 
to arrange not to talk about” in order not to be crushed by institutional pressures. Some amount 
of treachery, they insist, is necessary for institutional and everyday life. Actors who wield 
institutional power are often protected from having to tell outright lies (ibid., 221).  In drug court, 
defendants do not benefit from such protection. McDermott and Tylbor (ibid., 232; citing 
Bateson 1972) note that a key question for any context is what would a participant have to do to 
tell the truth. In the drug court truth game, when a participant gets a false positive, an additional 
question may be what would a participant have to sacrifice to tell the truth – for instance, like 
their “freedom.” 
Frank: So, uh, how– I mean, in your opinion, you’ve been in– 
observing for a while, someone goes in, in total denial, resistant, 
adamant–  
EM: No, you could go to jail for it.  
Frank: You’re going to jail. You could be– it could be your first 
time, something very minor, but that attitude is gonna get you locked 
up for three days. You know? I walked out.  
EM: Yeah.  
Frank: Okay? My head was high, because I know for a fact that I did 
nothing wrong.  
Frank knew his best bet was to take responsibility for breaking the rules of his contract by 
ingesting poppy seeds, and that, if he flat out denied any wrongdoing, implying the test could be 
wrong, he would get into more trouble. He had to lie in order to play the game on the drug 
court’s terms. And the lie set him free (marginally). His lie saved him from going to jail, and he 
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left with his head held high. While he had to remain under surveillance an additional three 
months, facing the positive drug test, that was the best he could hope for.  
Frank colluded, yes. But then he made another play in the truth game. Had Frank never 
revealed to me that he had lied to the drug court team, his collusion would have been largely 
preserving of the truth game. Frank knew he couldn’t challenge the terms of the game, but 
speaking to me and revealing his strategic lie presented a new opportunity for meaningful play 
on the sidelines.  
It is tempting to read Frank’s lie in the light of Judith Butler’s (1993) work on 
performativity. Frank “subtly calls into question the legitimacy of the command” (ibid., 122) to 
confess and be honest by giving a false confession. Playing the game, Frank’s iteration of the 
confession is parodic, hyperbolic.  Butler writes: 
Here the performative, the call by the law which seeks to produce a 
lawful subject, produced a set of consequences that exceed and 
confound what appears to be the disciplining intention motivating 
the law.  Interpellation thus loses its status as a simple performative, 
an act of discourse with the power to create that to which it refers, 
and creates more than it ever meant to, signifying in excess of any 
intended referent. (ibid.) 
The treatment court performatively instantiates a truth through repetition and holds all 
defendants to it. By lying to conform to the terms of the game, Frank preserved that truth. But 
then, in pointing it out to me, he disrupted the repetition that gives the game its performative 
force.  He “flipped the script” (Carr 2011). Hailed to confess his guilt, he did so, but then in 
another move, he created something more. Through his “double-movement” (Butler 1993, 222) 
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between false confession and his further confession to me, Frank successfully inhabited the role 
of model participant while also exposing the rigidity of the drug court’s game of truth to me (and 
perhaps to what I may have represented to him not only as a friend but also as a researcher 
contributing to the public domain of general knowledge).  
During my fieldwork, I was preoccupied with the question, why do defendants deny 
relapse when their urine comes up positive even when they will not be believed and when they 
could go to jail for doing so. Months went by after I completed my fieldwork before I thought to 
consider, what if defendants never denied having used drugs when confronted with a positive 
test? While contesting the urine test results does not prove successful in the immediate for most 
defendants, by doing so again and again, whether lying or not and despite negative 
repercussions, they keep the drug test truth game open to “permanent political contest” (ibid.), 
day after day.  
 
Conclusion 
Urine testing, and the truth game staged around it, does not appear to be very therapeutic, 
or to have only the delimited therapeutic effects intended by drug court designers. Its effects 
vastly exceed deterrence, honesty and admission, objective measures of compliance, and self-
consciousness. Further, the truth game tightly binds the ways defendants might use their two to 
three minutes before the judge. If they have trouble admitting relapse, and trouble admitting 
vulnerability, they can be jailed.  On the other hand, if they are honest about relapse, it will 
inevitably lead to more treatment that they might not be able to afford – whether because they 
have to pay for it out of pocket, or because it takes them away from other livelihoods or other 
responsibilities.   
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Jackie, the statewide drug court coordinator, explained: 
Jackie: And you also have a complication in the drug court world 
because there’s this, sort of, criminal, um, side of things and the 
prosecutors and judges may want more intensive treatment than is 
clinically indicated– 
EM: Mhm 
Jackie: –and that creates a problem because if you don’t get the 
right kind of treatment, you know, it’s not going to work. 
EM: Right. 
Jackie: It can be harmful even– 
EM: Hm 
Jackie: –you know, if you put somebody in residential treatment 
who doesn’t need it, they’re going to get frustrated; they’re not 
going to be as compliant. You know, you have to match people to 
appropriate level of services. 
EM: Mhm 
Jackie: But as I say, in some drug courts, and actually, particularly 
in [this city], there’s much too much of an emphasis on residential 
treatment. 
EM: There’s too much, you said? 
Jackie: Yeah. 
As Jackie made clear, more treatment is not always better, whether it’s an extra day spent 
in an outpatient facility each week, extra “self-help” meetings in the evenings, before work, or 
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over lunch hours, or being moved to a residential facility nearby or far from home. Therefore, 
when a defendant cannot devote more time to treatment because of work or family 
responsibilities, they may feel their best option is to attempt to conceal a “relapse” (or a single 
instance of drug use, the singularity of which the term relapse doesn’t really allow for). But 
sometimes a test catches them. Some defendants might weigh the slim chance that disputing the 
test results will convince the practitioners against the knowledge that if they are not believed, 
they will go to jail. Whether they get away with it or not, they will have to do more treatment. 
And either way, the length of their mandate will be extended.  But they may hope that there is 
some small chance they will be believed, and this is worth the risk of jail.   
To be sure, a truth game invites such calculating maneuvers.  But much more than these 
sorts of calculations – which indeed, many defendants made – my drug court practitioner 
interlocutors stressed to me how they imagine it must feel to have to admit to relapse. Even those 
who insisted on the importance of admission extended some empathy in our interviews toward 
defendants struggling with maintaining sobriety and the stigma of relapse. Interestingly, Jackie’s 
underplaying of the “sort of, criminal, um, side of things” suggests that at least some drug court 
advocates really want drug courts to be a space of treatment far above a space of criminal justice. 
In The Violence of Care, Sameena Mulla (2014) suggests that truth-seeking can be 
incommensurable with the work of care. An inquisitorial process of getting at the truth can 
impose violence where healing is called for. I suggest that a care worker may need to know 
certain things about what is going on with a patient in order to provide the best care, but 
admonitions to be honest, admit, and take one’s responsibility (i.e. punishment) are not friendly 
to a practice of care, or even to getting the information that is necessary to ensuring good care.   
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In fact, despite cultural expectations that trials uncover truths, legal scholars have argued 
that the opposing parties in trials have vested interests in concealing the truth (Weigend 2003). 
For the defense, this is primarily because guilt entails certain punishment. If drug courts were to 
make a space of care that removed the threat of imminent punishment for noncompliance, they 
might foster better communication, which, as Chapter 2 noted, is certainly crucial to providing 
good, effective, and responsive care (Mol 2008). If the “purpose of drug testing in drug courts is 
primarily to monitor a participant’s progress in treatment,” as Robinson and Jones (2000, 10) 
suggest, and this explains why there need not be such strictly monitored evidentiary procedures, 
then it follows that a lapse in progress would not be met with a “sanction.”  
 
Coda: magical thinking 
In the discourse of modernity “the secular” presents itself as the 
ground from which theological discourse was generated (as a form 
of false consciousness) and from which it gradually emancipated 
itself in its march to freedom. On that ground humans appear as 
the self-conscious makers of History (in which calendrical time 
provides a measure and direction for human events), and as the 
unshakable foundation of universally valid knowledge about 
nature and society. The human as agent is now responsible—
answerable—not only for acts he or she has performed (or 
refrained from performing). Responsibility is now held for events 
he or she was unaware of—or falsely conscious of. The domain in 
which acts of God (accidents) occur without human responsibility 
is increasingly restricted. Chance is now considered to be tamable. 
The world is disenchanted.  
 
 –Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity, 2003, (192f.). 
 
I begin this coda with a quote from Talal Asad’s Formation of the Secular. The Weberian 
thrust of this passage dovetails with many themes of this thesis: the punctuality of calendrical 
Time, disenchantment, individual responsibility, objective knowledge. The taming of chance also 
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recalls my discussion in Chapter 1 of reasonable foresight and “prevention plans,” and in 
Chapter 3, “Beyond Effective: Thinking Ethics, Rethinking Evidence,” of the risk that drug court 
represents for defendants. Asad’s words lay out the broader context for a modern ethics of belief 
that is based on encounters with evidence. This is the context in which the phrase “magical 
thinking,” which Judge Lazarus attributed to defendants, emerged. 
I asked Judge Lazarus my burning question about “why, when faced with a positive drug 
test, so many people will deny. Um, and just on a practical level, knowing that it’s going to be – 
that they’re going to be worse off, in terms of the response.” In her reply, Judge Lazarus 
rephrased my question, “why[…]so many people will deny,” to “So, why would they lie?” 
reintroducing a sense of guilty intention to defendants who dispute drug tests. This was her 
explanation: 
Judge Lazarus: They all believe in magical thinking. […] You know, 
the big lie is always better than the little lie. They’re definitely 
believers in the big lie.15 As addicts, they’ve spent years, many of 
them, being successful because of their ability to convince people 
that what you see with your own eyes isn’t true. “Yes, I’m nodding 
out but I didn’t take anything.” “Yes, you had twenty dollars in your 
wallet, I’m the only one else in the house, and I didn’t take it.” So, 
                                                
15 In hindsight, Judge Lazarus’s allusion to the big lie in July 2015, several months before 
Donald Trump entered the race for President of the United States, seems very prescient. 
Originally attributed to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, the big lie is a propaganda tool to persuade 
the masses. It is said that the big lie is effective precisely because it is so outrageous. People 
become convinced that nobody would be able to keep telling such an outlandish fabrication, so 
they eventually come to believe in the big lie. It is much easier to call out the little lie, even if it 
is of less consequence.  
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they’ve spent their lifetime– you know, their best survival skill is in 
denial.[…] They wish they hadn’t done it.  
EM: Mhm 
Judge Lazarus: And if you can say it enough, maybe it’s not true. 
[…] and like, if you wish– if you wish it away, it won’t be true.  
Judge Lazarus’s explanation of magical thinking recalls other explanations of this 
cognitive (dys)function. Early anthropologist James Frazer (1920, 420) explained that in magical 
thinking, “men mistook the order of their ideas for the order of nature, and hence imagined that 
the control which they have, or seem to have, over their thoughts, permitted them to have a 
corresponding control over things.” In her memoir, The Year of Magical Thinking, Joan Didion 
(2005, 35) poignantly explains that, in a time of profound loss, it was “as if my thoughts or 
wishes had the power to reverse the narrative.” According to the American Psychiatric 
Association (2013), magical thinking is a mistaken belief in the power of one’s thoughts, words, 
or actions to affect a particular outcome. In Judge Lazarus’s explanation, defendants think 
magically, while drug court practitioners think rationally and according to the evidence.16 
Defendants lack self-awareness, deceiving even themselves, she suggested. 
But I’m intrigued by the way that magical thinking involves a wish for the performative 
power of speech in Judge Lazarus’s explanation. The law itself depends on this performativity 
and the collusion that makes it possible, and the legitimacy of the drug tests depends on the 
performative powers of science and the collusion that protects results from challenge.  I find it 
                                                
16 The Judge’s words speak to a double bind for defendants. While criticized for fancifully and 
deceptively ignoring the facts, suspicion and doubt foreclose defendants’ ability to produce and 
present evidence that supports an alternative narrative. The further irony is that drug courts 
themselves have institutionalized pathways to knowledge that ignore many forms of evidence. 
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further quite suggestive that magical thinking describes a way of understanding events by 
inserting, or restoring, human agency where the authoritative diagnostician (be it the judge, 
psychiatrist, or anthropologist) believes there is none. It is such agency that is disavowed by a 
rule to treat the drug test as entirely “objective,” whether or not the results adhere to what the 
participant did or did not do. When treatment court practitioners know and acknowledge that 
urine tests produce false positives, can be mishandled, misinterpreted, and misreported, but still 
nevertheless “believe the test” as a policy, a belief that the court practitioners sustain, virtually 
unwilling to hear evidence that contradicts it, is there not some magical thinking to this?  
Court practitioners often insist that only by taking individual responsibility can 
defendants make change in their lives and “stay clean.” But defendants often contest individual 
responsibility by pointing to the social contexts in which drugs and alcohol are consumed: 
Someone spiked my drink; My sister served a rum cake; My father gave me a pill for my pain. In 
effect, if not intent, these explanations reject the individuality of the responsibility for relapse. 
They remind us that drugs are integrally a part of our social worlds – used for pleasure, for 
strengthening bonds, for medicine, for care, for vision, for forgetting, and for poison. Drugs are 
not so much individual choices as they are parts of social configurations. Drugs re-enchant the 
disenchanted world.  
In fact, the twelve-stepper mantra “people, places, and things,” which I heard often 
among defendants and court practitioners, would seem to fundamentally recognize the way drugs 
are part of our social lives, the social landscape, and assemblages of material goods, ideas, 
words, and symbols. Further, when Sam was prohibited from attending a close friend’s 
daughter’s wedding, Judge Fierro’s drug court team was insisting on the sociality of drugs. 
Despite this recognition of the fundamental sociality of drugs and consumption, defendants must 
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claim and bear individual responsibility for relapse. 
 While Judge Lazarus’s assertion that defendants believe in magical thinking would seem 
to create distance between her and them, “Othering” them as anti-modern beings without a 
rational, scientific understanding of the way things really are, there is another side to her use of 
the phrase. Later that same morning, after we had left her chambers, and, as we approached the 
courtroom together, Judge Lazarus told me that her husband had passed some years before. In 
her grief, she read Joan Didion’s The Year of Magical Thinking over and over again until a close 
friend took it away from her. While she didn’t put it just this way to me, Judge Lazarus’s 
experience with loss would seem to suggest that she could relate to defendants through a shared 
experience of ambivalent attachment to an object, be it a book or a drug, and through a wish that 
things might be different, and less painful. Perhaps by the time we spoke that morning, however, 
she saw herself as the friend who intervenes to put an end to the problematic relation more than 
she recognized the vulnerability to pain and loss that she shared with defendants.  
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CHAPTER 5  
TIME AND THE ADDICT:  
THE PROMISES OF DEFERRAL, RETURN, AND TRANSFORMATION  
It is graduation day in Judge Lazarus’s drug court. Graduation is an elaborate and thoughtful 
ceremony, full of ritual, that takes place three or four times a year. Judge Lazarus acts as the 
master of ceremony, introducing various speakers to the 32 defendants on the dismissal 
calendar, their friends, families, advocates, counselors, and a few other interested parties in 
attendance, like myself. One of the first speakers on the program today is Tony, the director of 
the treatment center. Tony tells the defendants, “Although this is the end of the drug court 
experience, it is not the end of your recovery.” Recovery is “a lifelong journey,” he tells them. 
“Take ownership of your past and control of your future.”  
 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the drug treatment court is a space that brings together 
multiple temporalities. Three themes repeat in my notes on, and memory of, graduation 
ceremonies: deferral, return, and transformation. I use glimpses (printed in italics) from 
graduation day in Judge Lazarus’s court to organize this chapter around these multiple temporal 
themes. The title of this chapter contains a play on Johannes Fabian’s (1983) Time and the Other. 
When I use the term “addict” in this dissertation, I mean to index the ideological figure who 
appears in discursive tropes like “Addicts lie” and “Addicts are sneaky and manipulative.” 
Actual people, ethnography is so good at reminding us, are much more complex. But ideology 
comes to shape how people perceive and encounter others as well as themselves. It shapes policy 
and practice, expectation and experience. It shapes authority and the value of evidence, as I 
showed in Chapter 1, “Compliance Trials: Flexible Evidence and Objective Standards.” It shapes 
truth, as the previous chapter showed. And it shapes the experience and expectations of time, 
history, and the future. 
The Otherness of the addict manifests in multiple ways, including that she is an Other in 
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time. Her life is arrested. She is spiraling down towards or has finally hit “rock bottom.” She is 
chasing, not leading. She is cyclical, repetitive. Her life is not progressing according to liberal 
and capitalist ideals. She is not “effectively producing in a capitalist fashion,” thus she is 
stagnant (Norum, Mostafanezhad, and Sebro 2015, 78).  
Dominant ideologies of time in the U.S. are plural, and certainly not always “linear” 
(Norum, Mostafanezhad, and Sebro 2015). Linear progress has a compelling normative force, 
but consider the prevalence of cyclical time in temporal experiences of everydayness, with each 
revolution of the earth round the sun, individual life as a life cycle, and the “circle of life,” 
connecting flora and fauna through earth and water and air. These are cycles that tend to be 
revered. Perhaps one could argue that cycle is ideologically connected to nature, linearity to 
“man” overcoming it (and see Ortner [1974] on this nature/culture divide in gender ideology).  
As such, cyclical time can also be construed as pathological. Poverty is thought to recur in 
generational cycles, recidivists are said to trudge again and again through a revolving door, 
addiction and other chronic illnesses relapse. Perhaps the Others of these tropes – addicts, 
criminals, the poor, and the sick – are in a sense deemed closer to nature (and further away from 
proper personhood). 
This chapter does three things. It looks at the way drug courts structure temporalities for 
defendants. I characterize this as the promise of deferral. Defendants are trained to defer their 
pleasure-seeking as the basis for recovery. During the time frame of their mandates, they also 
must meet various requirements that depend on their ability to find and seize on resources and 
opportunities – resources and opportunities that are scarce and discriminatorily distributed or 
withheld. But patience is a virtue, and they must wait out deferral with grace and optimism. 
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Second, it looks at the way defendants are imagined, or represented, in time. I 
characterize this as the promise of return. Return refers to the chronic cycling of relapse and 
recovery, the self-perpetuating vicious generational cycle of poverty, and the revolving door of 
the criminal justice system. Paradoxically, while defendants are imagined as caught among these 
cycles, they are chastised for their fatalism and encouraged to be hopeful and more future-
oriented.  
Third, this chapter looks at the way the time of defendants is corrected. I call this the 
promise of transformation. Big transformation is celebrated in drug court; the bigger the better. 
This comes out especially at graduations, where one gets the feel that the practitioners’ prodigal 
sons are the most warmly received and celebrated. Judge Lazarus’s graduation ceremony has a 
particularly explicit ritual to symbolically and narratively demonstrate and enact transformation: 
The Recovery Tree. During this ritual, graduating defendants narrate their conversion from a bad 
past to a hopeful present with a bright future. In these sorts of narrative exercises, defendants 
take responsibility for their pasts and at the same time, propel themselves forward in a narrative 
of progress, even as, for many of them, the histories of oppression that follow them are 
disavowed.  
This temporal plurality, or “heterotemporality,” of drug court is not inherent to the 
cultural differences between and among defendants and practitioners, but rather is an effect of 
power and inequality.1 Yet, in drug courts, as in other powerful institutional spaces, multiple 
                                                
1 As EP Thompson (1967) observed half a century ago, the rhythms of life for the wealthy, or 
“leisure classes,” are decidedly different than those of the working classes. This is still very true, 
even if “leisure time” is a diminishing resource (or perhaps a more diffuse and permeated one) 
with the advent of new technologies that keep labor time beeping and buzzing in the pockets of 
“no-collar” workers (Ross 2004) at Happy Hours, while photo albums, music, art, games, and 
television are likewise at their fingertips during labor time. 
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temporalities are often ignored. Gayatri Spivak (1999, 38) notes that the multiplicity of lived 
experiences of timing, “[t]his feeling for life and history[,] is often disqualified, in a dominant 
interest, in the name of the real laws of motion of “time,” or rather, “Time.””2  
 
The promise of deferral 
Defendants know that their criminal histories will chase them through life, preventing them from 
getting jobs, public housing, a college degree, and more. More than anything, the graduates are 
present today to have their cases dismissed, their guilty pleas withdrawn, and their convictions 
expunged from their records. This is the proverbial “carrot” of drug court. The moment of 
gratification that is anticipated, and deferred. Judge Lazarus toys with this deferral during the 
ceremony. There are multiple speakers before the legal proceedings begin. Then, Judge Lazarus 
introduces the “two dedicated lawyers”– Faye, the Legal Services defense attorney, and Allen, 
the assistant district attorney – who will initiate the proceedings. Allen makes his motion to 
dismiss the cases. At this point, some people clap, but Judge Lazarus coyly points out that she 
hasn’t granted the motion…yet.  
 
Drug court mandates are a long deferral between allocution and sentencing, during which 
defendants prove themselves to be worthy of prison or “freedom,” depending on whether they 
can remain compliant. As previous chapters have demonstrated, compliance hinges on following 
rules and treatment plans, being on time, law-abiding, and sober, and fulfilling certain 
requirements of responsible citizenship, like securing legal employment, stable housing, health 
insurance and public entitlements, a picture ID, a GED or enrollment in school, getting mental 
illness diagnosed and treated, and mending family relations. As explained in Chapter 1, 
“Compliance Trials: Flexible Evidence and Objective Standards,” defendants must progress 
through three phases of their court mandates, each of which lasts a minimum of several months. 
Sandrine, a graduate of Judge Lazarus’ court, told me she “didn’t pay much attention to the drug 
                                                
2 Stefan Helgesson (2014, 556) explains, “To think of ‘timing’ as standing in an uneasy, 
subordinate position relative to capitalized ‘Time’ provides a more flexible, nonculturalist point 
of entry to the question of theorizing temporal difference under conditions of inequality.” 
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court phases. Nah,” she said. “I couldn’t let that time do me.” But each phase is prolonged by 
any relapse, which can knock a defendant back to the beginning of her phase like a player in a 
video game. That is, any failure on the part of defendants to defer consumption of drugs or 
alcohol (or poppy seeds, as we saw in Chapter 4) occasions a deferral of their phase 
advancement and graduation (if they are ultimately able to get through those phases).  
Deferral of gratification has moral, spiritual roots in a Protestant ethic, and arguably in 
any spiritual tradition that advocates asceticism in anticipation of a pleasurable afterlife. The 
class-inflected morality of it can be heard in conservative media outlets that chastise the poor and 
working class for “conspicuous” consumption (including “luxuries” like refrigerators and 
televisions). It can be heard in the “marshmallow test” that presumes that deferral of pleasurable 
consumption as a young child is a necessary precursor to successful life.   
But here I want to look at another form of deferral that some defendants and their 
advocates spoke of to me. In May 2015, I was privileged to attend that month’s meeting of peer 
workers – that is, current and former drug users – employed by needle exchange programs 
(NEPs) around the city. They would have met without me, as part of a collaboration between the 
NEPs and the city health department. But the leadership allowed me to join them and turn this 
month’s meeting into a focus group for my project. Some of them had direct experience with 
drug courts, some of them had talked with other users over the years about them, and a few 
weren’t sure if they had ever even heard of the specialized courts. Sandrine, a middle-aged Black 
woman with a lot of poise and a soft and kind voice had graduated from Judge Lazarus’s drug 
court. While Sandrine was grateful for her drug court experience and fond of Judge Lazarus (as 
discussed in Chapter 2, “Team up, Speak Up, Lock Up: Creating Webs of Surveillant Care”), she 
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also maintained a critique of the burden placed on defendants to secure resources that are not 
available: 
They [drug court practitioners] want to see a lot of things that’s not 
being offered at those programs that they send you to. Such as, they 
want you– a lot of times you would have to advocate for yourself 
and do the work yourself because they want to see you employed, 
but we already know how employment going. But people being held 
in residential programs past their time because they’re not in– um, 
[the Center City drug] court plays a big part with that. They are real 
strict, you know, and they want you to have all these things – 
employment, housing, but then […] they don’t want you in the 
shelter. So then, now they don’t take – they don’t want you in 
PATH,3 now you can’t go there, so then now you’re scrambling and 
your life is all chaotic ‘cause you’re trying to get all these things that 
they’re asking for that is not available there, you know? And there’s 
some programs you have to – they don’t want you – like you said, 
being responsible and sometimes being responsible is taking control 
of your life and get a little bit of control because they tell you they 
want you in therapy […] and they have a psych on hand that only 
gives you meds and “goodnight.” Right? So, then you have to 
                                                
3 PATH is federal agency SAMHSA’s (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration) Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness. According to 
SAMHSA, PATH funds services for people with serious mental illness experiencing 
homelessness. 
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deviate and go find your own, you know, outside on the streets, so 
it’s like the, uh, the level of responsibility they want you to have 
before you leave– and I understand, you know, but it’s not there, 
you know? Even if you have mother and child, it’s just not there, 
you know, and that is a- they’ll tell you, you know, when you go to 
these programs, they sit you down: “You’re gonna get housing— 
 “Bullshit!” someone interjected.  Sandrine continued:  
“—vocational.” And they do have no vocational, you know? So […] 
they make it look good […] they even have tennis courts, right 
[laughs]. But […] if a person is trying– is working to get their life 
together, and you telling them all this, and all they do see is “I’ll see 
you tomorrow,” “I’ll see you tomorrow,” “I’ll see you in our face-
to-face,” “I’ll see you in our one on ones,” “I’ll see you in 
caseloads.” And this time is just passing. So, now you be like, you 
know, “What the sense in all this for?” You know, so, it’s like a lot 
of self-advocating.  
Sandrine described the scramble that drug courts set in motion for defendants living in poverty in 
bustling urban and suburban places: “you’re trying to get all these things that they’re asking for 
that is not available” – housing, employment, counseling, she mentions.4  She spoke to the 
experience of deferral. “I’ll see you tomorrow,” “I’ll see you tomorrow.” It’s not the putatively 
moral deferral of pleasure, it’s the deferral of care, of resources, and of the “help” she is required 
                                                
4 If drug courts required all defendants to eat healthy foods and breathe clean air, this would 
further illustrate Sandrine’s point that some defendants are unable to comply with drug court 
rules because of deprivation, racism, and class inequality. 
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to find. “You’re gonna get housing,” she was told. The requirements are framed as “help” in 
finding employment, housing, health insurance, entitlements. But it is not received here as help. 
It is received as impossible demands for which there is little or no help. Defendants are referred 
here and there, chasing services and opportunities that don’t deliver; they experience the deferral 
of referral.  
With the clock ticking during her mandate, Sandrine described her experience of time as 
relentless, yet out of reach: “This time is just passing.”  Perhaps she strove to do that time and 
not let it “do” her as she said, but it sounds as though she wasn’t always able to overcome. Her 
reference to the presence of tennis courts when there are no jobs or homes to be had 
demonstrates the cruel irony of pointing to irrelevant luxuries when basic needs aren’t being met, 
reminiscent of the clueless “optimism” of “Let them eat cake” (unless it is “Black Cake” or 
“Italian cake” with poppy seeds).  
Aware of the way Sandrine may have felt inhibited in praising Judge Lazarus’s drug 
court and her time there among her peers who were all fiercely critical of drug courts, I followed 
up with her after the meeting and she graciously gave me a private interview at a Subway 
franchise uptown several weeks later. There, she was able to wax nostalgic with me about her 
time in drug court. But she also maintained her critiques. Sandrine layered in more of the 
affective texture of the scramble she had described at our earlier meeting: 
Sandrine: You’re scared. You’re scared you’re not gonna make the 




Sandrine: You know, like, you telling a person who hasn’t been to 
school, haven’t been housed, don’t have a job, don’t even know 
their mental health diagnosis [...] or that they even have mental 
health syndromes and, how do you push me and tell me this is 
what I have to get? 
EM: Mhm 
Sandrine: And then when you go and try to seek those people out 
you can’t find or they don’t have anything or they just– 
EM: Mhm 
Sandrine: They could care less. 
EM: Mhm 
Sandrine: That’s in that program. 
EM: Mhm 
Sandrine: So, then the first thing they tell you in court is, “You got 
to go by their rules.” Okay, but these are your rules too [laughs] 
EM:  Yeah! 
Sandrine: How do that go together? [laughs] 
EM: Yeah 
Sandrine: You know, like- and it makes a person have to be there 
longer than they need to be there. 
EM: Mhm 
Sandrine: Because they can’t find that stuff. 
EM: Hm 
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Sandrine: They can’t. I mean, I wish it was something where, 
okay, something…to fall back on. 
EM: What’s that? 
Sandrine: To fall back on. 
EM: Mhm 
Sandrine’s talk suggests that some defendants find themselves caught between conflicting 
temporalities.  There is the strong tempo of the courts’ requirements, but this rapid beating 
clashes with the protracted (yet hurried) scramble to meet those requirements as one encounters 
bureaucratic and procedural hurdles and a scarcity of care, a dearth of help and material 
resources. Caught in this temporal clash, Sandrine was alternately scrambling and waiting, 
calling to mind the artful reuses of this syncopation of the rhythms of life in jazz composition.5 
Sandrine stepped forward with trepidation, knowing that with a wrong step, there was nothing to 
fall back on.  
Several of my interlocutors also explained how the time of punishment often clashes with 
the time of treatment, like Sandrine did here (“it makes a person have to be there longer than 
they need to”). In the U.S. today, punishment is all about time, hence the phrase “doing time.” In 
the drug court, blending the time of punishment with courses of treatment,6 there is constant 
deliberation over time. What type of program does someone need: a 28-day detox, 90 days in 
rehab, or 6 months in a residential treatment community?  How many times per week does a 
                                                
5 In 1926, Langston Hughes (2002, 35) wrote, “But jazz to me is one of the inherent expressions 
of Negro life in America; the eternal tom-tom beating in the Negro soul—the tom-tom of revolt 
against weariness in a white world, a world of subway trains, and work, work, work; the tom-tom 
of joy and laughter, and pain swallowed in a smile.” 
6 In his ethnography of diabetic patients at a VA clinic, Steve Ferzacca (2010) writes of a 
chronopolitics of care, where emphasis was placed on the work patients had to do to control their 
illnesses. Compliance depended on planning, scheduling, and timing their daily activities. 
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defendant need to attend outpatient treatment, a self-help meeting, or be tested for drugs? The 
fact that the determination for how long someone should be in a program is “clinical” lends it a 
particular authority and even an air of precision, while sentencing length is puzzlingly detached 
from any explicit calculus in criminal courts.7 
Judge Lazarus would explain the court’s one-year minimum mandate, as she did in this 
instance, to a defendant itching to graduate early, “It’s not an arbitrary number. In the treatment 
world, a year is magic number. They say the likelihood of success increases exponentially” at a 
year. She continued, “some people accomplish a lot in 8 or 9 months, but you need that 
minimum of a year.”  However, Jerome, the treatment resource coordinator in Judge Connelly’s 
court, explained to me that the drug court’s timeline might impose too much treatment in some 
cases, echoing something Jackie, the statewide drug court coordinator, also discussed with me 
(Chapter 4, “Testing Care: Truth Games, Confession, and Urine Trouble”).  Jerome explained:  
Most of the time we ask the program to extend their treatment to 
coincide with the timeline because the model is 12 to 24 months. If 
the program feels you’re ready to get out in 8 months, even if that 
may be true, you’re not fulfilling the obligation of a mandate, so 
unfortunately you have to stay in treatment another 3 to 4 months. 
                                                
7 But while sentencing appears to have little rhyme or reason, it does obey certain racist logics.  
Sentencing policy often reflects institutionalized racism, as the well-known example of the 
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine demonstrates. Before Congress enacted 
the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, sentences for crack cocaine were 100 times harsher than for 
powder cocaine by law. Congressional action diminished this disparity to 18:1. As Gayle said to 
me in one of our interviews, “because it didn’t affect the right people, the penalties were made 
higher […] lock them up.  [But,] it didn’t work too long because the system was so 
overwhelmed.” Sentencing reform in this explanation came as a result of bureaucratic overload, 
and not “justice.” This system overload is also one of the central elements of the drug court 
origin story, as I discussed in the Introduction, “Ambivalent Beginnings.” 
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As Jerome hints, the objective standard of the one-year mandate may not be quite so magical for 
everyone. The imposition of a “mandate” sometimes contradicts clinical determinations about 
the course of treatment most appropriate and effective. 
 
The virtue of patience 
 Defendants must tolerate deferral with patience. Many defendants who wondered aloud 
with me when the judge would announce their phase advancement also knew that they could not 
ask the judge during their appearance. Although Sandrine said that a lot of self-advocating was 
required to meet the requirements of the drug court, as we have seen in previous chapters, self-
advocating could also be risky for defendants, and thus any self-advocacy had to be done in 
savvy ways. If they were seen to be too eager to get through the program, it might appear that 
they were not serious or committed enough and were just going through the motions to get by; 
not just playing the game, but gaming the system.  
Defense attorney Hannah and social worker Catherine at Just Defenders in Judge 
Connelly’s jurisdiction articulated how court practitioners expect defendants to endure repetitive 
deferrals of care with patience, even as they feel pressed by the court’s clock to get their care in 
order. Their client Darryl’s story came up in Chapter 2, “Team up, Speak Up, Lock Up.”   
Hannah: Right and this is a client who is HIV+, who’s just had a 
lot of like– 
Catherine: Being shit on. 
Hannah: –really, really hard things in his life, um, and finally got 
approved for– for a mental health treatment program and then it 
took– 
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Catherine: It took, like, 7 months. 
Hannah: Right, the way that I realized what was going on is one of 
the treatment providers said to me and I think to [Catherine] 
Catherine: No, told me that I needed to tell [Darryl] to be more 
patient. 
Hannah: Yeah. 
Catherine: Because I was like, “What the fuck,” like, excuse my 
language but, like, “why is this taking so long, we come back to 
court every two weeks, you don’t have a bed. It’s– what is– what is 
taking so long.” And every week it would be a new thing like, “Oh 
we need a– 
Hannah: –medication– 
Catherine: –“PPD test” [for tuberculosis] or “we didn’t order his 
medication.” It’s like, “You’ve known about this for a long time. 
Why is this taking so long?” And she told me that I needed to 
instruct our client to be more patient.  
EM: Mhm 
Catherine: Because, um- And he’d been sitting in jail for seven 
months. 
Hannah: Right, and I’d sort of even forgotten because it’s just so 
typical for, like, there to be no space and no beds, so it gets 
adjourned and the person is waiting and waiting and waiting and 
when they complained to us that he was asking about [laughs] 
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when he could possibly go to the program, I went back and looked 
at my notes and it had been 8 months since he had been told he 
could get re-placed. 
EM: Mm 
Hannah: Right, not since the beginning of the case, since they had 
said you are approved for a–  
Catherine: Right. 
Hannah: –you know, a mental health program. So yeah, but it 
just shows how as advocates you get used to the environment and 
you get used to things, like, taking forever or things just being, 
like, absurd in the procedural hurdles. 
Catherine: I think it took close to a year. That’s why I still won’t 
talk to [her] [laughs], because she told me to tell him to be patient. 
So, I won’t talk to her. 
To coolly demand that someone else be patient – someone waiting in jail, no less – seems to 
presume that we all experience time as one, ignoring the ways that advocates or drug court 
practitioners experience time differently from those actually “doing time.”  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, “reasonable man” has a particular temporality. He exercises reasonable foresight to 
prevent harms from coming to himself or those in his community. Reasonable man is patient 
simply because he doesn’t have to be. He is not made to both scramble and wait for housing, 
health care, or to get out of jail.  
Other than scarcity of resources and the iron cage of bureaucracy, is there another 
explanation for why defendants should be encouraged to wait, to be patient, to defer?  Javier 
 252 
Auyero (2012) found that waiting is naturalized for poor “patients of the state” in Argentina. In 
this way, U.S. drug courts similarly participate in the daily labor of normalizing the necessity of 
waiting for the poor and for those who are wards of the state. This (re)produces subordination, 
Auyero argues (ibid. 19), “by producing uncertainty and arbitrariness.” As mentioned above, 
there are also powerful ideologies that are tied to class difference about the morality of deferral, 
of waiting, especially around norms of consumption.   
In mainstream recovery ideology, there is also a sense that it is “too late” for the addict to 
partake in pleasurable pursuits (at least ones that involve certain kinds of consumption). “Once 
an addict, always an addict,” goes a common saying. Because of this, anything but total 
abstinence is said to trigger a spiral into uncontrollable use. No glass of wine for the heroin 
addict, no marijuana for the alcoholic. Curiously, however, tobacco and nicotine products are 
generally regarded as fine. If one is counting clean time, they must restart the clock if they so 
much as set foot off the wagon (much like the phase is restarted in drug court).  
Paradoxically, one is supposed to feel better when they defer pleasure. But a few weeks 
in to his mandate, Sam told me:  
Sam: I was thinking, like, is there gonna be a time– is there gonna 
be a month where I say, “Oh my gosh, I physically feel a lot better 
now… 
EM: Mhm 
Sam: Wow!  It [using drugs] really did have a long-term effect.” 
EM: Hm.  
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Sam: I’m waiting for that and– and I’m depressed because I don’t 
think it’s gonna come. Like, I don’t think there’s gonna be like, 
“Oh, you felt better not on drugs.”  
EM: Mhm 
Sam: In fact, to tell you the truth, I’ve been feeling worse. 
EM: Hm 
Sam: But not– not– I don’t mean worse like withdrawal. I mean I 
just like – I don’t think it has to do with the drugs. I just– I– I –  
EM: Right 
Sam: I definitely haven’t been feeling better. 
Sam didn’t feel the progress, or the promise, of deferral.  He felt worse. 
 
The promise of return 
ADA Allen makes some brief remarks to the defendants, aware that he is not their 
favorite character of the drug court drama and the feeling is probably mutual.  He says: “I want 
to be brief. All we can do is give you the opportunity and what you need to succeed, but there’s 
no guarantee.” “There are several ways you can come back and see us. The preferred way is 
through that door over there – not the side door [where prisoners are led in from holding cells]. 
You don’t have to have an open case to come back and see us.” The theme of return is potent in 
his remarks. 
Judge Lazarus introduces Faye, who will join in Allen’s motion on all of the graduating 
defendants’ behalves. “It takes a special kind of lawyer to stand next to her client and let them 
speak for themselves,” Judge Lazarus says. Faye tells the graduates “how beautiful you look” 
and advises them to think about “how good you are feeling. I wish I could bottle this for you,” 
she says. Faye’s metaphor seems unintentionally barbed. She wishes she could bottle those good 
feelings, but a bottle full of good feelings is thought to pose inherent dangers to addicts.  Faye 
reminds the graduates that they have all completed the three phases of their mandates, some of 
them in a year, some after several years. Faye cleverly extends the phase schedule 
metaphorically to convey to graduates that their journey in recovery isn’t over. She tells them: 
“Phase 4 is your phase. You do it on your own.” But, she adds, “There’s no shame in needing 
help, in asking for help.”  “It would be a shame if you let it slip.”   
 
 254 
The cycle of chronicity 
Addiction is a chronic, relapsing brain disease, according to the biomedical paradigm de 
rigueur.8 This means that “recovery” is likewise a “chronic” state of illness, in which relapse is 
expected. While working in harm reduction, I heard challenges to the “disease model” altogether 
and its promise of chronicity.9 In fact, “addiction” was something of a “dirty” word at the May 
2015 meeting of active and former drug users working at syringe exchange programs around the 
city.  
Angela Garcia (2010) points out that the term “relapse,” to “slip again,” “still carries the 
moral residue of other morally charged terms, such as regress or recidivism.” While as Garcia 
notes, the formulation of addiction as a disease can go some length toward shifting the focus 
away from morality, the biomedical framework does not offer a full reprieve from moralizing. 
Nor does a biomedical perspective achieve full reconceptualization of individual responsibility. 
Arthur Kleinman (1988, 22) wrote of the “stigma of self-earned illness,”10 and Jean Jackson 
(2005) of the stigma of chronic pain.11 As Garcia (2010, 18) also notes, despite the fact that 
relapse is an expected sequela of the addiction disease, because both Twelve Step programs and 
                                                
8 Addiction is sometimes analogized with diabetes. Sometimes Judge Lazarus would extend the 
metaphor, likening methadone maintenance to insulin. She would note that at first, when her 
drug court began in the mid-1990s, she was against methadone assisted treatment. But over time, 
as she learned more about it, and as the evidence-based treatment community increasingly 
backed it, she came to see it as a valuable tool in recovery – like insulin for a diabetic.  
9 In fact, this rethinking of chronicity prompted me to rethink the “chronicity” of my own 
recurrent episodes of depression since childhood. The term “chronic depression” seemed to 
collect the many affective states I might have and cast them into a bin (or a “but…”) with an 
always present, always looming promise of return to depression. “I may love to dance to this 
song, or the company of these friends, but…” 
10 All illness – through diet, dehydration, exposure – can potentially be seen as one’s own fault. 
Still, the fact remains that different illnesses – and more importantly, the people they befall - 
carry different valences of stigma, blame, and victimhood (Cohen 1999).   
11 As norms of self-care gain a stronger grip on daily life through technological invention, 
individuals become increasingly responsible for knowing and regulating their risks (Rose 2007).  
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the drug courts in conversation with them are based on ideals of personal responsibility and free 
will, “the relapsed addict is ultimately assigned blame for the relapse and is therefore seen as 
lacking the will to recover.” This deep contradiction has been stressed before in different ways 
(Tiger 2013, Valverde 1997). In this dissertation, I have thought about it in terms of competing 
ethics of criminal justice and care. 
A couple of defendants in drug court also rejected the idea that addiction is like living 
with a chronic illness. John, the defendant in Judge Fierro’s court who was in trouble (in Chapter 
4) for drinking spiked health elixirs, told me:   
John: I don’t use the addiction part as people say that you are, like, 
a sick person. “This is your sickness.” 
EM: Mhm 
John: I just look at it as, like, this is something that you overcome? 
EM: Mhm 
John: And it’s not addictive if you can– if you’re not using. 
EM: Mhm 
John: It’s just something that you went through, you overcome. 
Some people think– 
EM: You reject the sort of the chronic– 
John: Yeah, I kind of– 
EM: –thing, like it’s not forever for you. 
John: It’s not […] 
John insisted that he is not an addict when he is not using. It can be a relief not to be swept into 
the whirl of cyclical chronicity, with its promise of return.  
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John protested when resource coordinator Marilyn told him he was a “90-90 guy, like, I 
only can be clean for 90 days and mess up.”  He seemed wounded by the label and its 
expectation of defeat as he relayed the moment to me. The way he summoned Marilyn virtually 
by using the second-person “you” suggested to me that the wounds were still fresh: 
John: You don’t know me, I was clean for a long Yeah, I’ve had– 
You don't even know me! I was clean in here before I messed up 
[for] seven months. 
EM: Yeah 
John: So, I had passed that. 
EM: Yeah 
John: So why would you say that? 
John’s words also remind that the threat of return is not just the threat of sickness as it is with 
other chronic illnesses, it is also the threat of punishment that attends relapse. Resonating with 
these experiences, Garcia (2010, 15) argues that “the framework of chronicity risks altering its 
own causality by insisting on a schema of return and repetition, whereby each return 
recapitulates a sense of inevitable demise.”   
 
The revolving door 
For John and his fellow defendants, the expectation of return extends also to recidivism 
and that proverbial “revolving door” of the criminal justice system. Charles, whose trials with 
lateness and attendance I discussed in Chapter 1, “Compliance Trials: Flexible Evidence and 
Objective Standards,” told me that drug court had been attractive to him, as it is to most 
defendants who “choose” it in the face of impossibly constrained choices, because “once you get 
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pulled into the criminal justice system, it’s hard to get back out.” Charles’s concern reminds us 
that despite the stigmatization of addicts, and especially the punitive stigma against addicts of 
color, and despite the punishing inevitability of chronicity, asserting one’s biological citizenship 
(Petryna 2001) as an addict in need of care is a tactical embodiment of a stigmatized identity. It 
was his only chance. In Charles’ words, the criminal justice system is less revolving door than it 
is maelstrom. 
At the May 2015 coalition meeting of peer workers, the conversation organically reached 
beyond drug court to experiences with the criminal justice system as a whole, but always hewed 
to themes that double back to drug courts. Cecilia, a Latina in her 50s, told me about the day she 
was released from one of the several prisons located out in the rural reaches of the state, far from 
home in the city: 
[W]e go to the bus, we go through the process, right, and um as I 
was walking out, the guard said to me, “See you when you come 
back.” […] I said, “I’ll never be back,” you know, and I wouldn’t 
turn my head because that shit messed me up so bad. I wouldn’t 
turn my head and look back, because I was afraid if I turned my 
head and looked back […], I’d come back.   
He got into her head, traumatized her, she said. He “instilled that shit in my head.” But, she 
continued, “I said, ‘I’ll never come back’ and I haven’t been back.”  Other attendees can be 
heard clapping on the recording in support of her, giving evidence to the incredible difficulty of 
staving off return once the cycle of imprisonment has initiated. While Cecilia was determined 
not to return, the guard’s utterance made her feel suddenly so vulnerable to the possibility of 
return that, like Orpheus, she must not look back.  
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The cycle of poverty 
Importantly, although I’ve referred to the figural “addict” in this chapter, the figure of the 
addict is not singular. Addicts are and have historically been differently imagined as deserving 
and undeserving, blameless and blameworthy, pitiful and criminal, and these often hew along 
racial and class lines. This explains why relapse might be met with punishment at all, and for 
whom.  Assistant district attorney Allen explained to me that he differentiated the “regular,” 
“normal people” who develop an addiction after a work-related injury or a “major crisis,” at 40 
or 45 years old, from the other defendants who wind up in his drug court.12 Maybe it is someone 
whose “wife died,” Allen suggested, and he “didn’t know how to handle it.” Suddenly in middle 
age, maybe it is that his “company went bankrupt.” For the “normal people,” it is a story of the 
advancement of a life arrested. For the others, there is no story. Theirs were lives that were never 
going anywhere. For the “regular” people, addiction interrupted a linear trajectory; whereas for 
the others – the ones who are supposed to be addicted – addiction is merely an anticipated part of 
a life lived in vicious cycle.13 
                                                
12 Helena Hansen (2013) finds a similar discourse of normal and blameless White addiction to 
painkillers to be pervasive. Timothy Hickman (2004) traces race and class-based distinctions 
among addicts to, for instance, the “Report of the Committee on the Narcotic Drug Situation in 
the United States” of the American Medical Association at its seventy-first annual meeting. The 
Report contended that for middle and upper-class users, “addicted by the conditions of a 
changing world,” addiction was simply a “modern malaise” (quoted with emphasis, 187). Often, 
these affluent addicts’ use was associated with a doctor’s reckless prescriptions. “Nonwhite and 
demimonde ‘others’” who “were supposedly free of the commercial and cultural strains of 
modern life” were generally “denied an excuse for taking drugs” (ibid.). The AMA distinguished 
“otherwise normal persons” from those who should be institutionalized in asylums or jails (193-
4). In fact, the “normal” addict’s “strong desire” for the drug was seen as “a measure of his 
energy,” which could be redirected for the good of society (ibid.). 
13 Hansen and Roberts (2012) point to the way racial imagery has been used to shape the course 
of differential treatment modalities for opioid users. These treatments have vastly different 
temporalities, and occur in different spaces. Affluent and middle-class Whites have more access 
 259 
This brings us to other less medical meanings within the conception of addiction as 
chronically cycling. Cycling chronicity features centrally in both contemporary conceptions of 
addiction as a lifelong, relapsing brain disease and the “culture of poverty” theory of 
generationally reproduced cultural pathology, a theory that, while thoroughly critiqued in 
academic scholarship, cycles again and again through generations of U.S. policy. 
After the graduation ceremony in March 2015, I sat with Faye, the defense attorney on 
Judge Lazarus’s team, at the bar counter at Lito’s Burritos, a sprawling Mexican-themed 
restaurant near the court buildings. We talked about how Judge Lazarus’s court had a special 
program for youth (18-25 year olds) who only smoked marijuana. Faye explained to me that 
these younger defendants, mostly men, “aren’t addicts in the traditional sense.” “It’s more a 
lifestyle choice where they’re smoking weed, but selling harder drugs.” Faye told me: 
They haven’t finished high school, having kids way too young and, you 
know, what I see is something that is even generational where they don’t 
understand that there is another way to live – that there is something 
beyond having kids and going on public assistance to support those kids. 
You know, it’s what their parents did that they don’t seem to really 
understand that there is something – another course, where you get a real 
job on the books, and you’re getting healthcare insurance through an 
employer, and you’re setting an example for that child. They – honestly 
very sad that they don’t know that there is that alternative. They don’t 
                                                
to buprenorphine, prescribed monthly in private doctors’ offices, while poor and people of color 
often must wait six or seven days a week on lines at methadone clinics for their daily doses, 
which they must consume under surveillance. Police gather around the clinics looking to bring 
order to what appears as disorder. 
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know to call me by my surname rather than my first name – and that’s one 
of the first things I start teaching them by calling them Mr. Whoever and 
insist they call me by my surname. There is a whole other world where, 
you know, the behaviors are very different and the idea of success is very 
different. Uh, so that’s what we try to teach, you know, the younger 
segment who maybe didn’t finish school. We get them hooked up with 
services and once in a while the light bulb goes on and they go on to 
college and bigger and better things and sometimes- sometimes sadly not. 
But I’ve had those clients and their parents come in – or parent, usually 
it’s singular – who say “my tax dollars pay your salary,” not 
understanding that they’re not paying taxes [laughs]. They thought 
everyone is born with tax dollars – like monopoly money. They’re not 
understanding that you have to actually have a job to pay taxes to be part 
of this system where other people are getting assistance by virtue of what 
you’re paying in. Very, very sad that it’s– it’s so many generations of that 
at this point. 
Faye cites a vicious cycle of dependence: her young clients should aspire to get 
healthcare through an employer (as opposed to Medicaid), and to be tax payers, not ignorant and 
overly entitled recipients of public assistance, like their (single) parents are.14 Dependence and 
repetition emerge as the common sin of the “needy” – the poor, women, children, the sick, the 
disabled, and addicts (Dean 2010; Fraser and Gordon 1994). Drawing on Simone de Beauvoir’s 
                                                
14 Michelle Alexander (2010) argues that the prevalence of single mothers in working class 
communities of color can be explained in large measure by mass incarceration of men of color. 
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work, Fraser and Valentine (2008) point out that domestic and factory labor is seen, like 
addiction, as inherently repetitive.15 That is, addicts, women, and the poor are stuck in repetitive 
time while creation and innovation are supposedly active, agentive, masculine attributes.16 
Repetition and dependence may provide clues as to why her young clients are “addicts” even if 
not “in the traditional sense.” While they may not be users of “harder” drugs, these untraditional 
addicts possess other hallmarks of the addiction chronotope, Mikhael Bakhtin’s term for the way 
time, place, and personhood are mutually co-constructed in narrative.17  
Addiction has many places: it alters the brain receptors for dopamine and serotonin; it 
thrives at “rock bottom;” it courses through veins, is aspirated into lungs, absorbed into nasal 
membranes. In public discourse, addiction is represented as breeding – endemically, 
epidemically, pathologically – in the city streets of neighborhoods of color (Roberts 1997). 
Increasingly, discourse in the media tends to center on middle-class suburban prescription opioid 
use. But part of the standard narrative is that whiter suburban and rural areas are being infiltrated 
and contaminated by Black and Brown gangbangers from the inner cities, or from Mexico, El 
                                                
15 In fact, all jobs require repetitive labor. Repetitive motion injuries, like Carpal Tunnel 
syndrome, which affect white and no-collar workers and not only blue collar workers, is 
evidence of this. But there is an ideology of the repetitive Fordist or service worker that contrasts 
him or her with the free-wheeling innovation of “idea men.”  
16 Fraser and Valentine (ibid., 142) suggest that addiction’s association with femininity – through 
these qualities of dependence and repetition –  partly explains its stigmatization, and even its 
status as a meaningful problem. I cannot agree that addiction wouldn’t be a meaningful problem 
but for its feminization. People suffer with addiction beyond being stigmatized for it. But stigma 
deepens suffering, and invites violence, sickness, and death. 
17 Linguistic anthropologist Michele Koven (2013) finds Bakhtin’s concept of the chronotope 
useful to illuminate how chronotopes operate in “race talk” to redeem and emphasize a (White) 
speaker’s own virtuousness. Briefly, the racist individual is characterized as coming from 
elsewhere (in the U.S., this is often “the deep South” or rural, often impoverished areas), 
backward, anti-modern – a corruption of the correct progressive, linear temporality of spatialized 
time (Fabian 1983), where the progressive move through time is towards the metropoles. A 
danger of this is that it takes the focus off structural violence and institutionalized inequalities 
and places racism in the minds of “backwards” individuals (Hill 2008). 
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Salvador, Colombia (see Mendoza-Denton 2008, Moodie 2009, Zilberg 2011). And, part of the 
narrative of prescription opioid abuse involves the eventual turn to heroin, needles, and the 
streets. 
According to culture of poverty logics, dependence repeats on itself from generation to 
generation. Those who are born into maladaptive cultures of poverty are supposedly held back 
by their fatalism; they dangerously reject the idea that they can “take control of the future,” as 
court treatment center director Tony put it to the graduates. As Faye explained, the families of 
non-traditional addiction are composed of too-young, and often single, parents, whose children 
are destined – fated – to repeat their mistakes. In fact, the chronotope itself is beset by fatalism. 
According to its own cyclical logics, there is no bright future for Faye’s clients to envision.  
Yet, with her reference to the light bulb that may or may not go off in their minds, Faye 
repeated a widely-held conclusion that their failures are driven by their own fatalistic mentality. 
Isaiah told me that Marilyn, the resource coordinator in Judge Fierro’s court, said, “I guess the 
universe is working against you,” indicting him for a fatalistic outlook. Isaiah rejected this. In 
our interview, and way out of Marilyn’s earshot, he joked with me, “the universe isn’t working 
against me, [Marilyn,] you are.”18 
While the “culture of poverty” theory is credited to anthropologist Oscar Lewis in the 
1960s, the way he articulated his ideas was not new. His theory built on the scaffolding of an 
already existing “conceptual architecture” (a term I borrow from Valverde 2015). These ideas 
returned in then Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report, The Negro Family: The 
Case for National Action (the “Moynihan Report”).  As Roderick Ferguson (2003) and Cathy 
                                                
18 Isaiah said that while he was grateful for the opportunity to graduate without felony charges, 
drug court wasted “a whole lot of my time and money.” He still owed $1700 to his treatment 
program for drug tests, months after graduating. 
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Cohen (2004) both note, the Moynihan Report did not innovate, but merely served to further 
authorize an already hegemonic discourse about black difference as deviance. That they 
resonated so deeply is perhaps because they took up a prevailing commonsense about poor folks, 
and especially racialized poor families.  They rehearsed late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century eugenicist and social evolutionist ideas about maladaptive values and behaviors being 
passed down through the family. Lewis’s culture of poverty theory has been widely criticized by 
anthropologists since he introduced it, and continues to be, given the tenacity of its conceptual 
architecture in public policy and mainstream discourse (e.g., Leacock 1971; Rosas 2012; Stack 
1974; Waterston 1993). I’ll briefly review the theory, highlighting for this chapter its temporal 
dimensions as well as its resonances with hegemonic ideas about addiction and addicts.  
Lewis (1970) argued that Mexican and Puerto Rican families were stuck in a self-
perpetuating culture of poverty cycling through the generations, passed on through the children  
– a culture which is beset by machismo, violence, matri-focal families, “early initiation into sex,” 
alcoholism, psychological pathology (ibid., xxvi-vii), “and a general quality of emotional and 
intellectual superficiality” (Rigdon 1988, 297).  Lewis also returned again and again to this 
culture’s pathological “time orientations” (Lewis 1970, xxv), marked by “a predominant present-
time orientation, a tremendous impulsivity and acting out, with little effort to defer gratification 
and plan for the future” (Lewis writing in 1966 to then governor of Puerto Rico, quoted in 
Rigdon 1988, 296-97).  
Culture of poverty discourse continues to reverberate in the U.S. – not only in the drug 
courts, but certainly there too. Kerwin Kaye Brook (2013), studying a drug court in New York 
City, similarly found that a characterization of the “drugs lifestyle” pervading drug court 
discourse is pregnant with culture of poverty logics. In a webinar hosted by the National 
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Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), Dr. Kenneth Robinson, one of the founders 
of Moral Reconation TherapyTM, an evidence-based treatment used in criminal justice settings 
including in Judge Lazarus’s treatment court, said: “Believe it or not, most of our clients have 
never had or held any ten-year goals. Four to six percent had any one year goals other than 
getting out or getting off probation, getting away from criminal justice – not what we would call 
true pro-social one year goals.”  Robinson said that MRTTM works to “decrease pleasure-
seeking” among their clients, where pleasure-seeking is understood as an immoral basis for 
action. MRTTM operates from the presumption that defendants’ criminality is a product of an 
underdeveloped, immoral mentality, and one that is not sufficiently future-oriented. Consider the 
title of the MRTTM workbook: How to Escape Your Prison. It dares to intimate to prisoners that 
their prisons (the real prisons, the ones of their minds) are of their own making. 
MRTTM is based on the idea that defendants possess something called “criminal 
thinking.” Or, as resource coordinator Marilyn told defendant John, he would have to change his 
“stinkin’ thinkin’.”  Based on a developmentalist logic that there is a hierarchy of levels, or 
stages, of moral reasoning, if a defendant is mandated to MRTTM, it is supposed that he operates 
from a lower, morally inferior, level. Jackie explained: 
If someone scores high on criminal thinking - they have no 
accountability, all their problems are because somebody else, or 
because the cops are bad, or because they’re poor, or because– 
that, you know, and they blame others, they don’t accept 
responsibility for their actions, poor decision making, um, and 
there have been interventions developed like Moral Reconation 
Therapy or Thinking for a Change that actually change that, I 
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mean, that have been shown to change the way people think and 
make them more accountable. […] I mean, MRT, really– the 
research is amazing about how it, like, changes the way they think. 
Interventions like this and the drug court project in general seek to make people believe that they 
are individually responsible for conditions and problems that are rooted in centuries of racism 
and capitalism. Recalling the discussion of “magical thinking” spurred by Judge Lazarus’s 
remarks in Chapter 4, it is as if by claiming responsibility, people will actually become 
responsible. Like magic.  
These prevalent ideas about poverty, addiction, and criminality disregard the “regimes of 
dispossession” (Rosas 2012, 121) that materially disadvantage many drug court defendants and 
that, for instance, make it impossible for them to secure the kinds of jobs that Faye suggests they 
don’t have due to an inability or unwillingness to project themselves into optimistic futures. 
Ellen Moodie (2010, 173) illustrates how the disavowal of such histories obscures the knowledge 
that there are social and structural roots of violence, poverty, and crime in post-war El Salvador, 
converting this knowledge into “the long-circulated idea of criminality as the result of individual, 
willful, and perhaps even congenital, deviance.” Moodie notes a modern history of scientific 
theories that criminality is caused by biology. For instance, there was Cesare Lombroso, an early 
and highly influential Italian forensic anthropologist, who empirically identified criminals by the 
shapes of their skulls. The evidence he used was later discounted, of course. Contemporary 
theories that addiction is criminogenic share a legacy of tying crime to individual biology, rather 
than to structures of inequality. 
It has been well-documented that deindustrialization has vastly diminished opportunities 
for employment in U.S. cities, especially lower wage factory work that many working-class 
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people of color previously relied on for their livelihoods (Mullings 2003; Sassen 1991; 
Wacquant 2009). In fact, some scholars have theorized that deindustrialization has created a 
surplus population of an unemployed, racialized working class and that, whether by design or 
Band-Aid, ad hoc measures, the justice system – and the private sector – has swooped in to 
collect the surplus and warehouse them in prisons (Irwin 2005; Simon 2007).19  
  Blaming poverty and unemployment on a presumed lack of optimism and a failure of 
imagination seems particularly cruel (Berlant 2011), 20 and it is certainly an “immodest claim of 
causality” (Farmer 1999). Beyond job opportunities, the charge of misguided fatalism ignores the 
curtailed life chances of Black and Brown drug court defendants.  Resonant with directives to be 
patient, inciting defendants to be more optimistic disavows the ways histories of oppression and 
dispossession are lived into the present.21  
 
 
                                                
19 Leith Mullings (2003, 3-4) notes: 
These global transformations imposed upon communities require 
new, harsher mechanisms to maintain order and control. African 
Americans, who have a history of protest against structures of 
inequality, pose a particular threat. Such dissent has often been 
criminalized, and the boundaries between protest and crime are 
shifted as the occasion demands. 
20 As Lauren Berlant explains it, “Cruel optimism’ names a relation of attachment to 
compromised conditions of possibility” (2011, 21). She illustrates: 
the proximity of two kinds of cruel optimism: with little cultural or 
economic capital, and bearing the history of a racial disinheritance 
from the norms of white supremacy, you work yourself to death or 
coast to nonexistence; or, with the ballast of capital, you hoard 
against death, deferring life, until you die. […] there is no way out 
now, no living as if not in a relation to death, which is figured in all 
of the potential loss which precedes it.  
21 Alisse Waterston (2013, xvii) quotes James Baldwin’s assertion that “‘people are trapped in 
history and history is trapped in them.’” The question, for the anthropologist for instance, is how 
to reveal this, Waterston notes. 
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The promise of transformation 
Before Judge Lazarus grants the motion to dismiss, she defers again. It’s time to hear 
from today’s graduates, she says.  Three graduating defendants have been invited to speak. The 
third, Ling Chen, says that in China, she tried to become a good granddaughter, a good 
daughter, a good sister – and that she didn’t know who she was. At her rehabilitation program 
here in the States, she learned who she was. She got her GED. She was grateful, she said. Today, 
Ling says in closing, “[I have a] good future for myself.” Judge Lazarus steps forward once 
again and chides, “It took a year before Ms. [Chen] admitted she spoke English.”  
Judge Lazarus then tells the graduates, “Recovery has made you better people. It’s made 
our community better.” These lines reflect the individualism that informs the drug court – that 
through self-improvement, society will be improved, as opposed to the reverse. She continues, 
“Today you don’t take anyone for granted. Today, you are a blessing to yourselves. Today you 
are no longer defendants. The charges are dismissed.”  There is cheering and applause.  This is 
the culminating moment of graduation – what defendants have been waiting and working 




After two long years as a drug court defendant, Amanda, a nurse in her thirties who was 
being treated for opioid addiction, graduated on the same day as Frank. Judge Fierro fondly told 
Amanda, “You might be the most problematic participant we’ve ever had in this court.” It took a 
long time, the judge said, to get her to want for herself the life that they all – the team (the judge, 
the resource coordinator, the probation officer, the district attorney, her defense attorney) – 
wanted for her.  
At graduations in Judge Fierro’s court,22 each practitioner could say a few words about 
the graduate, and they would often recall something about how they were when they first arrived, 
the changes they made, and who they had become. But when Frank, the model participant whose 
only “slip” was the poppy seed incident discussed in Chapter 4, “Testing Care: Truth Games, 
                                                
22 Judge Fierro’s defendants do not graduate together in a group. When they have been deemed 
to have successfully completed their mandate, their graduation day is scheduled, and each 
defendant has his or own brief moment. 
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Confession, and Urine Trouble,” took the stage of the courtroom floor to graduate, remarks from 
the staff were sparing. Frank had more motivating words for his peers in the gallery than any of 
the court practitioners had for him. On graduation days, I often got a powerful sense of the 
prodigal son parable. Remarks tended to be longer and more heartfelt when a defendant had 
struggled. The wayward defendant who ultimately returned was more celebrated, perhaps even 
more beloved, than those who took the straight and narrow throughout their mandates. Isaiah had 
a similar experience. Court practitioners, including the judge, didn’t have many words for him: 
Isaiah: But as she [Judge Fierro] said, she didn’t get to know too 
much about me.  
EM: Uh huh, because you were pretty easy. 
Isaiah: Yeah, like, I went pretty much straight through, and um, 
that was my plan from the get, like, “you’re not gonna keep me 
here for longer than I need to be.” 
Gayle explained, “there is that bond when clients really have a lot of difficulty.” “But I 
do think that everybody feels so much prouder of them, relieved for them, and they feel also that 
they’ve accomplished more.” The prodigal son theme in drug court shows how deeply valued 
personal transformation is.   
In Judge Connelly’s court, there was little fanfare when a defendant graduated.  Judge 
Connelly wouldn’t descend from the bench to give out hugs like Judges Lazarus and Fierro did. 
Jerome missed the days when Judge Salcedo was at the bench and they ran graduation 
ceremonies, presumably where he could see on display the transformative effect he and his 
colleagues were having. I asked him, “Do you find this work fulfilling?” and he told me: 
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Jerome: It is. It is. It pays well. And I used to– we used to have 
graduations here. 
EM: Uh huh 
Jerome: And we stopped. 
EM: Mhm 
Jerome: For whatever reason. But it’s always nice when you see 
somebody crawl through that door and a year later, their 
transformation. It’s really nice. 
EM: Mhm 
Jerome: And- and especially during the course of that year when, 
you know, they’re walking away from here and cursing the shit 
outta you and calling you a bunch of names and then at the end 
they come and they hug you. 
EM: Mhm 
Jerome: And they say thank you or– I’ve had people shake my 
hand and say, “I’m glad that you told the judge to remand me.” 
EM: Hm 
Jerome: “Because I woke up and, you know, I realized, you know, 
from that point on I– I woke up and I did the right thing.”  
Jerome emphasized transformation from wrong to right. “It’s really nice” for court 
practitioners to see that transformation, especially, he says, when it is from “crawling in” to 
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walking out,23 from “cursing the shit outta” them to hugging and thanking them. Without 
graduations, Jerome misses out on these narratives of conversion.24 
Based on my observations, the drug court practitioners endorse – albeit tacitly – a theory 
of narrative that is shared widely among linguistic anthropologists, too (Ochs and Capps 1996, 
Wortham 2001c). Namely, it is that the ways people narrate their selves help to shape who they 
are and who they become. As Ellen Moodie argues (2010) the stories people tell come to shape 
subjectivity and the experience of lived life. That is, the self doesn’t precede its telling, it is 
produced through it. I don’t know that court practitioners would put it that way, but I found that a 
significant amount of the labor of treatment goes to disciplining the stories defendants tell about 
themselves, as have other ethnographers of drug treatment and drug treatment courts in a variety 
of settings in the United States (Cain 1991; Carr 2011; Nolan 2001; Weinberg 2000).  
When Judge Lazarus questioned defendants, as we have seen, the questions often aimed 
to get their stories straight - that is, straightening them out to conform to the orderly chronologic 
of a timeline. In so doing, defendants are disciplined to create story world selves of the past, for 
whom their present selves must take responsibility. Goal-setting exercises project that self into 
the future, making the defendant responsible for her future self as well.  E. Summerson Carr 
(2011, 12) writes: 
                                                
23 Resonances with both human development from infancy and human evolution are hard to 
miss. On my first day in Judge Connelly’s court, when I told the ADA on staff I was an 
anthropologist, she quipped that I could tell her “how people evolved…or whether they 
evolved.” 
24 The concept of conversion here is meant to capture the disciplinary work upon defendants 
toward conformity to ideologies of addiction and recovery and responsible self-hood than does 
the strong narrative of individual self-fulfillment or actualization. Conversion captures the 
spiritual aspect of redemptive time, and it gestures to the powerful work of standardizing Time 
by treating time as a singular convertible quantity to which all the world must conform (notably 
from one single line, but really point, in England – the objective, “Archimedean point” from 
which all modern, secular Time issues) (Helgesson 2014; Spivak 1999).   
 271 
[D]rug rehabilitation commonly revolves around rehabilitating the 
drug user’s relationship with language. Following linear plotlines 
that proceed from a denoted dirty past to an anticipated clean 
future, recovery narratives are the means by which millions of drug 
using Americans have practiced self-insight in their efforts to get 
sober. And for many thousands of practitioners, recovery 
narratives are also the very measure of this insight, and therefore 
the most highly valued signs of their professional efficacy.   
Indeed, prodigal defendants who finally return to court practitioners remorseful and 
changed provide many more signs of professional efficacy than defendants who skate through.  
Gayle even suggested that she and her colleagues wonder if they have been “betrayed” by 
defendants who didn’t struggle because it suggests that they didn’t really need the care after all.  
 
Turning over a new leaf 
The March 2015 program quotes Booker T. Washington, congratulates the graduates, and 
explains the symbolism of the “recovery tree” – a cardboard tree standing about 7 feet tall with 
paper leaves. It lives in the court’s in-house treatment center except on graduation days when it 
is brought to the courtroom. In advance of the ceremony, each defendant is asked to write on one 
side of a leaf a word or phrase that describes themselves when they entered the program, and on 
the other side, one that describes them now. After the dismissal, as the defendants are called up, 
they present their transformation to the onlookers. After each defendant reads from both sides of 
his leaf, it is pinned to the tree.  
 
Silas Thomson was “Confused; I thought I was living, getting drunk, running around, 
just being; no goals.” Now, “I’m focused.” 
 
The two words on Qusay Maasri’s leaf are “Lost” and “Alive.” 
 
Leroy Watkins was “Negative.” Now he’s “Positive.” “Everything I did didn’t amount to 
anything. I’m not King Midas, but now, everything I touch, I feel like it’s gold.” 
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Nicholas Anastas, a former marine, reads the two sides of his leaf: “Impatient.” 
“Focused.” 
 
Angel Robles says, “It was real bad. Now I’m very happy.” 
 
Samuel Jones, a Black man in his 50s, reads from his leaf.  One side says, “Menace to 
society.” The other side, “Wonderful.” He says, “I’ve established residence in a new state, a job 
is waiting for me, I’m going to start a new life.”  
 
Carlton Jefferson, a Black man in his 60s, says he was “Hopelessly addicted.” Now he’s 
“Clean and Sober.” 
 
Luis Lopez, in his 20s, reads from the two sides of his leaf: “Confused.” “Focused.” 
 
Stuart James, a West Indian man, says “I have a better way of thinking nowadays.” 
 
Ryan Wells was a “Full time junkie.” Now, “I consider myself productive.” 
 
Michael Wexler was “just a mess in every aspect of my life. Now my biggest 
accomplishment is, I’m a father” 
 
Rafael Moscoso says, “I was a bad person. I used to get high every day, selling drugs. 
Now I’m a good person.” 
 
Ling Chen, who spoke earlier, says she was “Nobody; I don’t know who I am. Now I’m 
myself.” 
 
Simon Polyanksi, a very tall White man in his twenties, says to Judge Lazarus, “You look 
nice in civilian clothes.” He says he was “a monster. I hated everything about this place. 
Especially the DA. Now I’m a role model to myself, my friends, my peers. Thank you to Judge 
[Lazarus]. As many chances as you gave me, I should have been under the jail.” Judge Lazarus 
goes to hug him. “I need higher heels,” she jokes.  
 
Jason Calhoun was “Lost.” “I didn’t know where I was going. I didn’t know what I 
wanted. Now I’m found. I know what I want to do with my life”.  
 
One side of Luz Hernandez’s leaf reads “Lost.” The other, “Focused.”  
 
George Pickett, a black man in his 30s was “pretty much hopeless. I’m on a road to 
nowhere. But Now I’m hopeful. I got a great future.” 
 
Victor Margolis’s leaf reads “A mess.” The other side, “Motivated.” 
 




Heriberto Santiago was “a mess; punching holes everywhere. Today, I got my life back.” 
 
On Raul Figueroa’s leaf are the words “Destroyed” and “Grateful.” 
 
Raekwan Johnson was “Angry.” He was “pissed off.” He “didn’t like to follow rules” at 
his program. He “got into trouble.” Now, “I’m grateful. I wouldn’t have finished school.” 
 
Lawrence James was “Hopeless;” he “didn’t want to listen to nobody. I just wanted to 
smoke.” Now, “I achieve.” 
 
One of the speakers from earlier, Yesenia Guevara, a Latina in her forties, says she was 
“Broken and all alone.” Now, “a Wonderful, beautiful, courageous woman.” 
 
The leaf of a last graduate, Jane Simmons, has the words “Terribly broken” and “I’m 
hopeful.” 
 
The Recovery Tree ritual is an exercise in conversion narration. As graduates, defendants 
are asked to stand in judgment of their past selves. That is, instead of being asked to write on the 
“before” side of the leaf on the day they pled guilty and signed contracts to initiate their 
treatment court mandates, they write on both sides of these leaves on the morning of graduation. 
From this privileged moment, they look back with presumably clearer vision on their pasts.  
Only once the dismissal of their charges is finalized, the pivotal moment of “graduation,” do they 
read these leaves aloud to a courtroom public. In the conversion narrative, the narrator is both 
continuous with the former self and discrete, where the former, story-world (sinful) self is 
contrasted with the present, narrating (saintly) self who is the author/speaker of the story. In 
confessional literature, this reduplication and separation of the self provides “an Archimedean 
point from which the story of that former self may be judged with apparent objectivity and 
detachment” (Freccero 1986, 20).25 While some of these conversion narratives follow the 
“Amazing Grace” plot (i.e., I once was lost, but now I’m found), many of them speak more to 
                                                
25 Hill and Zepeda (1993) also note that when a speaker establishes a moral point or a claim in a 
story world, they tend to be viewed as more objective. 
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hope and deferral. Defendants said they were now hopeful, motivated, focused, ready to start a 
new life. They embraced the future orientation that practitioners have encouraged, but many of 
them speak to a transformation that has not yet occurred. 
In his study of drug courts, James Nolan (2001, 124) observes that defendants “are 
expected to accept a particular worldview, a particular understanding of themselves, and they are 
expected to express this understanding according to therapeutically defined categories. Not 
telling the right story, moreover, is also interpreted in therapeutic terms.” That person will be 
seen as “being in denial, as not complying, as not buying in to treatment. Failure to tell the right 
story can have serious consequences.” This means that, as I showed in Chapter 4, there is limited 
room for creative play with these conversion narratives. 
But not all defendants fully enact the ritual. Instead of “I was lost. Now, I’m found.”  
Some say something like “I have ‘lost’ and then ‘found’” or similarly, “I put ‘lost’ and then I put 
‘found.’” They indicate that they completed the exercise, but they are not prepared to enact the 
full measure of diachronic conversion. The tense of “I put” is ambiguous or ambivalent and “I 
have” situates the whole narrative in the present. Perhaps they are narrating (recent) past selves 
who wrote on two sides of this leaf, or present selves following orders. Either way, there is no 
rupture. They reject the ritual of diachronic self-objectification. The narratives authorized by 
drug court shape beliefs, understandings, what is imaginable, and how people live their lives, but 
not completely.   
 
Conclusion 
I asked Faye if she thought some graduating defendants hadn’t really changed and were 
just telling the staff what they wanted to hear. Faye told me about her “pants indicator.”  If a 
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defendant wore his pants sagging low at his graduation ceremony, it was a “tell.”  “I know I’m 
gonna see them again,” she said. For Faye, sagging pants were the future made evident. They 
told of relapse, recidivism, rearrest, return, evoking the “revolving door” of the criminal justice 
system. This might serve as a reminder that evidence points to different conclusions for 
differently positioned interpreters as discussed in Chapter 3, “Beyond Effective: Thinking Ethics, 
Rethinking Evidence.” But more importantly, it is a reminder that the conclusions drawn from 
evidence (and whether something is taken as evidence in the first place) are immediately tied to 
the goals (ethical or otherwise) of the interpreter, as I have demonstrated throughout this 
dissertation. 
Faye continued, “We don’t sweat it, because while they just had a felony dismissed, if it 
wasn’t a sincere effort, we’ll see them again and they’ll face the consequences next time.”  She 
explained further why this is a tell that their transformation wasn’t authentic, and why she knows 
she will see them again: 
If I can’t get them to pull up their pants then, while they’re in court 
[…] then chances are they’re not gonna be successful because to me, 
it’s a walking reason for police to stop someone. It’s not probable 
cause, but it’s certainly, you know, something that police would 
look at in terms of “is this somebody who’s respectable” or maybe 
[inaudible] “will this be an easy arrest” [inaudible] and, you know, 
I think they make themselves a target; it becomes self-fulfilling, you 
know, they are basically wearing a bullseye and they get stopped 
and [inaudible] if they’re holding, they get that new arrest. 
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 Faye links her job in drug court directly with a project of liberal citizen-making. For 
Faye, pulling up their pants, or tightening their belts, amounts to consent to the terms of 
governance. In full acknowledgement that discriminatory policing practices will make them 
targets, young Black and Brown men and women must pull up as part of their consent. If they 
don’t consent, and don’t agree to play by the rules of a discriminatory game, they haven’t really 
changed in the way they were supposed to.  
Faye also conveys a sense that the drug court has a synergistic relationship with police. If 
it wasn’t a sincere effort on the part of a defendant, if they didn’t really change, the system will 
catch up with them. This rectificatory sense of justice is the justice of a trial. It frames drug court 
as a test, albeit one that can be cheated on. No matter, though, because the whole system of 
criminal justice will ensure that things will eventually be made right, and the guilty will be 
punished. As I have argued, bringing this sense of justice to bear on a space of treatment contorts 
the goals of care in some potentially damaging ways.  More disturbingly, it shows how 
discriminatory policing is seen by some as an integral piece of justice itself.  
As Didier Fassin (2015, 4) argues, the state “is simultaneously embodied in the 
individuals” who comprise and enact it, “and inscribed in a temporality.”  Further, the 
individuals who comprise and enact the state also work to inscribe temporality, sometimes 
disavowing the multiple temporalities produced by the vicissitudes of life on treacherously 
uneven ground. The court’s “objective” standards are ill-equipped to account for the uneven 
times of differently positioned defendants. These are temporalities set into motion by the 
chronotopic ideologies of how defendants live through time, as addicts, as poor people of color, 
as criminals. And they are temporalities set into motion by the scramble of being required to 
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chase down resources and opportunities that are scarcely available while being told to patiently 
wait for them. 
For many, addiction does repeat; poverty is intractable; it is hard to get out and stay out 
of the criminal justice system. But the reasons why are important. What these “cycles” have in 
common is that the individuals caught up in them are blamed and held responsible for them. The 
full brunt of illicit and licit globalized markets, the cumulative effects of over a century of racial 
discrimination in housing, policing and punishing, employment, and healthcare, and centuries of 
systematic racial dispossession and class inequality comes down on individual shoulders, or is 
imagined to originate all in their heads. Or if these massive systems of structural violence 
(Farmer 1999) are acknowledged, the blame lies in an individual’s inability to simply overcome 
or to accept them and just “move on.” This “optimistic” sense that with hard work and 
determination defendants can be empowered to overcome lacks the kind of historical 
consciousness that many defendants bring to their horizons of expectation (Koselleck 2004) 
when they are said to not be optimistic enough. 
I offer a final thought about the implications of the celebration of the “prodigal child” in 
drug court. To me, the greater show of affection and admiration shown to defendants who 
fought, resisted, and faltered suggests that a defendant’s struggle and adversity with the court 
practitioners actually engenders more care, intimacy, and affection. If this is the case, it suggests 
that a different valuation might be placed on noncompliance. Noncompliance feeds the intimacy 
of relationships in drug court, while compliance doesn’t. By the court practitioners’ own logic, 
defendants often come to them bereft of care (or victims of inadequate, especially “enabling” or 
“co-dependent” care). The effect of “noncompliance” is to proliferate care. It draws care to 
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defendants and implicates court practitioners in their circles of care. Instead of being punished, 





CARVING OUT A SPACE OUTSIDE THE BINDS OF JUSTICE FOR CARE,  
AND FOR MERCY 
 
 
For the colonized subject, objectivity is always directed against 
him  
– Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 2007 [1963], 37 
 
 
It is not impossible to imagine society so conscious of its power 
that it could allow itself the noblest luxury available to it, – that of 
letting its malefactors go unpunished. […] Justice, which began by 
saying ‘Everything can be paid off, everything must be paid off ’, 
ends by turning a blind eye and letting off those unable to pay, – it 
ends, like every good thing on earth, by sublimating itself. The self-
sublimation of justice: we know what a nice name it gives itself – 
mercy; it remains, of course, the prerogative of the most powerful 
man, better still, his way of being beyond the law. 
– Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 2006 [1887], 
48 
 
In the final days of writing this dissertation, another verdict in a case prosecuting a police officer 
for the shooting and killing of a Black man during a “routine traffic stop” came down. Officer 
Yanez was not guilty, said the jury, for having fatally shot Philando Castile beside his partner 
and her young daughter. Immediately following the shooting, Minnesota Governor Dayton had 
publicly deplored the officer’s actions: “Would this have happened if those passengers would 
have been White? I don’t think it would have.”  But a year later, the jury was tasked with 
ensuring that justice be done. They did not have to determine if Yanez was in fact the shooter; 
that was clear and uncontested. The question put to them was whether Yanez should bear the 
responsibility (and guilt) for Castile’s death depending on whether his shooting of Castile was 
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“objectively reasonable.” And the jury determined that it was, like many juries have before in 
similar cases, and will do again.  
I’ll stop short of providing evidence of Castile’s humanity, and what makes his a 
grievable life (Butler 2004). As Lisa Cacho (2012) and Gilberto Rosas (2012) have both 
demonstrated in different ways, to “humanize” risks defining the terms of humanity, and 
deepening the marginalization of those not legible as human on those terms. As a White woman, 
it would be deeply problematic for me to resuscitate the humanity of this dead Black man. But I 
must point out that Yanez’s defense relied in part on some troubling evidence: that Castile had 
THC, the psychoactive chemical in marijuana, in his system at the time of the shooting. This fact 
became evidence for some that Castile’s life was dispensable, his murder reasonable.  
In their recent volume Competing Responsibilities, Susanna Trnka and Catherine Trundle 
(2017,18) write, “What we take to be the rational rule of law often entails considerable levels of 
violence against those who are governed” (citing Talal Asad 2003).  Many have observed, in 
different political contexts, at different times, a similar phenomenon (e.g. Patricia Hill Collins 
[2000], Frederick Douglass [2000 (1852)], Frantz Fanon [1963], Muhammad Khalil Gibran 
[2011], Gayatri Spivak [1988]).  But, the rub is that a “subjective” basis for justice would not 
necessarily be better.   
Mark Kelman (1994) points to the danger of a subjective standard of reasonableness, 
where a jury would be instructed to determine guilt or innocence based on the subjective state of 
the perpetrator at the time of the crime, not against some objective standard, equally applied to 
all. In a pedagogical exercise with his law students, Kelman presents two cases. In one, after 
repeated beatings, in fear of her life and future beatings, a woman kills her husband in his sleep 
when he posed no immediate threat to her. In the other, in fear of a Black man’s perceived 
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dangerousness, a White man kills him.1 Kelman’s conservative students want to convict the 
abused woman and exonerate the racist man; left-leaning students want to exonerate the woman 
and condemn the White man. Kelman’s exercise complicates a binary notion of objective versus 
subjective, and leave questions of justice open like a wound. Troublingly, given the recent 
verdict on the objective standard in the case against Yanez, either standard would exonerate 
Yanez. Neither standard seems to recognize Castile’s as a “grievable life” (Butler 2004). 
Yet, as Nietzsche’s words in the epigraph to this concluding chapter, and their appeal 
over the years to various fascist, White supremacist movements, should remind us, there is also 
grave danger in relinquishing the goals of justice. In truth, any practice, well intentioned or not, 
can become compromised and harmful. What I take from Nietzsche is that a critical analysis of 
power could inform a more merciful society. 
Questions of justice vex drug court practitioners as they seek to balance the principles 
and priorities of the justice system with treatment and a practice of good care. James Nolan 
(2001, 205) argues that the debate around the efficacy of drug courts misses the larger point. 
“The more important question,” he continues, “is what effect does a preoccupation with efficacy 
have on the meaning of justice.” As Nolan (2001) points out, opposition to the criminalization 
and punishment of drug crime is often based on the question of just deserts, one of the most 
fundamental questions in philosophical justifications of punishment. Does the punishment fit the 
crime? Judge Lazarus suggested to me that most critics of drug courts simply do not think drugs 
should be criminalized: “But, you know, they really just believe in legalized drugs, so their 
                                                
1 Kelman’s example, he points out, is somewhat like, but not quite as egregious as, the 1984 case 
in which Bernhard Goetz shot four Black teenage boys who he believed were mugging him in 
the subway of New York City. Goetz was found not guilty on all charges except for unlicensed 
carry of a firearm. 
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criticisms are really about that.” This dismissive framing risks ignoring the deeply philosophical 
and ethical nature of this position. The principle of just deserts is that the punishment should be 
proportional to the crime – to the crime as an act, that is, and not the whole being of the 
“criminal.” Just deserts comes out of the retributivist theory of punishment, ascribed to by 
Immanuel Kant (1965) and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1942). Kant and Hegel considered 
“forward-looking” theories of punishment (like rehabilitation or deterrence), which treat the 
offending actor “either as a harmful animal who has to be made harmless, or with a view to 
deterring and reforming him” (Hegel 1942, 71 quoted in Nolan 2001, 157) to be dehumanizing. 
Some have suggested that drug courts do not emerge from the rehabilitative ideal that 
Kant and Hegel deplored, but from a new jurisprudential model that focuses on “therapy” (Hora, 
Schma, & Rosenthal 1999; Nolan 2001). As spaces of therapeutic practice, then, drug courts aim 
to be primarily spaces of care, but they have a long way to go toward achieving this. 
Accordingly, I have sought ways in this study to rethink certain drug court practices and 
arrangements, not to restore the principles of criminal justice that they are said to warp, but to 
enhance the principles of care that guide their practice.  
Drug court practitioners want to be effective in their work. “Coercion works,” Judge 
Lazarus told a room full of providers, community organizers, and academics at a conference I 
attended. Perhaps she was being a bit subversive. Autonomy is such a prized American ethic, 
especially in the context of treatment. I’ve since read this intentionally prickly line in other pro-
drug court pieces. But I find it somewhat disingenuous. After all, drug court is presented to 
defendants as a “choice” (in a tightly limited field of options).  More to the point, drug court is 
not aptly likened to what are sometimes involuntary medical interventions like quarantine, 
mandatory testing, or directly observed therapy. Drug court does not respond primarily to the 
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problem of addiction. It does not pull addicts off the street and force them into treatment. It 
responds primarily to the serious problem of incarcerating addicts instead of treating them. Drug 
court filters through those arrested to find the ones who might be regarded as deserving of an 
alternative to prison because of what is considered to be an illness. Drug court is not so much 
involuntary treatment as it is a potential way out of prison and its devastating, lifelong collateral 
consequences (Allard 2006; Davis, 2008; Freudenberg, 2002; Howell 2009).  
Of course, there is nothing ideal about this arrangement. Many defendants who end up in 
drug court in the United States were disconnected from good, accessible, responsive, and 
respectful healthcare before they arrived in a courtroom. Drug court proponents argue that the 
arrest is a key moment for treatment. In 1996, the National Institute of Justice stated: “It must not 
escape our attention that the criminal justice system may represent the best opportunity these 
individuals will ever have to confront and overcome their drug use” (quoted in Kaye Brook 
2010, 82).  When I worked in needle exchange, I would sometimes meet people who said they 
got the best medical or psychiatric care in prison or jail. A coworker whose fathomless critical 
insight and shrewd historical consciousness epitomized what Samuel K. Roberts calls “harm 
reduction of color critique”2 pointed out that this was less evidence that prison and jail are not so 
bad after all, and more a devastating indictment of a society in which certain people fall so far 
through the cracks that they don’t receive decent care until they are in cages. If the “crisis 
moment” of arrest (see NADCP 1997) is the best opportunity the state can find to provide care to 
the most precarious, then state must do better. If “coercion works,” it should be a reminder that 
                                                
2 See Kirsten West Savali. “The Scholar: Samuel K. Roberts Jr. on Drug Policy, Radical 




drug court defendants, in various states of precarity, “fear the state as well as implore it, dread its 
punishment as well as demand its assistance” (Fassin 2015, 3).  
Drug court has the potential to work for some, maybe many, defendants not so much 
because it seizes on a captive moment to coerce people into treatment, but because it provides a 
rare exit point from the criminal justice system. As I have made in clear in previous chapters, 
drug courts thus perform a sorting function within the population of criminal defendants. Those 
who can be reformed according to the terms of responsible citizenship are given mercy, while 
those who cannot or do not reform are locked away; those who can ultimately abstain from drugs 
for a set time are set free, while those who cannot are imprisoned. This echoes the paradox of 
mainstream recovery models – that the addict is expected to overcome her addiction through her 
will power, while addiction is seen as a disease of the will. Mariana Valverde (1997, 252) argues 
that this paradox is a fundamental paradox of liberalism itself – that while said to be born free, 
people – others more than some – have to be “made free through training for autonomy.” Drug 
courts offer such training (another resonance with the benevolent and paternalistic – and racist – 
civilizing mission of colonialism) (Stoler 2001; Summers 2010; Vrecko 2010). The biopolitics of 
this sorting are deeply problematic – antithetical to a broader ethic of accessible care and radical 
recovery. 
Historian Samuel K. Roberts3 explains: 
                                                
3 “Radical Recovery: The Social and Political Roots of Lincoln Detox & NADA.” Presentation 
given at National Acu-Detox Association Annual Meeting Albuquerque, New Mexico; 7 May 





Historically, Radical Recovery is the critical political stance that 
problems of drug abuse derive from local and global political and 
economic arrangements of (often racial) capitalism. […] Emerging 
in the late 1960s, “Radical Recovery” was usually grounded in a 
deep critique of U.S. domestic and foreign drug policy; and as well 
in an analysis of race, class, and urban underdevelopment. […] 
Part of Radical Recovery is also the foundational notion that 
recovery from addiction can and should be accessible to all.  
That said, I am convinced that a more effective and more ethical drug policy than we 
currently have in the U.S. would involve decriminalization, and broad and comprehensive access 
to an array of different forms of compassionate treatment and care as well as other vital 
resources.  Yet, with the current Attorney General Sessions threatening to intensify the War on 
Drugs that seemed to be losing some ground in recent years, and President Trump lauding 
Philippine President Duterte for his policy of putting drug users and sellers to death, a radical 
change towards mercy in the drug laws does not appear to be on the immediate horizon. So, for 
now, I suggest that treatment courts could attempt to make a real break with the logics and 
practices of the justice system.  
 
The care of primary vulnerability 
Attorneys working at Just Defenders in Judge Connelly’s jurisdiction told me there was a 
sticker on one of the desks in the drug court that proclaimed, “Treatment works.” “You 
motherfuckers don’t actually believe that treatment works,” one attorney said of the treatment 
court practitioners. I think the attorneys’ sense that the drug court practitioners did not actually 
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believe that treatment works emerged from the court practitioners’ own doubt, which I discussed 
at length in Chapters 1 and 4. Their doubt of defendants also reveals a not-so-hidden doubt about 
whether treatment works. As I argued in Chapter 1, it is as if defendants are on trial to determine 
whether they are recovering or not. In this way, practitioners fall back on the logics and practices 
of justice, not care. There is a strong doubt about treatment, a certainty about justice, and an 
anxiety about mercy. As Judge Lazarus said to me, nobody seems to ever ask, does prison work? 
Yet treatment is subject to scrutiny and doubt. 
 The intensity of the Just Defenders’ epithet also evinced their deep dissatisfaction with 
the care they saw the treatment court providing. The “bind of radically inadequate care” in drug 
courts, in Judith Butler’s words, consists in the fact “that attachment is crucial to survival and 
that, when attachment takes place, it does so in relation to persons and institutional conditions 
that may well be violent, impoverishing, and inadequate.” Butler’s bind of radically inadequate 
care recall’s Gregory Bateson’s (1972) concept of the “double bind,” which has at its core this 
vulnerable being who requires care but receives conflicting signals about how to obtain it. She 
cannot ask her caretaker which of his contradictory messages she must follow to receive his 
nurturing, like the defendant perceived as a sociopath for his letter requesting treatment. The 
public defenders felt that the drug court offered inadequate care, but they maintained that it could 
be otherwise. 
In addition to defining vulnerability, as most humanitarian “regimes of care” sort out the 
vulnerable from others deemed unworthy of aid (see Ticktin 2011), vulnerability is a condition 
that the drug court’s regime of care also imposes on defendants. What if recovery (when viewed 
as something that demands total abstinence), instead of being seen as all positive movement 
towards better life, could also be recognized as a loss? No matter that the loss might be of a 
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problematic relation, for what relation is without problems and compromised conditions of 
possibility (Berlant 2011)? When I worked in needle exchange, I knew a kind, intelligent, and 
funny woman who would refer to heroin as her husband, her beloved. Heroin had been by her 
side for decades, helping her through times of scarcity, of oppression, giving her joy and 
pleasure, and also pain. A person who comes to depend on a drug faces a loss when she has to 
give it up. It hurts. The pain of withdrawal is a pain that undoes her. Drug use may become a 
compromised relation for some, but only after it has become a kind of sustenance. Quitting, or 
abstaining, is a loss. 
And then there is more loss still. Defendants plead guilty and waive rights to enter 
treatment court. They lose their powers of self-defense. They become somewhat defenseless. 
They are forced to make themselves vulnerable in this way so that they can access care instead of 
punishment. And then they are exposed, week after week, month after month, even year after 
year; intimate aspects of their lives and their bodies, traces of their morality, integrity, honesty, 
and will, are laid bare in open court before their superiors and fellow defendants (and an 
ethnographer!). 
When I asked Gayle, “Why do you think people are so resistant to [admitting to 
relapse]?” She said, “Oh! I– I know totally for myself.” She continued, “Because when you’re 
being judged, it’s sometimes very hard to admit that you faltered.”  She said, “And– and these 
are people– you know, and I can relate a lot to the clients in so many ways, but one of the ways 
is that feeling of vulnerability that’s very present in me, and it’s very present in them. And some 
of the toughest, toughest appearing people in our program– the meanest, scariest people– are the 
really most tender people. And it’s very difficult for them to just utter the words. Sometimes 
they’re so shamed, and they’re so fearful that they’re going to develop a reputation with the 
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judge that they’re never going to be able to overcome. They just can’t do it.” And of course, this 
fear is borne out of the evidence, from observing judgment come down on themselves and 
others, from the stigma against drug users, and from their criminalization. 
Starting from this place of shared vulnerability that Gayle touches on, drug court 
defendants should be treated with a care that “starts out from the fleshiness and fragility of life” 
(Mol 2008, 13). In other words, this vulnerability demands a response. It calls out for responsive 
care. Judith Butler asks, how do we negotiate vulnerability? And she answers that perhaps there 
is a way to live in the face of vulnerability and loss through mutual responsibility, “such that one 
becomes neither affectively dead nor mimetically violent, a way out of the circle of violence 
altogether. This possibility has to do with demanding a world in which bodily vulnerability is 
protected without therefore being eradicated and with insisting on the line that must be walked 
between the two” (Butler 2004, 42). 
Drug court defendants embody a primary vulnerability as they embark on a new chance 
at living. Their success depends on receiving good care. It depends on how “recovery” is defined 
– on whose terms. Drug court practitioners demand that defendants fight the strongest cravings, 
endure the most severe pain (both from withdrawal sickness and from the enduring pains that in 
some cases oriented them towards drugs in the first place), and forgo their greatest source of 
pleasure, calm, or wellbeing, through heroic acts of sheer “will power.” And they are expected to 
do this in the face of profound loss, the trauma of arrest and incarceration, and under threat of 
further punishment. I have argued that this is all in a vain attempt to enforce a concept of 
individual recovery that has severe limits.  
A finding of drug court evaluators Cissner, Rempel, Franklin et al. (2013) is vital to heed:  
 289 
maximizing graduation rates may be important, since it is primarily 
the graduates who contribute to drug courts’ net positive impact. It 
is possible that over-programming drug court participants through 
highly taxing graduation requirements, resulting in a lower 
graduation rate and fewer participants who avoid jail or prison at 
the end of their participation, may yield worse outcomes than 
policies that enable achieving a higher graduation rate.   
While the authors couch this in perhaps overly cautious language, this finding supports a vision 
of “radical recovery,” which Samuel Roberts has identified as part of a harm reduction of color 
critique. A radical recovery would not take the individual as its prime target for change.  
 
Changing lives 
Months after my fieldwork came to an end, I ran into Gayle outside of a grocery store. 
She worried that she and her colleagues had been hearing that a lot of graduates had been 
rearrested or had relapsed. Several months before that, I had asked Karen, the other defense 
attorney on Judge Fierro’s team, “So, do you feel like it’s [drug court is] generally successful?” 
She replied: 
I think so. I mean, I’m happy when somebody graduates. You 
know, it’s– it’s very, um, it’s very sad when we see someone gets 
rearrested when they’re in the program or they graduated and they 
get rearrested. Um, you know, it’s an emotional kind of a thing.  
Maybe it shouldn’t be, because I’m supposed to be the stoic 
attorney, but it’s, you know, when you lose somebody, it’s 
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upsetting. Especially when you really believed, like, “Oh this 
person’s going to make it. They’re going to be good.”  
Karen reminds us how being in the role of a care-giver can often engender strong feelings of care 
as she indicates her ambivalence about the drug court’s effectiveness. 
Months into their mandates, Sam and Amanda had become close friends. A nurse who 
had lost her hospital job because of her opioid addiction, Amanda worked as a caretaker for 
Sam’s aging mother. Within days after Amanda’s graduation, Sam couldn’t reach her. She 
wouldn’t return his calls, and she seemed to be actively avoiding him. He thought she must be 
using again. He vividly described her life outside of drug court on the phone with me as he 
pictured her holed up in the marble bathroom attached to her bedroom in her parents’ home, 
shutting out the world with pills. He worried that her parents would have no idea she was using 
again. He worried she would die. He said the underlying issues that had led her to start using, the 
pain of her personal history, were never addressed while she was in drug court. Recasting the 
sense that problematic drug use is a disease, here it becomes the medicine for the deeper pains of 
life. The pharmakon. Or perhaps Amanda didn’t relapse after her graduation, but instead sought 
to put drug court entirely behind her, to make it history, breaking off from friends associated 
with that experience. As I noted in the Introduction, my friendships with defendants began to 
wane in the months after their graduations, and I’ve always speculated that this could be why. 
Drug court is not “real life.”  
Many defendants crave change in their lives. But what kind of deep and lasting change 
does personal transformation4 alone promise?   
                                                
4 The primacy of self-transformation is a trend which scholars have identified as part of our 
contemporary moment’s shift from mid-twentieth century’s medicalization to late century’s 
“biomedicalization” (Clarke et al. 2003) and a “politics of life itself” (Rose 2007). 
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One morning toward the end of my fieldwork, Judge Fierro announced to the courtroom 
that a recent graduate had been killed. She reserved the details. But overcome with emotion, she 
quietly rose from the bench, excusing herself. The courtroom was unusually silent. A few 
minutes later, the Judge was able to return, solemn and somewhat stooped by grief.    
Someone told me the surveillance footage had played on the local news the evening 
before. Later, with some hesitation, I sought it out online. In the quiet security footage, barely 
perceptible, a driver waits in a car at the corner of a relatively bustling city street. People come 
and go, nothing unusual. Then, a woman steps off the curb in front of the car. The car accelerates 
at full speed; the woman is slammed against the windshield.  It all happens in an instant.  
Over lunch a few weeks later, Gayle and I talked about this woman who had “had a 
fascinating story in diversion.” Gayle explained, “She was a very taciturn woman. Nasty, nasty, 
nasty.” But then, something changed. Her counselor at her program said something hurtful about 
her appearance during group therapy. When she told Marilyn, the treatment resource coordinator, 
Gayle said that Marilyn stood up for her: “You know what, that’s actually no way to talk to 
somebody.”  And they switched her into a different program.  Suddenly, “there was a whole 
change of her attitude and she would smile where she never smiled before,” Gayle said. “So one 
day I was talking to her and I said, ‘You know, you’re so wonderful [now]. What do you 
attribute your change in attitude?’ She said, ‘You know what? This is the first time in my life 
where I think people like me. I think they really like me over there. And so, you know what, I’m 
sort of feeling like I like me now.’”  As Gayle relayed this story, her grief literally interrupted her 
as tears swelled in her eyes and her throat tightened. 
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EM: I was really, um, struck, moved when the Judge did announce 
the death of the woman and got obviously choked up. That's um, 
that's huge emotional investment, then- this job. 
Gayle: It is! It is. I mean, I feel. It is a very– and to see of– of all 
the people, her. It was like a hard luck– The whole deal. First, 
feeling that she was not liked. Then feeling that– then she needed 
back surgery that interrupted this and you know she said that, “I’m 
not gonna take any medication, I’m not gonna,” and she didn’t. 
EM: Wow. 
Gayle: And then she got right back. She was so determined to 
make this work for her and she was so– you could see she was so 
proud of herself that for something like that to happen, and we all 
saw the tape, you know, and we– […] And it is very sad, but for 
her, it’s especially sad because she was such really a tender soul 
and it had finally– she had finally gotten to that point in life where 
that could come out. 
EM: Yeah. 
The violent ending of this woman’s life is saddening on its own, and there is something deeply 
moving about this story of a tragic hero who dies just as she finds love. But Gayle’s story also 
speaks to the parallax view of care (Žižek 2006), seen differently from different perspectives.  
Court practitioners may impose a particular ideology of how defendants should feel and express 
care, an ideology that, as I argued in the Introduction, also justifies to court practitioners their 
paternalistic decisions to reform, discipline, and punish defendants as exercises of care.  
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But as Gayle continued, she wondered aloud if the personal transformations that drug 
courts celebrate are all to the good: 
And actually, some of us were talking about it and we had asked 
our– each other, you know, maybe if she had stayed a hard, nasty 
woman, maybe she’d be alive today because maybe– maybe she 
revealed something of her vulnerability that this woman [her killer] 
felt meant she could be taken, um, you know, so yeah, that was 
very hard.  
Gayle’s concern speaks beyond this one woman’s history. It raises questions about the 
relevance of the transformation sought, and perhaps sometimes achieved, in drug courts to 
defendants’ “real lives.” This also raises questions about how relevant and sustainable the drug 
court model of treatment is for defendants when they graduate or are terminated from the court. 
Drug courts emphasize personal transformation of individual drug court defendants. But 
Sandrine and many of her peers crave institutional and societal change.  Members of the drug 
user coalition I met with in May 2015 articulated a strong indictment of the state’s devaluation of 
their lives. Amos called some of the current criminal justice and drug policies “archaic and 
barbaric,” turning the modernist temporal dichotomy back on the state. “We’re so far behind,” he 
said. “And our police department, the diversion programs [like drug treatment courts] – how can 
they really work in [this city] if our – those that’s in power have the attitudes from the 1940s and 
1950s. […] They still on- on that mentality. So that– that thinking, that type of thinking that they 
have, we need to change.” Amos turned the logic that marginalization is “a state of mind”5 on its 
                                                
5 Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in the Trump Administration Ben Carson, 
recently theorized, “Poverty is a state of mind.” 
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head, challenging the many interventions, like I described in Chapter 5, that seek to “cognitively 
restructure” his fellow users. 
Amos went on to talk about what he sees as a progressive devaluation of Black and 
Brown life over time, turning the narrative of progress around.6 “Now they just straight 
murdering people in our community.” Sandrine, who was at this meeting and was a graduate of 
Judge Lazarus’ court, added, “I think they also- because they’ve forgotten that people are 
human.” Amos called out “Respect” to convey his agreement. Sandrine continued: 
Yeah, they don’t treat us like humans anymore. They feel like, you 
know, if you’re using [drugs], you’re not human. […] And maybe if 
they would change some of the ways they think – you know, give 
them more training— 
“Exactly!” someone chimed. Sandrine continued: 
 —on how to be a – how to treat people as a human.[…] There’s a 
lesson for them there too. 
With this, Sandrine offered an implicit critique of efforts to train drug users to be more human, 
suggesting the need for training is among those who refuse to see their humanity. Since 
Sandrine’s moving words proceeded from Amos’s remarks about police shootings, I asked her if 
she was mostly referring to police officers and not to drug courts. “Everything is under the same 
umbrella,” she said, indicating that dehumanization pervades the institutions that racialized drug 
users are subject to. 
                                                
6 See Samuel K. Roberts’ (2009, 98) monograph Infectious Fear, which provides examples of 
how Black Doctors used the rhetoric of Progressive Era ethic “to expose white Progressives’ 
hypocrisy” in “a calculated rhetorical strategy to combat white supremacy” (ibid., 263 n. 37).   
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Sandrine, Amos, and the members of their coalition expressed outrage at several violent, 
if in their own ways “effective,” drug policies that primarily effect working class and people of 
color: the forced sterilization of drug using women, the termination of parental rights for drug 
using mothers, and government contracts with privatized prisons and prison services that 
promise to keep prisons and jails full. Still, not unlike drug court defendants who take the 
substantial risk of drug court, they have the courage to imagine that things could be different. 
And not just to imagine, but to work hard for these changes.  
 
A very brief summary of the recommendations  
I have argued that drug court practitioners struggle to meet the demands of competing 
ethics – namely, of justice and care. In a trial, there is a responsibility to ascertain guilt, to 
punish, to reinforce ideals of individual responsibility, and to be objective.  Freed from such 
responsibilities to justice, drug courts could be responsible to deliver care and mercy.  
In Chapter 1, I argue that “compliance” ought not be a test of the commitment or the 
ability of the subject of care in the way that a trial is a test. The concept of an objective standard 
against which to judge whether a defendant is recovering and acting responsibly (the two being 
so closely entwined as to be taken as virtually the same thing) is so ideologically enmeshed in 
individualist ideals of “reasonable man” that it ignores the intersectional imbalances of power 
and privilege tied to multiple axes of social difference: race, class, gender, sexuality, 
ablebodiedness, etc. Responsibility for falling out of compliance cannot fall squarely on the 
shoulders of the subjects of care. As care workers, court practitioners share in the responsibility 
to develop responsive courses of treatment, which requires a consideration of the meanings and 
values defendants place on their recovery and treatment. This also means that the doubt with 
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which they regard defendants’ every utterance is harmful to a practice of good and responsive 
care. As I have repeated throughout this dissertation, instead of seeking to filter the good, 
recovering, and responsible addicts from the bad, drug court practitioners should work creatively 
and comprehensively to maximize success of all defendants. They can do this by embracing a 
broader definition of health and recovery and recognizing the ways in which defendants 
negotiate and attempt to balance competing responsibilities in their lives with the mandates of 
the court. 
Chapter 2 argues that teamwork and communication can benefit practices of care, but not 
if they entail teaming up against subjects of care, and not when communication amounts to 
panoptical surveillance that results in punishment. I recommend that court practitioners 
reevaluate their reporting channels with treatment providers, recognizing how profoundly the 
duty to report changes the relationships and responsibilities counselors have with their clients. 
Further, given the ways that counselor reports move from a non-legal to a legal setting, counselor 
reports should not be relied upon as legal testimony that can lead to someone’s jailing and/or 
failure from drug court with a prison sentence and a felony charge.  
Chapter 3 makes a case for the limits of “evidence-based” research and practice, 
suggesting that current measures of effectiveness and the limited field of evidence-based 
practices are insufficient to help guide court practitioners’ practice of ethical care. Throughout 
this dissertation, I argue that when it comes to designing better and more responsive care models, 
the intersubjective evidence produced by ethnography is crucial.   
Chapter 4 argues that confession is ill-suited to a care environment, especially when 
punishment is always on the horizon. Drug court practitioners need not seek out the evidence that 
serve the goals of justice, but rather should seek out the evidence necessary for care. Urine drug 
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tests are less likely to aid in a process of recovery if their results can be used to punish or to 
override the treatment needs and preferences expressed by defendants. Furthermore, the total and 
complete sobriety approach that drug courts take to recovery is likely to produce more failures 
than would recovery goals tailored to each defendant’s personal history of drug and alcohol use.  
In Chapter 5, I argue that the drug court must acknowledge the multiple rhythms of life it 
sets into play instead of blaming defendants for falling out of sync. The individual recovery 
model that sets defendants, especially those who have historically had minimal access to health 
and mental health care and those who have been marginalized from housing, employment, and 
normative family, chasing after resources that are not available is a setup for failure. A definition 
of recovery must consider the structures of inequality that are so often obscured by an ideology 
of personal responsibility.   
 
The last word 
At the meeting of peer workers from needle exchange programs around the city in 2015, 
attendees made it clear that after decades of life with drugs, stints in prison and jail, periods of 
homelessness, trials with multiple drug treatment modalities, and now working to help other 
users access care, they know a great deal about what constitutes good care and respect for a 
multitude of ways of living and lifeworlds. They emphasized the need for the broader 
implementation of “harm reduction of color” practice. Such a practice would stem from a critical 
analysis of the histories of dispossession and abiding practices of marginalization. The justice of 
care, as opposed to criminal justice, attempts something like equity rather than equality. In 
contrast to the procedural justice ideals of drug courts that suggest two minutes of 
communication is “fair,” they suggest that only policies that grow out of the sustained analysis 
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and deep organic knowledge of people who have lived experience of being a defendant in drug 
court can be considered to be based on ethical evidence. Drug courts are surely different from 
other courts in many ways, as they claim and strive to be, but they are not nearly different 
enough. “If these issues are not addressed,” Tyrone warned, “Then you’re gonna have the same 
thing over and over and over again until they tell you, ‘You know what, well, we done tried to 
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